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The Right of Publicity vs. the First
Amendment: A Property and Liability
Rule Analysist
ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL"
INTRODUCTION
The right of publicity is a legal theory which enables individuals to protect
themselves from unauthorized, commercial appropriations of their personas.
It first received explicit recognition in Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps
Chewing Gum, Inc.,' which was decided in 1953. Today, the right of
publicity is approaching middle age. In many respects, the right of publicity
has fared well in terms of acceptance.2 Still, both the judiciary and the
scholarly commentary in this area have been unable to resolve the operation
of this doctrine in cases presenting appropriations that may potentially be
justified by the First Amendment.
The constitutional command embodied in the First Amendment safeguards
freedom of expression in our society. Traditional First Amendment jurispru-
dence dictates that political, informational, and entertainment works receive
substantial protection, and seeks to maximize public access to these works. On
the other hand, right of publicity jurisprudence recognizes the property right
that stems from the value of an individual's persona. What then should be the
result when a user appropriates an individual's persona in a medium that is
traditionally protected by the First Amendment?
Currently, courts lack a principled and consistent method of resolving the
conflict between the right of publicity and the First Amendment. Part of the
difficulty courts have experienced in this area stems from the vast array of
potential types of appropriations. Illustrations of the inherent tension between
the right of publicity and the First Amendment abound. Consider the
following examples from case law of uses which occurred without permission.
A company included three photographs of Babe Ruth in its baseball calendar,
t © Copyright 1994 by Roberta Rosenthal Kwall.
* Professor of Law, DePaul University College of Law. A.B. 1977, Brown University; J.D. 1980,
The University of Pennsylvania. I wish to thank Professors Erwin Chemerinsky, Rochelle Cooper
Dreyfuss, Wendy J. Gordon, Sheldon W. Halpern, Harold J. Krent, Jeffrey L. Kwall, William P.
Marshall, Edward L. Rubin, Jeffrey M. Shaman, Stephen A. Siegel, and Diane Leenheer Zimmerman
for their insightful comments and suggestions on prior drafts of this Article. All errors, of course, are
my own. Thanks also are due to Dean John Roberts and DePaul University College of Law, whose
summer research grant assisted in the preparation of this Article. Finally, I am grateful to Melissa
Campbell, my research assistant, for her tireless efforts on my behalf.
1. 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953).
2. See infra notes 26-33 and accompanying text.
3. In this Article, the term "persona" is used as an umbrella term and encompasses any attribute
protected under the right of publicity. For a discussion of the extent to which various attributes are
protected, see infra notes 27, 30 and accompanying text.
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one of which appeared on the cover.4 Another company marketed a commer-
cial poster with a photograph of a mock presidential candidate stating "FOR
PRESIDENT" at the bottom.' A group produced a play using true incidents
from the plaintiff's life but without identifying him by name.' Another play
featured performers simulating the Marx Brothers' unique style, appearance,
and mannerisms. 7 A foundation sought to erect a bronze statue of Elvis
Presley in Memphis and to distribute pewter replicas of the proposed statue
to individuals who donated twenty-five dollars or more to help finance the
project.' A baseball table game manufacturer used baseball players' names
and playing statistics in a board game.9 Indeed, the number of possible
scenarios presenting a conflict between the right of publicity and the First
Amendment makes the development of an analytical framework within which
to treat this conflict an enormous challenge.
This Article has three overall objectives. First, it exposes the massive
confusion surrounding the conflict between the right of publicity and the First
Amendment. Second, it makes a case for resolving this conflict by applying
a property and liability rule framework such as that found in other areas of
the law. Third, it develops a specific mode of analysis within which this
framework can be applied and thus supplies the organization that has so far
eluded this difficult area.
The overall inquiry of this Article is geared toward resolving those
situations in which, but for the First Amendment, there would be a right-of-
publicity violation. In such instances, courts must confront the impact of the
First Amendment upon what would otherwise be an actionable invasion of
property rights. One premise of this Article is that integral to the resolution
of this conflict is the application of a combination of property and liability
rule principles. Thus, the approach taken here necessitates a choice between
three possible resolutions in any given situation: property rule protection
(under which the appropriate remedy is an injunction and concomitant
damages), liability rule protection (which disallows an injunction but requires
the defendant to pay damages), and no protection for a right-of-publicity
plaintiff." A second premise of this Article is that, in any given case, the
4. Pirone v. MacMillan, Inc., 894 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1990); see infra notes 313-20 and
accompanying text.
5. Paulsen v. Personality Posters, Inc., 299 N.Y.S.2d 501 (N.Y. Sup. Ct 1968) (holding that the
right of publicity is not applicable to the use of one's name or likeness in connection with a matter of
public interest).
6. Hampton v. Guare, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d 1713 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992); see infra notes 321-27 and
accompanying text.
7. Groucho Marx Prods., Inc. v. Day and Night Co., 523 F. Supp. 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'd on
other grounds, 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982); see infia notes 262-64 and accompanying text.
8. Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir.) (approving the Foundation's
use on the ground that the right of publicity is not descendible), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980).
9. Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277 (D. Minn. 1970); see infia notes 186-91 and
accompanying text.
10. This Article frequently uses the term "publicity plaintiff," although it should be recognized at
the outset that where the owner of the persona is dead, the plaintiffs will be the relatives and/or
assignees of the deceased. See infra part I.B.3.
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determination of appropriate relief should be made by balancing the relevant
harms triggered by allowing unauthorized uses of publicity rights against the
benefits that society derives from such uses."
Part I of this Article addresses the preliminary issue of why it is necessary
to develop an independent framework that is uniquely suited to resolving the
conflict between the right of publicity and the First Amendment. Part II
delineates the proposal for a truce between the right of publicity and the First
Amendment. Part II.A examines the First Amendment interests at stake and
evaluates the benefits to society that flow from a recognition of these
entitlements. Part II.B discusses the potential harms that can result from
forcing individuals to tolerate unauthorized uses of their personas. Part II.C
develops a balancing approach under which the benefits that derive from
allowing the forced use of an individual's persona are measured against the
relevant harms.
The proposal set forth in this Article differs from the existing jurisprudence
and commentary in three significant respects. First, it incorporates the
possibility of liability rule protection for a right-of-publicity plaintiff. No
court has yet applied a liability rule approach in a case involving a conflict
between the right of publicity and the First Amendment, notwithstanding the
prevalence of this approach in other areas of the law.' 2
Second, the proposal provides a detailed examination of the types of harms
that occur when unauthorized uses are tolerated, and explicitly incorporates
these harms into the analysis. In these situations, the relevant harms include
economic and moral injuries to the plaintiff stemming from the defendant's
use, the potential for consumer deception, the potential for decreased
incentives, injuries to the relatives of the individual whose persona has been
appropriated, and the potential for unjust enrichment. A matrix which
capsulizes the relationship of these harms to the remedial choice ("Matrix
#1") can be found in Appendix A. The Property Rule Protection column of
Matrix #1 details the circumstances relating to these harms which suggest the
propriety of a property rule approach. The Liability Rule Protection column
indicates the relevant factors to be considered in granting mandatory damages
to a right-of-publicity plaintiff. The No Protection column details those
circumstances relevant to denying a plaintiff any relief whatsoever. Neither
the courts nor the commentators have isolated these significant harms and
In First Amendment parlance, "no protection" means, of course, that the activity in question does not
receive First Amendment protection and thus may be prohibited more readily. In contrast, "no
protection" in the context used in this Article will result in sustaining the user's activity.
11. In this Article, the terms "harms" and "benefits" are used in their conventional respective
meanings of positive and negative consequences, notwithstanding a recognition that the meaning of these
concepts can be influenced by a preliminary baseline choice regarding a level of welfare impairment or
improvement. See Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the
Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149, 161 n.40 (1992) [hereinafter Gordon, On Owning
Information]; Wendy J. Gordon, Of Harms and Benefits: Torts, Restitution, and Intellectual Property,
21 J. LEGAL STUD. 449 (1992).
12. See infra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
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tested their application to the conflict between the right of publicity and the
First Amendment.
In evaluating the nature of the harm to the plaintiff, this Article asserts that
economic harms are typically far less onerous than nonmonetizable harms
which derive from uses the plaintiff would never have condoned. These
nonmonetizable, or morally based, harms can include reputational damage,
distasteful associations, or uses which advance a substantive argument the
plaintiff finds objectionable.13 In addition, the potential for consumer
deception is particularly strong where the use is one to which the plaintiff
would never have consented.'
4
The potential for decreased incentives must include a consideration of the
extent to which a "no protection" or liability rule resolution will impact
negatively on the plaintiff's desire to create.' Such a negative impact is
unlikely to occur with de minimis uses by the defendant. In addition, the
extent to which society in general and users in particular will be harmed by
decreased incentives on the part of users under a liability rule approach must
be considered. This diminished incentives inquiry involves two questions.
First, is the end product in which the persona is used likely to reap an
economic benefit for the user that will exceed the cost of using the persona?
Second, will the value of the user's work be derived largely from the
persona? 6 With respect to harms to relatives (and assignees) of deceased
personas, this Article aigues that the degree of harm diminishes as the number
of years since the persona's death increases. This Article adopts a framework
for dealing with this issue which endorses a minimum fixed period of time
following the persona's death to protect these interests.'7 Finally, it contends
that the potential for unjust enrichment, which is related to the significance
of the user's contribution, also must be evaluated in connection with any
use.
18
This Article asserts that in determining the appropriate relief, the relevant
harms must be measured against society's entitlements deriving from
particular types of uses. A second matrix ("Matrix #2") illustrates the
operation of the relevant balancing process in determining the relationship
between society's entitlements and the remedial choice. This matrix can be
found in Appendix B. The invocation of a balancing approach represents the
third break with existing doctrine in this area. Typically, courts and
commentators have urged a basic categorization approach under which the
exclusive focus is the medium of the defendant's use. The result of such an
application has been the approval of informational and entertainment usages,
and the invalidation of commercial usages. 9 The application of such a
13. See infra notes 111-19 and accompanying text.
14. See infra part II.B.2.a.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 151-52.
16. See infra notes 153-54 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 173-75 and accompanying text.
18. See infra part ILB.4.
19. See infra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
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framework, however, has resulted in legal applications of questionable
soundness. For example, one court invalidated the use of baseball players'
names and statistics in a board game while suggesting that an opposite result
would be appropriate if the same subject matter had been used in a book.20
This Article does not suggest that all informational and entertainment uses
should be approved automatically, and that all commercial uses should be
enjoined automatically. Under the proposed analysis, informational uses
typically should not be enjoined or subject to a liability rule approach due to
society's strong entitlement to information. Moreover, this Article argues that
a publicity plaintiff lacks a true property right in pure information about
herself, regardless of the particular medium in which the information is
used.2' This analysis suggests that the use of athletes' playing statistics
should be completely approved when they appear in either books or board
games.
A different analysis is required, however, for visual depictions which
convey information. This Article asserts that publicity plaintiffs have a true
property right in their likenesses which subjects uncondoned uses to any of
the three potential resolutions, depending on the outcome of the balancing
analysis developed herein. Thus, in the context of visual depictions, this
Article argues that the balancing analysis must weigh all of the relevant harms
created by the particular use against society's general informational interest
and the cultural value of the specific visual depiction at issue.22 It should be
noted, however, that property rule protection for visual depictions conveying
information should be invoked only in very exceptional circumstances due to
the strong societal entitlements in the area of informational uses generally.
With respect to uses of an entertainment nature, the balancing analysis
developed herein may result in no protection, liability rule protection, or in
exceptional circumstances, property rule protection. Again, society's
entitlements in the realm of entertainment uses are strong and they must be
carefully weighed against the magnitude of the relevant harms in a particular
case. Thus, the producers of a successful show which consists exclusively of
the simulation of a living performer, may be required to pay mandatory
damages under a liability rule approach if the use depicts the performer in a
particularly unflattering light and a large degree of consumer deception exists
regarding the persona's sponsorship of, or connection to, the show. In
addition, there is a high potential for unjust enrichment in such situations, as
the show's appeal is primarily derived from the performer's appeal. Moreover,
the user will most likely prefer to pay for the right to use the persona rather
than forgo the production of an economically successful show. 23 In contrast,
where the particular entertainment use is a pure fictionalization, this Article
20. Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277 (D. Minn. 1970); see also infra notes 186-91 and
accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 198-205 and accompanying text.
22. See infra part II.C.2.
23. See infra notes 246-71 and accompanying text.
1994]
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contends that the relevant harms are typically so minimal that no protection
is warranted.24
Finally, primarily commercial uses of an individual's persona are usually
subject to injunctive relief because they do not involve as strong a set of
societal entitlements as do less obvious commercial uses. In addition,
primarily commercial uses generally involve a high potential for consumer
deception and unjust enrichment. In contrast, this Article argues that hybrid
commercial uses that have informational or entertainment elements, or that are
combined with strong expressive needs or substantial creative contributions
on the part of the user, can be resolved by any of the three approaches,
depending on the outcome of the proposed balancing analysis."
In short, the proposal developed in this Article calls for the invocation of
a more flexible remedial approach in cases involving the appropriate degree
of public access to publicity rights. It also supplies the framework within
which the judiciary can exercise this much needed flexibility. Before
delineating this proposal for change, however, it may be helpful to briefly
explore and critique the more established approaches to resolving the conflict
between the right of publicity and the First Amendment.
I. OVERVIEW
Today, the right of publicity is a well-recognized and frequently invoked
legal doctrine. About half of the states have recognized the right of publicity,
and in at least fifteen of these states, legislation exists that governs this area
either partially or completely. 26 Some disagreement still exists with respect
to questions such as what attributes are protected by the right,27 whether the
24. See infra notes 276-79 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 301-12 and accompanying text.
26. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 990, 3344 (West Supp. 1994); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 540.08 (West
1988); IND. CODE § 32-13 (1994); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.170 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1984);
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 214, § 3A (Law Co-op. 1986); NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-202 (1991); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 597.770-.810 (Michie 1994); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 839.1-.2 (West 1993),
tit. 12, §§ 1448-1449 (West 1993); I1. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-28 (1985); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-25-1101
to -1108 (1988 & Supp. 1993); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 26.001-.015 (West Supp. 1994); UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 45-3-1 to -6 (1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-40 (Michie 1992); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.50
(West 1983 & Supp. 1993).
In addition, the New York privacy statute addresses some aspects of the right of publicity. N.Y. Civ.
RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1992 & Supp. 1994). Courts in that state have held that this statute
precludes the existence of a common law right-of-publicity protection. See, e.g., Pirone v. MacMillan,
Inc., 894 F.2d 579, 585 (2d Cir. 1990); Stephano v. News Group Publications, Inc., 474 N.E.2d 580,
584 (N.Y. 1984). Currently, there is a movement underway to codify the right of publicity in New York
through the proposed Celebrity Rights Act. See Barbara A. Burnett, The Property Right of Publicity and
the First Amendment: Popular Culture and the Commercial Persona, 3 HOFSTRA PROP. UJ. 171, 186-88
(1990).
As of 1993, the American Law Institute explicitly recognized the right of publicity in the
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1993).
27. Compare White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that
Vanna White's right-of-publicity claim against a consumer electronics company which used, in its
television commercials, a robot that was dressed and acted like her could not be dismissed on summary
judgment), amended, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 19253 (9th Cir. Aug. 19, 1992), reh 'g en banc denied, 989
F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2443 (1993) and Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d
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right is preempted by § 301(a) of the copyright statute,28 and whether the
right is descendible.2 9 Although a uniform resolution of these issues certainly
would be desirable, the absence of complete uniformity on these points does
not threaten the very fabric of the doctrine. Part of the reason why the
existence of the right of publicity is not especially threatened by these
unresolved issues is that, with respect to questions involving the scope of the
right and preemption, courts have a relatively uniform way of analyzing these
questions, even if the outcomes of particular cases are somewhat inconsistent.
For example, the degree to which the particular attribute in question is
distinctive or recognizable is always the focus in cases involving the right's
extension to less traditional attributes.30  The analytical framework of
copyright preemption cases also is fairly consistent.3 Although the issue of
descendibility once was particularly controversial, 32 the majority of jurisdic-
tions that recognize the right of publicity now agree that the right should be
descendible, although no uniformity exists with respect to the duration of the
right following an individual's death.33
460 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that the use of a sound-alike of a famous and distinctive voice violated
plaintiff's right of publicity), cert. denied, 112 S. CL 1513 (1992) and Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable
Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983) (finding that use of the phrase "Here's Johnny," which is
associated with the celebrity Johnny Carson, is protected by the right of publicity even though the phrase
is not a name or likeness) with Tin Pan Apple, Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 737 F. Supp. 826 (S.D.N.Y.
1990) (holding that the New York privacy statute does not extend to use of sound-alikes) and Rogers
v. Grimaldi, 695 F. Supp. 112 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding that right-of-publicity claim arising from use
of actress' first name in film title was precluded by First Amendment protection of artistic speech), aff'd,
875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989).
28. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1988). Compare Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992)
(holding that an action based on right of publicity in voice was not preempted by copyright statute),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1047 (1993) and Midler, 849 F.2d 460 (finding that since a voice is not
copyrightable, the right of publicity in a voice is not preempted by copyright law), and Apigram
Publishing Co. v. Factors Etc., Inc., No. C 78-525, 1980 WL 2047 (N.D. Ohio July 30, 1980) (observing
that the legislative history shows § 301 of the copyright statute was not meant to preempt the common
law right of publicity) with Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 805 F.2d
663 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that baseball players' right of publicity was preempted by § 301(a) since
on-field performances are embodied in copyrighted telecasts), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 941 (1987). See
generally David E. Shipley, Publicity Never Dies; It Just Fades Away: The Right of Publicity and
Federal Preemption, 66 CoRELL L REV. 673 (1981) (detailing the development of the law on
copyright preemption of the right of publicity).
29. See infra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
30. See, eg., Midler, 849 F.2d 460 (observing the distinctive familiarity of Bette Midler's voice in
allowing right-of-publicity cause of action against a sound-alike); Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974) (unique and distinctive decorations on race car protected by
right of publicity).
31. See Shipley, supra note 28, at 702 (arguing that § 301(a) of copyright statute provides that state
law is preempted if it creates rights equivalent to the copyright statute and the work comes within the
subject matter of copyright). For cases using this framework, see Midler, 849 F.2d 460 (holding that
since one's voice is not "fixed," it is not within the subject matter of copyright and is not preempted);
and Baltimore Orioles, 805 F.2d 663 (finding that state law was preempted because performances were
within the subject matter of copyright and equivalency was shown since no additional elements were
required by state law). 0
32. See Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Is Independence Day Dawning for the Right of Publicity?, 17
U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 191, 207-28 (1983) (detailing various approaches courts have adopted to determine
whether the right of publicity is descendible).
33. Many of the statutes listed in note 26 also recognize that the right against commercial
exploitation of an individual's name or likeness is descendible. In California, Nevada, and Texas
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Although some commentators have questioned the very existence of the
right of publicity as a matter of social and economic policy, this Article
proceeds from the assumption that the right of publicity deserves the
widespread recognition it has received. The case law involving the right of
publicity demonstrates a concern for the following social interests: fostering
creativity,34 safeguarding the individual's enjoyment of the fruits of her
labors,35 preventing consumer deception, 36 and preventing unjust enrich-
ment.37 This Author holds the view that the right of publicity successfully
statutory protection is granted for 50 years following a person's death. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 990(g);
NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 597.790; TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 26.012. Kentucky also provides for 50
years of protection following death, but only for public figures. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.170(2).
Florida allows protection for 40 years after a person's death. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 540.08(4). The Virginia
statute allows for 20 years of protection following death. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-40(B). The Tennessee
statute provides protection for 10 years after death. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-1104(a). Oklahoma's
statute apparently grants protection for 100 years following a person's death, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§ 1448(G), as does the Indiana statute, which is the most recently enacted state statute. IND. CODE § 32-
13-1-8.
The right of publicity has been held to be descendible as a matter of common law in some
jurisdictions. See, e.g., Martin Luther King, Jr., Center for Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage
Prods., Inc., 694 F.2d 674, 682 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding that under Georgia common law, the right of
publicity survives the death of the owner and is devisable and inheritable); Nature's Way Prods., Inc.
v. Nature-Pharma, Inc., 736 F. Supp. 245, 252 (D. Utah 1990) (following the "modem trend," the
common law right of publicity survives death in Utah if its holder exploited her right of publicity while
living); Sinkler v. Goldsmith, 623 F. Supp. 727, 733 (D. Ariz. 1985) (finding that under Arizona law,
the right of publicity survives death if the holder of the right exploited it during his lifetime); State ex
rel. Elvis Presley Int'l Memorial Found. v. Crowell, 733 S.W.2d 89,99 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987) (holding
that a celebrity's right of publicity is descendible under Tennessee common law).
Some jurisdictions make the unauthorized appropriation of protected attributes actionable under a
statutory right of privacy. Nebraska, New York, Virginia, and Wisconsin take this approach. See NEB.
REv. STAT. § 20-202; N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51; VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-40; WiS. STAT. ANN.
§ 895.50. The Virginia privacy statute specifically provides relief to the relatives of a decedent whose
name or likeness is appropriated for commercial purposes. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-40. The Nebraska
privacy statute also allows an action for the unauthorized exploitation of a person's name or likeness
to survive that person's death. NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 20-202 to -208. In contrast, the New York courts
have limited the reach of the state privacy statute to living individuals. See, e.g., Pirone v. MacMillan,
Inc., 894 F.2d 579, 585 (2d Cir. 1990) (finding that daughters and licensees of Babe Ruth were
precluded from bringing an action under the statute based on the defendant's use of photographs of Ruth
in a baseball calendar); James v. Delilah Films, Inc., 544 N.Y.S.2d 447, 451 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989)
(holding that successors-in-interest of deceased performers could not recover for unauthorized film
showings since the rights created by the statute terminated when the performers died); Antonetty v.
Cuomo, 502 N.Y.S.2d 902, 906 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986) (holding that the father and son of a deceased
woman could not use the statute to prevent a park from being named after the deceased woman because
the statutory rights terminated at her death). Similarly, the Wisconsin privacy statute specifically limits
the ability to recover for the unauthorized commercial use of protected attributes to "living" people. Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 895.50(2)(b). In Ohio, the right of publicity is not descendible as a matter of common
law. See Reeves v. United Artists Corp., 765 F.2d 79, 80 (6th Cir. 1985).
Given the varying lengths of protection for descendible publicity rights, problems are created for
lawyers whose clients want national protection for the publicity rights of deceased personas. As will be
discussed later, the descendibility issue also impacts upon the conflict between the First Amendment and
the right of publicity. See infra part II.B.3.
34. See infra notes 55-56, 151-52 and accompanying text.
35. This interest is related to that fostering creativity. See infra no'es 55-56, 151-52 and accom-
panying text.
36. See infra part II.B.2.a.
37. See infra notes 67-69, part II.B.4. This Author has argued elsewhere that once an individual
dies, the unjust enrichment rationale warrants continued protection for the right of publicity so as to
avoid an enterprise obtaining a windfall by exploiting the decedent's persona at the expense of the
[Vol. 70:47
RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
vindicates these important social interests. Critics of the right of publicity
argue that the labor and unjust enrichment justifications for publicity rights
overlook the roles of the media, the audience, and our cultural fabric in
creating celebrity personas. These critics claim that the right of publicity
overstates the contribution of the individual whose rights are being protected
and ignores the efforts and contributions of many others whose combined
efforts molded that individual into a persona with marketable appeal.38 The
people responsible for this molding process can include those who are
currently working with a celebrity to develop her persona,39 as well as earlier
celebrities and cultural reference points that have influenced the publicity
plaintiffs artistry.4" From an economic standpoint, it also has been argued
that the increased creativity which society enjoys as a result of the right of
publicity is too speculative to justify protection for the right, and that
recognition of publicity rights decreases economic efficiency.41 The consumer
protection rationale for the right of publicity has been attacked on the ground
that it is overinclusive because the right applies even absent a danger that
consumers will be misled into believing that there is an association of, or
endorsement by, the publicity plaintiff of a particular product. 42
As stated earlier, it is not the purpose of this Article to make a case for the
right of publicity.43 This Article embraces its existence, and seeks to resolve
the most troublesome issue in its application. This Author believes that the
right of publicity has the potential for safeguarding from unauthorized use any
marketable and publicly recognizable attribute of any individual, regardless
deceased's heirs, legatees, and assignees. See Kwall, supra note 32, at 229. The consumer protection
justification for the right of publicity is also applicable to the descendibility issue since the use of a
deceased individual's persona to market products can, in certain contexts, give the impression that, while
alive, the deceased endorsed the product See infra notes 160-62 and accompanying text. Another
justification for a descendible right of publicity emphasizes society's interest in encouraging creativity,
which arguably can be accomplished when celebrities strive to maximize the assets they can bequeath
after death. Since many individuals are motivated to achieve fame for reasons entirely divorced from
providing for their heirs, this rationale for a descendible right of publicity is clearly the weakest. See
Kwall, supra note 32, at 212.
38. See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1517 (9th Cir.) (Kozinski, J.
dissenting), denying reh'g en bane to 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992), as amended by 1992 U.S. App.
LEXIS 19253 (9th Cir. Aug. 19, 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2443 (1993); Rosemary J. Coombe,
Author/izing the Celebrity: Publicity Rights, Postmodern Politics, and Unauthorized Genders, 10 CARD.
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 365, 368-76 (1992); Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular
Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. L. REv. 127, 179-205 (1993).
39. Examples of individuals in this category include agents, publicists, fashion advisers, lawyers,
body trainers, voice coaches, and the like.
40. See Madow, supra note 38, at 197 (noting several examples of celebrities borrowing from the
existing cultural fabric).
41. Id. at 205-28.
42. See also infra notes 124-26.
43. In the course of delineating the proposal for reconciling the right of publicity and the First
Amendment, this Author does in fact address the countervailing arguments summarized in the text. See
infra part II.B.2.a in general and notes 124-26 and accompanying text in particular (discussing the
consumer deception rationale); part II.B.2.b (addressing decreased incentives for creativity on the part
of the publicity plaintiff); notes 90-94, 286, 302-06 and accompanying text (discussing society's need
for ongoing interpretation of its cultural icons); and notes 291-99 and accompanying text (analyzing the
economic efficiency argument).
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of whether that person is a celebrity.44 Moreover, whatever the means
through which an individual's persona comes to have value, that value should
be attributable to the persona of the publicity plaintiff who has a right to
participate in decisions about how her persona is utilized by others. This is
the overall objective which the right of publicity tries to fulfill. Thus, even if
others help mold a celebrity's image, the celebrity herself is still responsible
for the vast majority of the profit potential of her persona. Those who assist
the plaintiff in creating a marketable persona typically are paid for their time
and efforts. 4' Further, when a celebrity borrows from the cultural fabric in
creating her persona, it is still the unique combination of the past and the
persona's original contributions that give the persona its present appeal.
One prominent approach to the conflict between the First Amendment and
the right of publicity draws upon a Yale Law Journal article published in 1979
that advocates resolving the tension between the right of publicity and the
First Amendment by classifying the uses in which the plaintiff's persona
appears." Specifically, the article recommends as a "starting point" the
recognition of the following three purposes of media portrayals of individuals:
informational, entertainment, and commercial uses.47 The piece elaborates
upon the different treatment accorded these types of uses, with commercial
uses clearly receiving a lower level of First Amendment protection than the
other two.48 Although this approach represents a useful starting point, a more
developed methodology is needed. To begin, the categorization process itself
can be difficult in that many uses defy separability into these three discrete
categories. 49 For example, is a docudrama informational or entertainment?
Is a baseball version of the game Trivial Pursuit an informative, entertain-
ment, or commercial use? Secondly, an approach which considers the type of
use as its focal point ignores the fact that the nature of the appropriation is
44. Kwall, supra note 32, at 206 ("At a minimum, such a standard would protect from commercial
exploitation the names and likenesses of all individuals because every person is publicly identified by
these two attributes. This standard also would protect additional personal attributes of celebrities and
other public figures when such attributes trigger public recognition.").
45. Indeed, how would we even attempt to assess what portion of a particular celebrity's success
is due to the celebrity's actual efforts and talent, as opposed to the suggestions, talent, and efforts of
others?
46. Peter L. Felcher & Edward L. Rubin, Privacy, Publicity, and the Portrayal of Real People by
the Media, 88 YALE L.J. 1577 (1979).
47. Id. at 1597.
48. Felcher & Rubin also proposed looking to the nature of the "identifiable harm" caused by the
defendant's conduct. Thus, portrayals that are exploitative in nature should be actionable if they also
cause "identifiable harm" of"an economic or a dignitary nature." Id. at 1616, 1622. In contrast, due to
First Amendment concerns, a portrayal that serves an informative or cultural function will be beyond
reach, even if identifiable harm is present. Id. at 1622.
49. This difficulty is even recognized by Felcher & Rubin, who write: "To be sure, these three
purposes will often tend to merge, so that they may be regarded as representing portions of a continuum,
rather than as discrete and mutually exclusive elements." Id. at 1597. See also White v. Samsung Elecs.
Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1520 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) ("In our pop culture, where
salesmanship must be entertaining and entertainment must sell, the line between commercial and
noncommercial has not merely blurred; it has disappeared.'), denying reh g en banc to 971 F.2d 1395
(9th Cir. 1992), as amended by 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 19253 (9th Cir. Aug. 19, 1992), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 2443 (1993).
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the same regardless of the particular use a defendant is making of a plaintiff's
persona. Recall the example mentioned in the Introduction regarding the use
of baseball players' names and playing statistics in a board game as opposed
to a book.5" Most importantly, however, a pure categorization approach
leaves unaddressed the competing interests at stake in cases involving a
conflict between the First Amendment and the right of publicity. Specifically,
an approach which resolves the conflict by simply categorizing the defen-
dant's use fails to consider the application of the relevant harms in its
analysis.
Another popular avenue for purporting to resolve the conflict between the
right of publicity and the First Amendment is the invocation of copyright
law's fair use doctrine. 5' The fair use doctrine is one of the major means
through which copyright law accommodates First Amendment principles in its
analytical framework.52 As codified at § 107 of the 1976 Copyright Act, the
fair use doctrine considers four primary factors---the purpose of the defen-
dant's use, the nature of the plaintiff's work, the degree of the appropriation,
and the effect of the defendant's use upon the marketability of the plaintiff's
work-in mediating the balance between compensated uses of copyrighted
works and uncompensated access to these works.53
50. See supra text accompanying note 20. See also infra notes 186-91 and accompanying text.
51. See infra note 54.
52. The other way in which copyright law accommodates the First Amendment is by protecting
expression rather than ideas. See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,
556(1985) ("[C]opyright's idea-expression dichotomy 'strike[s] a definitional balance between the First
Amendment and the Copyright Act by permitting free communication of facts while still protecting an
author's expression.") (quoting the lower court's decision at 723 F.2d 195, 203 (2d Cir. 1983)); Los
Angeles News Serv. v. Tullo, 973 F.2d 791, 795 (9th Cir. 1992) ("Copyright law incorporates First
Amendment goals by ensuring that copyright protection extends only to the forms in which ideas and
information are expressed and not to the ideas and information themselves.'); Sid & Marty Krofft
Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1170 (9th Cir. 1977) ("The 'marketplace
of ideas' is not limited by copyright because copyright is limited to protection of expression.").
Underlying what has come to be known as the idea-expression dichotomy is the notion that our societal
interest in fostering creativity demands that ideas remain freely available to all. See Eichel v. Marcin,
241 F. 404, 408 (S.D.N.Y. 1913) ("If an author,'by originating a new arrangement and form of
expression of certain ideas or conceptions, could withdraw these ideas or conceptions from the stock
of materials to be used by other authors, each copyright would narrow the field of thought open for
development and exploitation, and science, poetry, narrative, and dramatic fiction and other branches
of literature would be hindered by copyright, instead of being promoted.") (emphasis added).
In contrast, an author's expression of her ideas can be safeguarded by copyright law. Thus, the idea-
expression dichotomy "strike[s] a definitional balance between the First Amendment and the Copyright
Act by permitting free communication of facts while still protecting an author's expression." Harper &
Row Publishers, 471 U.S. at 556. The idea-expression dichotomy has been the subject of extensive
criticism because it is difficult to distinguish an idea from its expression. For a discussion of this
criticism, see Amy B. Cohen, Copyright Law and the Myth of Objectivity: The Idea-Expression
Dichotomy and the Inevitability ofArtistic Value Judgments, 66 IND. L.L 175, 208-10 n.127 (1990). See
also Edward Samuels, The Idea-Expression Dichotomy in Copyright Law, 56 TENN. L. REV. 321, 323
n.3 (1989); Alfred C. Yen, A First Amendment Perspective on the Idea/Expression Dichotomy and
Copyright in a Work's "Total Concept and Feel", 38 EMoRY L.J. 393 (1989).
53. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Specifically, the Act provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a copyrighted
work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means
specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching
(including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement
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INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
This Author believes that the automatic invocation of the copyright fair use
framework in cases presenting a conflict between the First Amendment and
the right of publicity is inappropriate. Copyright law and the right of
publicity, while in some ways analogous, are nonetheless significantly
different in both their theoretical underpinnings and objectives. Thus, the
incorporation of a copyright law doctrine as the springboard for analysis in
the First Amendment/right of publicity dilemma will result in the adoption of
an imprecise analytical framework and potentially inappropriate outcomes.54
Before discussing the salient differences between copyright law and the
right of publicity, a few words about their similarities are in order. The
purpose of both the right of publicity and copyright law is the provision of
economic incentives for people to devote themselves to creative activities that
will be beneficial from a societal standpoint." Furthermore, both doctrines
are concerned with preventing the unauthorized appropriation of valuable
property rights. Both doctrines attempt to accomplish these objectives by
of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair
use the factors to be considered shall include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial
nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work
as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is
made upon consideration of all the above factors.
Id. All of these factors were widely used under the previously existing common law as well, resulting
in a similarity of analysis in pre- and post-Act opinions. See, e.g., Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061
(2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978). Courts typically balance these four factors in
determining whether a particular use of a work constitutes a fair use, although other factors such as
equitable considerations often come into play in a fair use analysis. In fact, the legislative history to
§ 107 emphasizes that these factors are not to be considered definitive or determinative. H.R. REP. No.
553, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5679.
54. 1 must confess that several years ago, I was among those commentators who suggested resorting
to copyright law's fair use doctrine as an appropriate means by which courts could balance the
competing interests of the right of publicity and the First Amendment. See Kwall, supra note 32, at 232.
Although other scholars and at least one court also have embraced the fair use analogy to resolve the
tension between the right of publicity and the First Amendment, my work in this area over the past 10
years has convinced me that the copyright analogy is less than satisfactory. See generally Apple Corps.
Ltd. v. Leber, 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1015 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1986) (holding that the defendants'
conduct in producing a live, on-stage performance featuring individuals who looked and sounded like
the Beatles violated §§ 50 & 51 of the New York Civil Rights Law and that such conduct could not be
excused under a fair use analysis); Richard Ausness, The Right of Publicity: A "Haystack in a
Hurricane", 55 TEMPLE L.Q. 977, 1048 (1982); Randall T.E. Coyne, Toward a Modified Fair Use
Defense in Right of Publicity Cases, 29 WM. & MARY L. REv. 781, 817 (1988); Steven J. Hoffman,
Limitations on the Right of Publicity, 28 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 111, 140 (1980); Pamela Samuelson,
Reviving Zacchini: Analyzing First Amendment Defenses in Right of Publicity and Copyright Cases, 57
TULANE L. REv. 836, 915 (1983). See also infra notes 247-56, 266-71 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Leber.
55. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977) ("Ohio's decision
to protect petitioner's right of publicity here rests on more than a desire to compensate the performer
for the time and effort invested in his act; the protection provides an economic incentive for him to
make the investment required to produce a performance of interest to the public. This same
consideration underlies the patent and copyright law long enforced by this Court.").
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restricting forms of expression which infringe on these respective rights. 6
Notwithstanding these similarities, however, important differences exist
between these doctrines which bear upon this discussion.
Although copyright theory is compatible with recognition of a creator's
personality rights,57 copyright law in this country is inordinately preoccupied
with pecuniary, as opposed to personal, interests." Clearly, the unauthorized
56. See Kwall, supra note 32, at 230-31.
57. Protection for an individual's authorial presence was not the original, primary focus of copyright
law. In the 18th and 19th centuries, copyrightable authorship was defined by the labor invested in a
particular work rather than the embodiment of a creator's heart and soul. Jane C. Ginsburg, Creation
and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection of Works of Information, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1865, 1873-
81 (1990). This view of copyright law is consistent with the labor-desert theory of property espoused
initially by John Locke. According to this theory, an individual's property interest stems from the
combination of that person's labor with a natural resource so as to make that resource more productive
for society. JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 294-96 (Peter Laslett ed., student ed. 1988)
(3d ed., 1698). According to this theory, each person has a right to the product of her own labor with
minimal outside interference. See RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER
OF EMINENT DOMAIN 340-41 (1985); see also Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression:
Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533 (1993)
(discussing how Locke's theory of property can be applied to resolve competing claims between the
original creators of intellectual property and those who wish to make subsequent use of these original
creations); infra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
By the beginning of the 20th century, however, two distinct rationales for copyright protection had
emerged: copyright was viewed as protecting against "both the authorial personality present within a
work and the labor and resources invested in it." Ginsburg, supra, at 1890. The view of copyright
protection as a means of safeguarding a creator's personality or identity is attributable to the work of
the German philosopher Hegel, and was also espoused by Immanuel Kant. See IMMANUEL KANT, Of
the Injustice in Counterfeiting Books, in 1 ESSAYS AND TREATISES ON MORAL, POLITICAL, AND
VARIOUS PHILOSOPHICAL SUBJEcTS 225, 229-30 (1798); see also Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of
Intellectual Property, 77 GEo. L.J. 287, 330 (1988); Linda J. Lacey, Of Bread and Roses and
Copyrights, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1532, 1539, 1541.
In addition to these two views of copyright ownership, Professor Lacey posits a third view which sees
copyright as "an artificial right created by the legislature and the judiciary." Lacey, supra, at 1539. See
also Russ VerSteeg, Federal Moral Rights for Visual Artists: Contract Theory and Analysis, 67 WASH.
L. REv. 827, 829 n.8 (1992) (citing Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) for the
proposition that the Supreme Court has adopted this last theory of copyright protection).
58. Section 201(d) of the 1976 Copyright Act provides that the copyright owner can transfer any
or all of the following exclusive rights safeguarded by the 1976 Act: the rights to reproduce and
distribute the original work, to prepare derivative works, and to perform and display publicly certain
types of copyrighted works. 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 201(d) (1988). As this list of rights suggests, the 1976
Act manifests the United States' tradition of protecting only the pecuniary interests of a copyright
owner. Since the 1976 Act generally does not purport to protect the creator, but rather the copyright
owner, if the original creator of a work assigns all of her rights under the statute to another party,
traditionally the creator no longer retains any rights with respect to her work. But see id. § 203(a)(3)
(1988) (allowing a creator to terminate transfers and licenses during a 5-year period beginning 35 years
after the execution of the grant). Following such an assignment, the copyright proprietor has a purely
monetary interest in safeguarding the work, and thus will not share the creator's personal loss when the
work is used without authorization. In this respect, then, copyright law recognizes the copyright
proprietor's monetary interest, rather than the creator's personal rights.
Perhaps one of the clearest illustrations of this economic preoccupation is the dearth of moral rights
protections currently available in this country. In contrast to the United States, many European and Third
World nations have well-developed moral right doctrines. See generally Roberta Rosenthal Kwall,
Copyright and the Moral Right: Is an American Marriage Possible? 38 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1985). The
moral rights doctrine essentially includes three major components: the right of disclosure, the right of
attribution, and the right of integrity. Underlying the right of disclosure is the idea that the creator, as
the sole judge of when a work is ready for public dissemination, is the only one who can possess any
rights in an uncompleted work. The right of attribution, as its name suggests, safeguards a creator's right
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appropriation of copyrighted property will almost always entail a high degree
of subjective loss on the part of the creator of the copyrighted property.59
Nevertheless, the framework of our copyright law is such that economic
compensation for the copyright proprietor, who may or may not be the creator
of the work, is exalted over compensation for the personal rights of creators
in their works.
A compelling argument can be made that forcing the use of an individual's
persona in a way to which the person would not have consented is even less
justified than forcing the unauthorized use of copyrighted property.6 If
copyrighted property can be said to represent the embodiment of a creator's
heart, mind, and soul, this is even more true for attributes such as an
individual's name and likeness that are protected by the right of publicity.
Thus, a strong argument can be advanced that uses of an individual's persona
strike at the heart of one's personhood even more than appropriations of an
individual's expression.6' In Midler v. Ford Motor Company,62 wherein the
court concluded that the unauthorized appropriation of singer Bette Midler's
voice for commercial purposes constitutes a tort in California, the court
observed that although her voice is not copyrightable, "[w]hat is put forward
to compel recognition for her work and to prevent others from naming anyone else as the creator. The
right of attribution also protects a creator's negative rights of anonymity and pseudonymity. The right
of integrity lies at the heart of the moral rights doctrine, as it prohibits any alterations of a creator's
work that will destroy the spirit and character of the author's work. Id. at 5-16.
In 1990, Congress added § 106A to the copyright statute, which safeguards for creators of "visual
art," as that term is defined in § 101 of the statute, relatively limited rights of attribution and integrity
when modifications to their works are made that will prejudice their honor or reputation. Section 106A
applies only to a very narrow category of visual art, which includes "a painting, drawing, print, or
sculpture, [or 'a still photographic image produced for exhibition purposes only'] existing in a single
copy, [or] in a limited edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively numbered by
the author." The definition of a "work of visual art" is contained in 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. V. 1993).
Section 106A also fails to define or provide any guidance with respect to how a determination of
"prejudice" should be made. Moreover, the right of integrity provided in § 106A is limited to intentional
modifications and fails to include rights in reproductions of the protected work. In addition, the right
of attribution in § 106A, while limited to intentional alterations, does not include the negative rights of
anonymity or pseudonymity. See Edward J. Damich, The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990: Toward a
Federal System of Moral Rights Protection for Visual Art, 39 CATH. U. L. REv. 945, 958-60 (1990).
Section 106A was added to the copyright statute in the wake of our accession in 1988 to the Berne
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, the oldest multilateral treaty governing
copyright protection. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat.
2853. With the exception of this relatively recent, and very narrowly crafted moral rights provision, our
copyright statute reflects very little concern with protection for the personal rights of creators. The 1976
Copyright Act contains only one other provision that explicitly recognizes, in a limited context, an
aspect of the moral rights doctrine. See 17 U.S.C. § 15(a)(2) (1988) (allowing the reproduction of a
previously reproduced musical composition upon payment of a specified royalty as long as the
arrangement does not "change the basic melody or fundamental character of the work").
59. See Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Governmental Use of Copyrighted Property: The Sovereign's
Prerogative, 67 TEx. L. REv. 685, 716 (1989) ("Because such property is the embodiment of the
creator's mind, heart, and soul, its appropriation may engender a greater sense of loss than the
appropriation of forms of tangible property."). This recognition is consistent with the view of copyright
protection that emphasizes "authorial personality." See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
60. See infra notes 109-19 and accompanying text.
61. The concept of "personhood" is explored by Professor Margaret Jane Radin in her seminal
work, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982).
62. 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1513 (1992).
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as protectible here is more personal than any work of authorship."63 Other
courts have also emphasized this distinction between the right of publicity and
copyright law.64
In addition, the right of publicity differs from copyright law in that it is
concerned with a type of societal harm that is essentially unrelated to
copyright's protections. Specifically, the right of publicity carries strong
consumer protection overtones and is recognized, in part, to assure that
consumers receive accurate information about the sponsorship, approval, and
certification of goods and services. 65 This concern recognizes the danger that
if advertisers were free to use anyone's right of publicity without authoriza-
tion, the manufacturers of poor quality or even dangerous products would be
able to manipulate consumers through such unauthorized exploitations.6 In
contrast, copyright law in general, and the fair use doctrine in particular, is
not intended to promote consumer protection and has not developed any type
of analytical framework that takes this policy into consideration.
There is another interesting difference between the theoretical underpinnings
of copyright law and the right of publicity that militates against the automatic
invocation of the fair use doctrine as a mechanism for resolving conflicts
between the right of publicity and the First Amendment. Specifically, the
unjust enrichment rationale so prominent in publicity theory appears to be on
the wane with respect to copyright theory.6 7 This difference in emphasis on
63. Ia at 462. The court also noted that "[a] voice is as distinctive and personal as a face. The
human voice is one of the most palpable ways identity is manifested." Id. at 463.
64. See Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1100 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting that rights protected
by the right of publicity are more personal than those protected by copyright and thus not subject to
copyright preemption), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1047 (1993); Apigram Publishing Co. v. Factors Etc.,
Inc., No. C 78-525, 1980 WL 2047, at *2 (N.D. Ohio July 30, 1980) ("A cause of action based on the
right of publicity involves elements, such as the invasion of personal privacy rights, which are not
present in the law of copyright.").
This distinction between that which is protected by the right of publicity and by copyright law
becomes even more manifest when the copyrighted work at issue is a "low authorship" work featuring
informational components, as opposed to the more creative types of authorship such as books, plays,
pictures, and songs. See Ginsburg, supra note 57; Jane C. Ginsburg, No "Sweat"? Copyright and Other
Protection of Works ofInformation After Feist v. Rural Telephone, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 338 (1992). In
these pieces, Professor Ginsburg explores the appropriate degree of copyright protection for "low
authorship" works.
65. See State e reL Elvis Presley Int'l Memorial Found. v. Crowell, 733 S.W.2d 89, 99 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1987).
66. See Madow, supra note 38, at 228, 237-39 (disputing all rationales underlying the right of
publicity and questioning the soundness of the right's very existence).
67. In Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991), the Supreme Court held
that white pages from a telephone directory did not manifest the requisite degree of originality for
copyright protection. Significant for purposes of this discussion are the great lengths to which the Court
went to discredit the "sweat of the brow" theory of copyright protection that had been developed and
invoked in prior judicial decisions. Id. at 352-56; see, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, A "Wiseguy's'"
Approach to Information Products: Muscling Copyright and Patent into a Unitary Theory ofIntellectual
Property, 1992 SUP. CT. REV. 195; Ginsburg, supra note 64, at 341; Dennis S. Karjala, Copyright and
Misappropriation, 17 UNIV. DAYTON L REV. 885 (1992).
Prior to Feist, courts had been much more inclined to prohibit as copyright infringement activity that
more resembled misappropriation. See Ginsburg, supra note 57, at 1880. Professor Ginsburg has
observed that Feist "appears to enshrine a policy of free-riding in the Constitution." Ginsburg, supra
note 64, at 349.
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unjust enrichment suggests that in copyright law, the extent to which a
defendant is unjustly enriched by a free use of the plaintiff's work is a
consideration secondary to the main goal of promoting creativity for the
benefit of society. In other words, copyright law will sanction an uncompen-
sated and unauthorized use of the copyrighted work where such use is deemed
beneficial to society and unlikely to impair the incentives for creation."8 In
contrast, the need to prevent unjust enrichment is one of the fundamental
rationales underlying the right of publicity. Therefore, the presence of this
factor in any given situation should weigh more heavily in a publicity analysis
than it does under current copyright theory.69
The conclusion suggested by the above discussion is that a model which
focuses on the codified copyright fair use factors is an unsatisfactory method
by which to resolve the conflict between the right of publicity and the First
Amendment. The four codified factors are doctrinally geared to determine the
appropriate degree of uncompensated access to copyrighted works. Copyright
law, while in some ways analogous to the right of publicity, nonetheless
manifests significant differences such as the ones explored above.70
Rather than resorting to the automatic invocation of a ready-made
framework borrowed from copyright law, the difficult issues surrounding the
conflict between the First Amendment and the right of publicity should be
addressed in the context of a specially developed analytical framework that
is tailored to addressing these critical issues.7 1 This Article suggests an
68. See Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the
Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1614 (1982). After Feist, the presence
of unjust enrichment seems to be largely irrelevant to this analysis.
69. Paradoxically, Feist's endorsement of intellectual creativity at some "minimal level" for
copyright protection, Feist, 499 U.S. at 358, is reminiscent of copyright's concern with "authorial
presence." See supra note 57. Thus, the opinion can have the effect of more directly equating copyright
with the right of publicity in light of the more personal attributes protected by the right of publicity-
attributes which lend themselves to the establishment of "authorial presence." Still, the opinion's de-
emphasis of unjust enrichment is inconsistent with right-of-publicity theory, which is very much
concerned with the ability of an individual to enjoy "'the fruits of his own industry free from unjustified
interference,"' and with "preventing unjust enrichment by those appropriating another's identity without
consent for commercial advantage." See Kwall, supra note 32, at 198 (quoting Uhlaender v. Henricksen,
316 F. Supp. 1277, 1282 (D. Minn. 1970)); see also Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, 698 F.2d
831, 838 (6th Cir. 1983) (noting that prevention of unjust enrichment is one purpose of right-of-publicity
law); Factors Etc., Inc. v. ProArts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215, 221 (2d Cir. 1978) (noting role of unjust
enrichment prevention in right-of-publicity theory), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979); State ex. rel. Elvis
Presley, 733 S.W.2d at 98 (recognizing unjust enrichment as a basic premise of right-of-publicity
protection); infra part II.B.4.
70. See H. Lee Hetherington, Direct Commercial Exploitation of Identity: A New Age for the Right
of Publicity, 17 COLuM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 1, 29 (1992) (providing examples of how the various fair
use factors can be inapplicable in a right of publicity/First Amendment analysis).
71. A few other alternatives have been offered in addition to copyright's fair use analysis to resolve
the tension between the First Amendment and the right of. publicity. Some courts have avoided the
conflict entirely by narrowly construing the scope of the statutory or common law at issue. See J.
THOMAS McCARTHY, THE RIGHTs OF PUBLICITY AND PRiVACY, § 8.6[B], at 8-34 (8th ed. 1992);
Burnett, supra note 26, at 204; see e.g., Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 867 F.2d 1188, 1197 (9th
Cir. 1989) (construing the New York privacy statute narrowly to encompass only commercial uses of
an individual's name or likeness), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 812 (1989); Valentine v. C.B.S., Inc., 698 F.2d
430, 433 (1 1th Cir. 1983) (holding that the use of plaintiff's name in a musical work did not violate the
Florida statute and construing the statute by stating "an interpretation that the statute absolutely bars the
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inquiry that is much broader than that invoked in fair use. Specifically, the
focus should be on the consequences to both society as a whole and to
publicity plaintiffs in particular of allowing both uncompensated and
compensated forced uses of an individual's persona. In determining both the
need for and type of relief, the benefits of allowing unauthorized uses of an
individual's persona must be balanced against the harms created by forcing
such unauthorized uses.72 With the exception of the application of the fourth
fair use factor-the extent to which the defendant's work has affected the
market value of the plaintiffs work-the fair use doctrine fails to explicitly
incorporate a consideration of the relevant harms engendered by the doctrine's
application. Additionally, the fair use doctrine differs from this analysis in
that it fails to provide explicit liability rule protection for a plaintiff in
appropriate instances.73
II. A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK
The approach advocated in this Article examines the nature of the
competing interests at stake and invokes an analytical framework that lends
itself to resolving these interests in the most equitable manner. Integral to the
resolution of the conflict between the right of publicity and the First
use of an individual's name without consent for any purpose would raise grave questions as to
constitutionality.'). Obviously, this approach simply begs the question.
Alternatively, First Amendment principles can be directly incorporated into a state law conception
of the right of publicity. Bumett, supra note 26, at 204. State statutes which circumscribe the right of
publicity when it conflicts with the First Amendment include the following: CAL. CIv. CODE § 3344(d)-
(f) (providing exceptions to consent requirement for use of personality in connection with news, public
affairs, sports broadcasts, or political campaigns); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 540.08(3)(a) (excepting from right-
of-publicity liability those uses for news reports having legitimate public interest and not used for
advertising purposes); IND. CODE § 32-13-1-1 (exempting uses in literary, theatrical, and musical works,
film, radio, television programs, fine art, material with political or newsworthy value, advertisements
for all such uses, and reports on topics of general or public interest); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 20-202(1)
(allowing a use as part of a bonafide news report having cunent or historical public interest and not used
for commercial advertising purposes); NEv. REv. STAT. § 597.790(2)(a)-(e) (providing that there is no
violation of the right of publicity where name or likeness is used in connection with news or art, is an
impersonation in a live performance, or is without relation to commercial sponsorship); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 47-25-1107 (exempting uses in connection with news); TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 26.012
(requiring no consent for use in connection with news); and Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.50(3) (providing
defense for the maintenance of freedom of communication). The statutes in California, Nevada, and
Tennessee provide that it should be a question of fact whether a defendant's use of a plaintiff's protected
attribute was sufficiently directly connected with commercial sponsorship so as to constitute a prohibited
use. Nevertheless, in general the statutory formulations tend to be insufficiently flexible to solve the
problem. See generally McCARTHY, supra, § 8.6[E, at 8-38 (In speaking of conflicts with the First
Amendment where there is "media use of human identity," the author states that "[there is no neatly
packaged general rule that can be waved like a magic wand to make the solution any easier. The balance
must be laboriously hacked out case by case.').
72. For an example of this type of comparative approach in the context of the policies underlying
the First Amendment and the Lanham Act, see Morgan Creek Prods. Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC Inc.,
22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1881 (C.D. Cal. 1991). In Morgan Creek which involved a television program
title that allegedly infringed a motion picture title, the court emphasized that it must determine how "the
conflict between consumer protection and freedom of expression balance[s] out in this particular
scenario." Id. at 1884.
73. Some copyright decisions have, however, endorsed a liability rule analysis. See infra note 75
and accompanying text.
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Amendment is the recognition that certain situations will be most effectively
resolved by a liability rule approach in which a successful right-of-publicity
plaintiff is awarded damages rather than injunctive relief. This approach is
consistent with constitutional doctrine which holds that prior restraints of
speech are particularly offensive to First Amendment values. It is, therefore,
almost always preferable to penalize speech after publication rather than by
prior restraint. 4 Support for this type of remedial approach has grown in
recent years in copyright law as courts and commentators have emphasized
the need for considering the public interest when determining whether
injunctive relief is appropriate in a successful copyright infringement action.
Last term, the Supreme Court explicitly acknowledged "that the goals of
copyright law . . . are not always best served by automatically granting
injunctive relief when parodists are found to have gone beyond the bounds of
fair use."" The discretionary nature of injunctive relief is also well estab-
lished in other areas of the law such as nuisance76 and torts. 77
74. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam) ("'Any
system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its
constitutional validity.") (quoting Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963)); Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 719 (1931) (noting the "general principle that the constitutional guaranty of
the liberty of the press gives immunity from previous restraints"). Injunctions are considered the classic
prior restraint. See, e.g., Alexander v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2766, 2771 (1993) (noting that
"[tjemporary restraining orders and permanent injunctions-i.e., court orders that actually forbid speech
activities-are classic examples of prior restraints.").
75. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1171 n.10 (1994). Moreover, in Abend
v. MCA. Inc., the Ninth Circuit held that under the 1909 Copyright Act, the defendants' exploitation of
the movie Rear Window without the plaintiff's consent violated Abend's renewal copyright in the
underlying story, It Had to Be Murder. 863 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1988), afrd sub nom. Stewart v. Abend,
495 U.S. 207 (1990). The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit's ruling that the
continued distribution of the movie by the defendants without the plaintiff's permission constituted
copyright infringement. Stewart, 495 U.S. at 236. What is particularly significant about the case for
purposes of this discussion, however, is the Ninth Circuit's recognition of the contributions of the
movie's director and actors, and the public's interest in viewing the movie, and its conclusion that these
"compelling equitable considerations" militate against the plaintiff's request for injunctive relief. Abend,
863 F.2d at 1478. Thus, the Ninth Circuit concluded that "Abend can be compensated adequately for
the infringement by monetary compensation." Id. at 1479. The Supreme Court's affirmance of Abend
specifically stated that it did not grant certiorari on the issue of relief, and the Court did not discuss the
Ninth Circuit's ruling in this respect. Subsequently, the Supreme Court quoted this portion of the Ninth
Circuit's opinion in the footnote of Acuff-Rose discussed in the text. Acuff-Rose, 114 S. Ct. at 1171 n.10.
Other courts and commentators have similarly emphasized the public interest consideration in
determining the propriety of injunctive relief in successful copyright actions. See, e.g., New Era
Publications Int'l ApS v. Henry Holt, Co., 884 F.2d 659, 661, 664 (2d Cir. 1989) (concurring and
dissenting opinions), denying reh'g en banc to 873 F.2d 567 (2d Cir. 1988); Gordon, supra note 68, at
1614; James L. Oakes, Copyrights and Copyremedies: Unfair Use and Injunctions, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV.
983, 997 (1990); Note, Remedies for Copyright Infringement: Respecting the First Amendment, 89
COLUM. L. REv. 1940, 1956-57 (1989). In making injunctive relief discretionary rather than mandatory,
the 1976 Copyright Act provides further support for this view. See 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (1988).
76. The seminal article on property and liability rules explored their application in the context of
pollution control. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972); see also Edward H. Rabin,
Nuisance Law: Rethinking Fundamental Assumptions, 63 VA. L. REV. 1299 (1977). For an insightful
exploration of these rules in the context of contract law, see Richard Craswell, Property Rules and
Liability Rules in Unconscionability and Related Doctrines, 60 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1993).
77. Lawson Prods., Inc. v. Avnet, Inc., 782 F.2d 1429, 1433 (7th Cir. 1986) (In an action for
tortious interference with the business of a competitor, the court recognized the discretion given judges
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In light of the substantial support for the imposition of a liability rule
approach in other areas of the law, it is surprising that this approach has never
been invoked in the context of adjudicating conflicts between the right of
publicity and the First Amendment. Indeed, resolution of this conflict is
particularly suited to the imposition of a liability rule system since many
situations will arise in which the defendant's use is in the public interest, but
the plaintiff and defendant will be unable to negotiate privately an agreement
permitting such use. The failure of these negotiations may be attributable to
factors such as the plaintiff's adamant refusal to sell her persona, or the
ability of the plaintiff to extract economic rents from the buyer due to the
relative uniqueness of the desired commodity. In such instances, the adoption
of a liability rule approach yields the most economically efficient result.78
Still, courts will be faced with determining whether a particular conflict is
best resolved by flatly denying the plaintiff any relief, by awarding the
plaintiff damages alone under a liability rule approach, or by awarding the
plaintiff injunctive relief and concomitant damages under a property rule
approach. The framework developed in the following analysis facilitates a
resolution of these questions by demonstrating that the appropriate remedy in
any particular case will be dictated by a careful balancing of the relevant
benefits and harms. It begins with a consideration of the benefits side of the
balance.
A. Society's Entitlements Deriving From the First Amendment
At the outset, the rationales supporting the First Amendment must be
weighed against the justifications supporting the right of publicity discussed
earlier.79 The underpinnings of the First Amendment have been treated
extensively elsewhere,8" and for purposes of this discussion they will be
in issuing injunctions, and noted the following factors to be used in a balancing approach: the "nature
and degree of the plaintiff's injury, the likelihood of prevailing at trial, the possible injury to the
defendant if the injunction is granted, and the wild card that is the 'public interest.").
At least one court has also used this balancing approach in granting an injunction where free speech
was involved. See Fort Wayne Journal-Gazette v. Baker, 788 F. Supp. 379,387 (N.D. Ind. 1992). In that
case, a newspaper sought a preliminary injunction to overcome a protective order which barred
publication of information a reporter learned in a court proceeding. In deciding to grant the injunction,
the court recognized factors which must be taken into consideration, including whether there was an
adequate remedy at law, the likelihood of irreparable harm, the likelihood of success on the merits, and
the public interest. Id. at 387-88. In Baker, however, granting the injunction had the effect of allowing
the information to be published. Id. at 388.
78. Cf Kwall, supra note 59, at 739 (noting that similar justifications support the exercise of
eminent domain).
79. See supra text accompanying notes 34-37.
80. See THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF ExPRESSION 6-7 (1970) (identifying
four premises upon which freedom of expression rests: individual self-fulfillment, participation in
decision-making by society, advancing truth and knowledge, and maintaining stability in the
community); FREDERICK F. SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 86 (1982) (adopting
a "governmental incompetence" rationale for freedom of expression which posits that the freedom is
justified because the government is not good at regulating speech); C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First
Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964, 990-91 (1978) (noting four First Amendment
values: self-fulfillment, societal participation in decision-making, advancement of truth and knowledge,
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addressed briefly. The most frequently cited justifications for the free speech
guarantees of the First Amendment are that (1) they advance knowledge and
the search for truth by fostering a "free marketplace of ideas" and thus are
necessary for a democratic society;8 (2) they fulfill the human need for self-
expression; 2 and (3) they guard against violent societal eruptions by
providing people with other meaningful vehicles of expression.83 Although
the political underpinnings embodied in the third rationale for First Amend-
ment protection may not be particularly significant for the right of publi-
city,84 the first two rationales clearly have the potential to pit the importance
of First Amendment values against the protections embodied in the right of
publicity.
The importance of the First Amendment for a democratic society empha-
sizes the enlightenment function of that doctrine. To achieve this function, not
only news subjects but also entertainment must be protected. 5 In rejecting
the argument that constitutional protection for a free press only applies to the
expounding of ideas, the Supreme Court has stated: "The line between the
informing and the entertaining is too elusive for the protection of that basic
and achievement of stability in the community); Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in
the First Amendment, 43 U. CI. L. REv. 20, 23 (1975) (identifying informed choice, search for truth,
and self-actualization as purposes underlying First Amendment free speech); Kwall, supra note 32, at
230 (noting that free speech is necessary in a democratic society because it fulfills the need to self-
express and it guards against societal eruptions by providing an outlet through expression); Steven D.
Smith, Skepticism, Tolerance, and Truth in the Theory of Free Expression, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 651,729
(1987) (supporting a tolerance theory of freedom of expression).
81. See EMERSON, supra note 80, at 6 ("An individual who seeks knowledge and truth must hear
all sides of the question, consider all alternatives, test his judgment by exposing it to opposition, and
make full use of different minds."); Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth,
1984 DUKE L.J. 1, 6 ("Classic marketplace theory assumes truth is discovered through competition with
falsehood.'); see also Cynthia L. Estlund, What Do Workers Want? Employee Interests, Public Interests,
and Freedom of Expression Under the National Labor Relations Act, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 921, 942
(1992) (identifying "the importance of speech on matters of public concern in a democratic society" as
the primary justification for protecting public.employee speech); Donald E. Lively, The First Amendment
at its Third Century: Reckoning With the Ravages of Time, 18 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 259, 275 (1991)
(noting that alternate rationales for the First Amendment are acceptable insofar as they support
"democratic robustness'); Kim M. Watterson, Note, The Power of Words: The Power of Advocacy
Challenging the Power of Hate Speech, 52 U. PITT. L. REv. 955, 973 (1991) (stating that the "polestar
justification" for First Amendment free speech is its contribution to the democratic process).
82. See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 804, 807 (1978) (White, J., dissenting) (noting
that a principal justification for freedom of speech is individual self-expression); Ronald K. L. Collins
& David M. Skover, Commerce & Communication, 71 TEX. L. REV. 697, 733 (1992) (recognizing that
individual self-expression is the primary justification for freedom of speech); Helene Bryks, Note, A
Lesson in School Censorship: Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, 55 BROOK. L. REv. 291, 310 (1989) (noting
that individual self-expression is a major justification for freedom of speech).
83. See Marc A. Franklin, Libel and Letters to the Editor: Toward an Open Forum, 57 U. COLO.
L. REV. 651, 675-76 (1986) (identifying the "safety-valve" justification to freedom of speech as giving
"a fair chance to persuade"); Toni M. Massaro, Equality and Freedom of Expression: The Hate Speech
Dilemma, 32 WM. & MARY L. REv. 211, 219 (1991) (noting that hate speech is justified because it
defuses hostility and avoids physical violence); Melville B. Nimmer, Introduction-Is Freedom of the
Press a Redundancy: What Does it Add to Freedom of Speech?, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 639, 653 (1975)
(citing Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927), as the source of three justifications for freedom of
speech: individual self-expression, a necessity for democratic society, and a safety-valve justification).
84. See Burnett, supra note 26, at 191.
85. Id. at 190.
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right.... What is one man's amusement, teaches another's doctrine." 6 The
self-expression function nurtures the human spirit.87 Again, the Supreme
Court has explicitly recognized that all different art forms embodying human
expression are entitled to protection by observing that the "teacher as well as
the public speaker" and "[t]he actor on stage or screen, the artist whose
creation is in oil or clay or marble, the poet whose reading public may be
practically nonexistent, the musician and his musical scores ... are
beneficiaries of freedom of expression.""8
Most courts have attempted to resolve the inherent conflict between the
right of publicity and the First Amendment simply by categorizing the
defendant's use, with entertainment and informational uses receiving greater
protection than commercial uses.89 This Article maintains that categorization,
in and of itself, is far too simplistic and that the competing interests on each
side of the equation must be thoroughly examined. The first step in this
inquiry is to ask what type of entitlements the First Amendment affords
society. Professor Wendy J. Gordon recently attempted to use Lockean theory
to explicate the appropriate balance between free speech and the public
domain in the context of intellectual property. She explains Lockean theory
as requiring that initial creators of any aspect of culture cannot maintain the
exclusive right to use that cultural component if depriving the public will
result in a "devalued common."9 The following example is illustrative. Baby
boomers who were teenagers in the 1960's grew up with the Beatles
phenomenon. Persons who are slightly older may have experienced a similar
phenomenon with Elvis Presley. To what extent and for how long should Paul
McCartney, George Harrison, Ringo Starr, and even the legatees of John
Lennon's and Elvis Presley's estates have the power to determine the meaning
of these cultural icons?9' Do the former members of the audience suffer a
86. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507,510 (1948) (invalidating a New York law which prohibited
the distribution of magazines primarily composed of material concerning criminal news or stories of
bloodshed or lust).
87. See Burnett, supra note 26, at 190.
88. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497,514 (1961); see also Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment
is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REv. 245, 257 (noting that art can have a political content and thus may
be composed of exactly the kind of speech the First Amendment is directed to protect).
89. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text. Cf MCCARTHY, supra note 71, § 8-11 [C], at
8-83 (advocating an analysis focusing on the "primary purpose" of the usage to determine its "primary
impact).
90. See Gordon, supra note 57, at 1570. Professor Gordon actually takes Lockean theory a step
further by arguing that "a later arrival on the cultural scene should be at liberty to use an existing
creation if prohibiting his own use would make him worse off individually than he would have been if
the predecessor creator had not created the intangible at issue." 1d. (emphasis in original). Professor
Gordon notes, however, that "[t]his is a somewhat controversial interpretive step to take" since "[m]any
commentators have interpreted Locke's proviso as imposing only an 'aggregate' condition." Id. See also
Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 969 (1990) ("When individual authors claim
that they are entitled to incentives that would impoverish the milieu in which other authors must also
work, we must guard against protecting authors at the expense of the enterprise of authorship").
91. See Madow, supra note 38, at 145 (In commenting on a bill before the New York Legislature
that would make the right of publicity descendible in that state, the author notes that if the New York
Legislature were to make John Wayne's right of publicity descendible, it would confer on Wayne's
assignee "the power to fix, or at least try to fix, the meaning that 'John Wayne' has in our culture: his
meaning for us.') (emphasis in original).
1994]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
serious harm if unable to invoke these personas for purposes of self-
expression and to determine their ongoing cultural meaning?92
As a society, we must have the ability not only to write about, but also to
interpret, the thought processes of illustrious individuals who have shaped our
society. Some postmodernists argue that intellectual property laws in general
have the capacity to deprive society "of possibilities for dialogic interaction
with the cultural reality" by safeguarding the rights in cultural texts and
images which have come to be viewed as commodities.93 In the context of
the right of publicity specifically, it has been argued that recognition of
publicity rights allows "celebrities, their assignees, and their estates to control
the meaning of the celebrity image in a fashion that deprives us of access to
our collective cultural heritage and the ability to reflect upon the historical
significance of the celebrity aura.
' 94
Society's entitlement to invoke the personas of our cultural icons is
substantially diminished in the context of patently commercial appropriations.
Commercial speech is afforded a degree of constitutional protection,95 but
to a lesser extent than political speech and entertainment speech.96 Although
the protection of commercial speech is warranted to foster accurate product
and price data,97 these objectives are not served by allowing unauthorized
uses of an individual's persona in a primarily commercial context. Moreover,
as explored in Part II.B, allowing these uses can promote consumer deception
and thereby harm society.98
Of course, one of the major difficulties in this area is formulating a strategy
for determining whether a particular use is primarily commercial. This issue
is explored in more depth in Part II.C, which argues that a degree of judicial
latitude is necessary in making these determinations.99 That portion of the
Article also discusses the possibility that some traditionally commercial uses
of an individual's persona can still involve a high degree of societal
entitlement based on the expressive needs and additional creative effort of the
92. See Gordon, supra note 57, at 1569 (suggesting that if "former audience members ... [are] not
able to play with the symbols that formed their mental vocabulary, they may be worse off than if they
had initially not been exposed to them").
93. Rosemary J. Coombe, Objects of Property and Subjects of Politics: Intellectual Property Laws
and Democratic Dialogue, 69 TEX. L. REv. 1853, 1861 (1991); see also id. at 1866 ("By objectifying
and reifying cultural forms-freezing the connotations of signs and symbols and fencing off fields of
cultural meaning with 'no trespassing' signs-intellectual property laws may enable certain forms of
political practice and constrain others.").
94. Id. at 1876.
95. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
762 (1976) (holding that even speech which is wholly commercial is afforded some First Amendment
protection).
96. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978) (noting that although
commercial speech is now given protection, it is different than the protection afforded other forms of
speech and is subject to more regulation).
97. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561-62 (1980)
("Commercial expression not only serves the economic interest of the speaker, but also assists
consumers and furthers the societal interest in the fullest possible dissemination of information.'); see
also Burnett, supra note 26, at 204.
98. See infra part II.B.2.a.
99. See infra part II.C.4.
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unauthorized user.' One such example is the use of celebrity photographs
on T-shirts with creative or double entendre slogans. Such examples similarly
illustrate the argument that as a society, we must have the ability to re-
establish the meaning of cultural icons.
As the foregoing discussion illustrates, the inquiry regarding entitlements
is also intertwined with the descendibility component of the right of
publicity.'0' In many instances, the individual whose publicity rights have
been appropriated is no longer alive, and the claim for relief is being brought
by the relatives or assignees of the deceased. We need to address the
appropriate length of time personas can be monopolized by the heirs, legatees,
and assignees of deceased individuals, after which point society obtains the
right to benefit from unauthorized uses of deceased personas. These issues
will be considered more specifically in Part II.B.3.10 2
The importance of the concerns raised in this section, when considered in
conjunction with the constitutional mandate underlying them, might suggest
that the First Amendment should always trump the right of publicity, which
lacks a comparable constitutional predicate. As the following section
demonstrates, however, allowing unauthorized uses of an individual's persona
does trigger significant harms that must be factored into the remedial
equation.
B. Harms Resulting From Allowing Forced Uses
This section examines the potential harms both to specific parties and to
society as a whole that can result from allowing the unauthorized use of an
individual's persona. The specific parties whose interests can be affected by
an unauthorized use include not only the right-of-publicity plaintiff, but also
relatives and assignees of the person whose publicity rights have been
appropriated and even prospective users of publicity rights. The following
discussion illustrates that although some harms will occur only in conjunction
with a "no protection" system, certain harms also exist under a liability rule
approach.
1. Harms to Right-of-Publicity Plaintiffs
Any avid student of right-of-publicity litigation will notice that some right-
of-publicity plaintiffs are concerned exclusively with redressing the unautho-
rized commercial exploitation of their personas, while others seem to
complain about injured feelings, mental anguish, or a violation of their right
100. See infra notes 302-10 and accompanying text.
101. See Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Information as Speech, Information as Goods: Some Thoughts
on Marketplaces and the Bill of Rights, 33 WM. & MARY L. REv. 665, 717 (1992) (noting that the
descendibility issue presents one of the right of publicity's "chief problems under the First Amend-
ment").
102. See infra notes 172-75 and accompanying text.
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to be "left alone.' ' 3 It is entirely appropriate for the right of publicity to
redress both economic and emotional injuries that stem from an unauthorized
appropriation of an individual's persona.' °4 In some states, such as New
York, the right of publicity is encompassed within the statutory right of
privacy. 0 5 Moreover, some courts have combined elements of defama-
tion0 6 and false light invasion of privacy actions into their discussions. This
analysis generates an overall confusion regarding the application of these
respective theories.0 7 Such confusion might be avoided if the right of
publicity were explicitly acknowledged to include emotional as well as
economic harms.
Allowing the unauthorized use of an individual's persona potentially poses
the maximum harm to the plaintiff when the persona is being appropriated in
an objectionable context or for an objectionable purpose. In those cases where
the plaintiff is primarily objecting to the defendant's failure to provide
compensation for an unauthorized use of the plaintiff's persona, a court can
easily grant the plaintiff her desired remedy once it finds a violation of the
plaintiffs publicity rights. In contrast, in those instances involving a use
which the plaintiff deems objectionable, neither an award of injunctive relief
nor monetary damages will erase the damage which the plaintiff perceives as
having already been inflicted by virtue of the defendant's prior unauthorized
103. See Dora v. Frontline Video, Inc., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 790, 792 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (discussing
these two aspects of "appropriation").
104. See MCCARTHY, supra note 71, § 1.1 1[C, at 1-47 (advocating a unification of the right of
privacy against appropriation and publicity into a "right of identity" that would cover both emotional
distress and pecuniary loss).
105. Nebraska, Virginia, and Wisconsin also take this approach. See supra note 33.
Dean Prosser's renowned article on privacy posited the following four distinct torts comprising the
law of privacy:
1. Intrusion upon the plaintiff's seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs.
2. Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff.
3. Publicity which places the plaiptiff in a false light in the public eye.
4. Appropriation, for the defendant's advantage, of the plaintiff's name or likeness.
William L. Presser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960). This Author has previously argued that
"a careful reading of Prosser's article suggests that had the right of publicity been an established legal
doctrine at the time of his writing, he might have been inclined to separate the appropriation tort from
the other privacy torts." Kwall, supra note 32, at 193.
106. The law regarding defamation has become exceedingly complex. The constitutional standard
for defamation contains various standards of proof depending upon the status of the plaintiff. See, e.g.,
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 756, 763 (1985) (finding that, in a
case involving a private figure and a matter of private concern, presumed and punitive damages are
available absent proof of actual malice, but the case is unclear as to whether the general liability
standard differs from private figure/public matter situation); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,
334, 343-47 (1974) (holding that where a libelous statement is made concerning a private figure on a
matter of public concern, proof of at least negligence on the part of the defendant is still required and
thus affords more First Amendment protection than the traditional common law strict liability theory
of libel and that actual malice is also required to recover punitive and presumed damages); New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 256, 279-80 (1964) (establishing an "actual malice" standard,
which requires knowledge of falsity as to the libelous statement or reckless disregard as to its truth, in
cases involving statements made about a public official concerning official conduct).
107. One such case is Eastwood v. Superior Ct., 198 Cal. Rptr. 342 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983). See infra
note 234 for a discussion of this case; see also SHELDON W. HALPERN, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION,
PRIVACY, PUBLICITY AND "MORAL RIGHTS" 592 (2d ed. 1993).
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appropriation. No judicially mandated relief can eliminate the prior effects of
the defendant's objectionable public exposure of the plaintiff's persona.'
These are situations involving what this Author calls morally based, as
opposed to economically based, objections to the defendant's use.109
108. See Hetherington, supra note 70, at 17 ("The right of publicity should not only encompass
commercial usage of identity but also the right to deter others from unflattering usages that would dilute
the public esteem, good will and commercial potential for endorsements that one has built over a
lifetime").
109. Although the right of publicity does, and should, redress morally based objections to the
defendant's use, First Amendment jurisprudence demonstrates that speech causing emotional harm to
particular individuals can be regulated in some contexts but not others. First Amendment law on this
point is complex and inconsistent. As a general matter, "the government may not prohibit the expression
of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable." Texas v. Johnson, 491
U.S. 397, 414 (1989). Nevertheless, abusive language aimed directly at a particular individual rather than
society in general and which is "inherently likely to provoke violent reaction" can be prohibited by the
states under the "fighting words" doctrine. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971) (citing
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942)).
The Supreme Court's recent pronouncements on the application of the "fighting words" doctrine
reveal a state of uncertainty as to its perimeters. In R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul, the Court issued a 5-4
opinion invalidating a city ordinance prohibiting expressions constituting "fighting words" based on
"race, color, creed, religion or gender" because the ordinance, by prohibiting only those "fighting words"
emphasizing "bias-motivated" hatred, resulted in content-based discrimination and inhibited the
expression of particular ideas. 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2547-49 (1992). The clear implication of the opinion
is that five members of the Court believe that hateful speech can be regulated under a more inclusive,
broadly worded statute, rather than the one at issue which targeted only certain kinds of fighting words.
Moreover, Justice White's concurrence champions the "fighting words" doctrine and laments the
majority's emphasis on the statute's underinclusiveness. Two other Justices joined this portion of his
concurrence. Nevertheless, Justice White, in a portion of his opinion in which three other Justices joined,
also asserted that the statute was unconstitutionally overbroad in that it "ma[de] criminal expressive
conduct that causes only hurt feelings, offense, or resentment, and is protected by the First Amendment."
Id. at 2560. Under this approach, "fighting words" can be regulated under a more narrowly-drawn
statute.
Subsequently, in Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194, 2201 (1993), the Court unanimously held
that a state penalty enhancement statute that penalized bias-motivated crimes more severely than crimes
which are not similarly motivated did not infringe a criminal defendant's First Amendment rights. The
Court reasoned that the statute was aimed at unprotected conduct rather than speech and such conduct
is more likely to inflict greater individual emotional harm, as well as overall societal harm. Although
the Court emphasized that the statute differed from the one at issue in R.A.Y, in that it prohibited
conduct rather than expression, the fact remains that the Court upheld a statute that increases penalties
solely on the basis of a defendant's thoughts and beliefs. See id. at 2199. Thus viewed, the decision
supports the view that a state can regulate particularly hurtful expression in certain contexts.
Thus, the extent to which states can regulate speech causing emotional harm to particular individuals
is a complicated area of First Amendment law. The position advocated in this Article regarding the
incorporation of a standard emphasizing morally based harms is not necessarily inconsistent with First
Amendment jurisprudence. Of course, even if First Amendment doctrine refuses to prohibit speech that
is morally offensive to a particular individual in certain instances, this does not mean that the right-of-
publicity doctrine should fail to consider the morally offensive nature of an unauthorized use. In Hustler
Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, the Court held that the First Amendment protects against liability for a
publication that is patently offensive and intended to inflict emotional injury to a public figure when
such publication does not contain a false statement of fact made with "actual malice." 485 U.S. 46
(1988). In Hustler Magazine, however, the Court observed that in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977), it had ruled that the "actual malice" standard does not apply
to unauthorized appropriations of the right of publicity. Hustler Magazine, 485 U.S. at 52. The Court
in Zacchini was not faced with a morally based objection to the defendant's appropriation and therefore
its discussion emphasized the economic aspects of the right of publicity. Still, Zacchini does not
preclude a consideration of morally based objections to a given unauthorized appropriation.
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This Author recognizes that the "no protection" and liability rule approaches
developed herein entail an element of compulsion for the owner of the
persona, just as the property and liability rule approaches engender compul-
sion for the user. Under a property rule approach, the user is compelled to
engage in private negotiations with the persona owner or to refrain from using
the desired commodity. Under a liability rule approach, the user is compelled
to pay damages and the persona owner is compelled to tolerate certain uses
of her persona. Under a "no protection" approach, the persona owner is
compelled to tolerate not only objectionable uses of her persona, but also a
denial of profits. It has been argued that the compulsion under a "no
protection" system is not comparable to that under a property rule system
because the inability to collect profits by the property owner is not as harmful
as the inability of the user to engage in certain activity."' Underlying this
Article's distinction of moral versus economic objections, however, is the
notion that forced uses which mandate an objectionable use of the plaintiff's
persona are more onerous than coerced uses which result only in economic
harm.
Additionally, morally based objections can take different forms, and the
degree of the harm can differ accordingly. For example, an individual can
object to the use of her persona in connection with the advertisement of a
product which she personally dislikes. In such cases, the individual's
credibility is compromised even though the world at large may not realize that
the individual feels the way she does about the product, and even though her
unauthorized association with the product may not negatively affect her
reputation. An even more problematic situation occurs when a celebrity's
persona is used in connection with a product that the celebrity does not use
and with which she would not want to be associated. An example of such a
case is a diet program's appropriation of the persona of an actress who is
naturally slender and has never used the program. Such an appropriation not
only compromises her credibility but also gives her a reputation for having a
tendency to be overweight, which may be both personally and professionally
damaging. A more extreme example of this situation is when a company
invokes an individual's persona in connection with a product that is either
inherently or potentially dangerous. The unauthorized use of a celebrity's
persona in a commercial for beer is one such example."' Such unauthorized
uses can obviously adversely affect the individual's personal and professional
reputation. In addition, situations can occur where the plaintiff is not objecting
to the particular context or content of the use itself, but rather to the
110. For an exploration of these themes in the copyright context, see Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry
into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of Consistency, Consent, and Encouragement Theory, 41
STAN. L. REv. 1343, 1430-35 (1989).
11 . See Tin Pan Apple, Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., in which a rap group that emphasized avoidance
of drugs and alcohol to its youthful listeners brought an action under the New York privacy statute
against a beer company that used a look-alike/sound-alike group in a beer commercial after the original
group had declined to appear in the commercial. 737 F. Supp. 826, 839-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). The court
declined the defendants' motion to dismiss the cause of action based on the look-alikes, but held that
the state law does not extend to the use of sound-alikes.
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unauthorized use as a general matter. For example, some celebrities eschew
all forms of endorsements.. and some individuals shy away from any type
of publicity that would place them in the public eye."'
A good example of this situation is Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc.,H4 in which
singer Tom Waits sued Frito-Lay and its advertising agency for using a
sound-alike who imitated Waits' distinctive voice in a commercial for Doritos.
Waits has a firm public policy against doing commercials because he believes
that commercials undermine the artistic integrity of musicians." 5 The jury
awarded damages to Waits not only for the economic value of his voice, but
also for injury to his mental well-being and professional reputation. The Ninth
Circuit affirmed the propriety of the entire damage award and specifically
noted that a violation of a plaintiff's right of publicity can induce humiliation
and embarrassment." 6 In this case, Waits' feelings of anger and embarrass-
ment were particularly pronounced given his strong public stand against doing
any type of commercial endorsements." 7 In this type of situation, then, the
harm to the plaintiff goes beyond a lack of compensation.
Of course, morally based objections can also occur in conjunction with less
patently commercial appropriations. As the discussion in Part II.C demon-
strates, these are often the most difficult controversies to resolve due to the
strong countervailing First Amendment interests at stake. As is the case with
more traditional commercial appropriations, there is a continuum of harm in
this category. For example, if an individual's persona is appropriated in an
objectionable fashion in an informational and truthful context, or in conjunc-
tion with a work that is clearly understood to be fiction, that person's
credibility and reputation are not compromised to the same extent as in a
situation where her persona is used by or associated with a group the
individual finds objectionable or distasteful," 8 or for the purpose of making
substantive arguments with which the individual disagrees." 9
112. Actor Cary Grant is one example of a celebrity who avoided any commercial exploitation of
his publicity rights during his lifetime. See Grant v. Esquire, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 876, 880 (S.D.N.Y.
1973) (stating that Grant had asserted that he did not want himself or others "to profit by the publicity
value of his name and reputation").
113. See, e.g., Dora v. Frontline Video, Inc., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 790, 793 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (noting
that a legendary California surfer who was included in a documentary about the early days at Malibu
against his will "spent a good deal of energy avoiding the limelight"); Onassis v. Christian Dior-New
York, Inc., 472 N.Y.S.2d 254, 257 (N.Y. Sup. CL 1984) (arguing that the defendants hired a look-alike
because they "knew there was little or no likelihood that [Jacqueline Kennedy] Onassis would ever
consent to be depicted in this kind of advertising campaign"), aff'd, 488 N.Y.S.2d 943 (N.Y. App. Div.
1985).
114. 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1047 (1993).
115. Id. at 1097. See also Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460,461 (9th Cir. 1988) (noting that
Bette Midler rejected offers to use her voice in a commercial context), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1047
(1993).
116. Waits, 978 F.2d at 1104.
117. Id. at 1105.
118. See Clark v. Celeb Publishing, Inc., 530 F. Supp. 979, 983 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (involving pictures
published in explicit pornographic magazine which were objectionable to plaintiff, who suffered personal
and professional damages as a result).
119. Cf Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1255 (2d Cir. 1986) (allowing defendant,
under fair use rubric, to quote a large amount of material contained in a book supporting pro-choice to
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In contrast, many right-of-publicity cases involve uses by the defendant that
are not objectionable per se to the plaintiff. Instead, the plaintiff is distressed
by her failure to obtain a share of the economic benefits her persona is
providing for the defendant. Such cases tend to reflect a high concern with the
potential for unjust enrichment. These themes are evident in Hirsch v. S.C.
Johnson & Son, in which a prominent athlete sued a company for
commercial misappropriation of his nickname "Crazylegs" on a shaving gel.
Near the conclusion of the Wisconsin Supreme Court's opinion, the court
observed that upon retrial, Hirsch must prove that "he has suffered damages
based either on his loss or Johnson's unjust enrichment."'' Thus, the
overall thrust of the Hirsch opinion is the protection of the plaintiffs
economic interests rather than the vindication of a morally based objection.
Not surprisingly, economic loss is emphasized in many right-of-publicity
cases. 
122
It is important to recognize that the moral and economic objections
discussed in this section can be asserted by an assignee of the individual
whose publicity rights have been appropriated. Although an assignee's
economic interest in safeguarding the individual's persona from unauthorized
appropriations is sufficiently clear, it should be kept in mind that uses which
negatively affect the persona's reputation can diminish the value of existing
and future assignments. Nevertheless, for purposes of assessing the impact of
both economic and morally based objections against the First Amendment
interests at stake, objections on the part of a living persona can be treated the
same as objections on the part of her assignees. As will be discussed below,
where the persona is no longer alive, the harms to the persona's assignees can
be considered in conjunction with the harms to the persona's relatives. 2 3
2. Harms to Society
As a society, we can suffer two general types of harms from the toleration
of unauthorized uses of an individual's persona. One type of harm focuses on
the increased potential for consumer deception, and the other focuses on the
increased potential for diminished incentives. Each of these harms will be
explored below.
bolster his analysis in an anti-abortion book), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1059 (1987).
120. 280 N.W.2d 129 (Wis. 1979).
121. Id. at 140.
122. See, e.g., Allen v. National Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612, 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (noting that the
plaintiff was primarily seeking to vindicate his economic interests).
123. See infra part II.B.3.
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a. Potential for Consumer Deception
Several courts have recognized that one objective of the right of publicity
is to "further the public's interest in being free from deception with regard to
the sponsorship, approval or certification of goods and services." 24
Unauthorized uses of a purely commercial nature pose the greatest degree of
potential harm in this respect. Although the First Amendment affords
protection to commercial speech for the purpose of promoting the dissemina-
tion of accurate information,'25 this goal is undermined when an unautho-
rized appropriation of an individual's persona for strictly commercial purposes
gives rise to consumer deception regarding a particular product. 2 6 In fact,
false or misleading commercial speech receives no First Amendment
protection whatsoever.'27 Thus, when advertisers appropriate an individual's
124. State ex rel. Elvis Presley Int'l Memorial Found. v. Crowell, 733 S.W.2d 89, 99 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1987). See also BCL Finance, Ltd. v. Waddolf, No. 92 Civ.1645, 1992 WL 200033, at *1 (D.D.C. July
28, 1992) (noting that the violation of a musical groups' right of publicity was likely to cause consumer
confusion as to sponsorship). In contrast, one commentator has argued that to the extent that the right
of publicity does prevent consumer deception in the marketplace, such relief parallels that of federal or
state unfair competition law and thus is unnecessary. Madow, supra note 38, at 228-36. Even though
there may be some overlap in objectives between the right of publicity and the Lanham Act or other
state law analogues, the right of publicity also protects against other types of harms which are irrelevant
to the framework of trademark law and unfair competition.
125. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
126. But see Madow, supra note 38. Madow posits that whether or not the right of publicity makes
purchasing decisions more rational depends upon whether the "celebrity endorsers actually do the
'homework' consumers impute to them." Id. at 23 1. He also questions whether many celebrities actually
attempt to assure themselves of the quality of the products they endorse in light of the "huge fees
dangled before their eyes and the slim chance that they will be held liable in tort if something goes
amiss." Id. (footnotes omitted). One would hope, however, that most celebrity endorsers have more
integrity than Madow suggests. Moreover, in the footnote accompanying these observations, Madow
cites a recent bankruptcy court decision, In re Diamond Mortgage Corp., 118 B.R. 588 (Bankr. N.D.
Ill. 1989), which held that celebrity endorsers must obtain reliable and independent information
regarding the products or services they endorse, and admits that this decision "may well induce more
caution." Madow, supra note 38, at 231 n.485.
127. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980); Castrol Inc.
v. Pennzoil Co., 987 F.2d 939, 949 (3d Cir. 1993).
In Central Hudson, the Supreme Court developed the following four-part test for determining the
regulation of commercial speech under the First Amendment:
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment.
For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least must concern lawful activity
and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial.
If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine whether the regulation directly
advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is
necessary to serve that interest.
Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. By the Court's admission, however, misleading commercial speech
is not protected and thus, to the extent that a defendant's unauthorized use of a plaintiff's persona can
be viewed as misleading, the Central Hudson test would be inapplicable. See also Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (noting that "there is no constitutional value in false statements
of fact"). But see White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1520 (9th Cir.) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing the panel majority opinion for failing to apply the Central Hudson test), denying
reh 'g en banc to 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992), as amended by, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 19253 (9th Cir.
Aug. 19, 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2443 (1993). For a discussion of White, see infra notes 129-34,
307-12 and accompanying text.
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right of publicity in an explicitly false endorsement, consumers are misled and
society as a whole suffers.
Several cases have involved the application of section 43(a) of the Lanham
Act "'8 to commercial advertisements invoking an individual's persona absent
an explicit false endorsement. Recently, the Ninth Circuit contemplated the
possibility of consumer deception in a right-of-publicity and Lanham Act case
in which the defendant appropriated the plaintiff's persona by suggesting her
image in a commercial advertisement, rather than by using her name, likeness,
or even hiring a look-alike. In White v. Samsung Electronics America,
Inc.,' 9 the appellate court reversed the district court's grant of summary
judgment to the defendant in an action brought by Vanna White against an
electronics company for using, in an advertisement for videocassette recorders
("VCR's"), a robot which was dressed in a wig, gown, and jewelry suggestive
of White and posed next to a Wheel of Fortune game board. The caption
underneath the ad read: "Longest-running game show. 2012 A.D."'3" The ad
was part of a series of humorous advertisements with a twenty-first-century
theme which were intended to convey the message that the company's
products would still be in use at that time. Unlike the other celebrities who
were also depicted in the defendant's advertisements, White did not consent
to the use and was not paid.
The White court held that Vanna White had alleged facts showing that the
defendant had appropriated her identity for commercial purposes and thus the
district court had erred in granting the defendant summary judgment on this
ground.' The decision leaves open the door for finding consumer deception
based on a wide variety of unauthorized uses of an individual's persona,3
even if a typical false endorsement situation is not present. 33 White also
illustrates that a strong possibility for consumer deception exists in situations
128. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (Supp. V 1993).
129. 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992), amended, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 19253 (9th Cir. Aug. 19,
1992), reh'g en banc denied, 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2443 (1993).
130. Id. at 1396.
131. The court concluded that White raised a genuine issue of material fact with regard to a
likelihood of confusion regarding her endorsement, and noted that "[1]ooking at the series of
advertisements as a whole, ajury could reasonably conclude that beneaththe surface humor ofthe series
lay an intent to persuade consumers that celebrity Vanna White... was endorsing Samsung products."
Id. at 1401. The court did, however, qualify its holding by adding that whether White should actually
succeed in her Lanham Act claim is "a matter for the jury." Id. The dissenting opinion vigorously
disputed the majority's conclusion, stating that "no reasonable consumer could confuse the robot with
Vanna White or believe that, because the robot appeared in the advertisement, Vanna White endorsed
Samsung's product." Id. at 1408 (Alarcon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
132. The court did say, however, that its conclusion was rendered "in light of the peculiar facts of
this case." Id. at 1401. Specifically, "the robot ad identifies White and was part of a series of ads in
which other celebrities participated and were paid for their endorsement of Samsung's products." lId
133. The dissent in the White panel opinion and the dissent in the opinion denying the petition for
rehearing explored in depth the First Amendment implications of the majority's opinion. See infra notes
307-12 and accompanying text. Cf Apple Corps Ltd. v. A.D.P.R., Inc., 843 F. Supp. 342 (M.D. Tenn.
1993) (in a case involving the use of the Beatles' names and likenesses in a stage, show performance
and accompanying advertisements, the court declined the plaintiff's summary judgment motion on the
§ 43(a) count since a genuine dispute existed regarding the likelihood of public confusion); see also
infra notes 247-56 and accompanying text.
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involving the unauthorized appropriation of various facets of an individual's
persona when that appropriation is done in a commercial context.
34
The case law also illustrates that this same potential for consumer deception
exists in situations involving less of a pure commercial component. For
example, in Estate of Presley v. Russen,135 the defendant produced "THE
BIG EL SHOW," which featured a performer impersonating the late Elvis
Presley by dressing, singing, and performing generally in Presley's unique
style. 36 One of the claims alleged by Presley's estate was common law
trademark and service mark infringement. The court concluded that the case
involved a "likelihood of confusion or deception as to source. ' 37
134. Another interesting case is Allen v. National Video, Inc., where the defendant hired a Woody
Allen look-alike to pose in an advertisement for its national video rental chain. The advertisement
featured the look-alike in a context which was suggestive of Allen's persona. 610 F. Supp. 612
(S.D.N.Y. 1985). Not only were the physical features and pose of the look-alike characteristic of Allen,
but the advertisement also made use of videotape cassettes of movies that were either made by or
associated with Allen. Id. at 618. A disclaimer with small print appeared in some of the advertisements
indicating that the advertisement contained a celebrity look-alike. Id.
Allen's action was based on violation of §§ 50 and 51 of the New York Civil Rights Act and § 43(a)
of the Lanham Act. The court refused to grant Allen's motion for summary judgment on the state
statutory claim since the New York privacy statute requires the use of a person's "name, portrait or
picture" N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51. Allen obtained a summary judgment on his § 43(a) claim
in light of the court's conclusion that the defendant's action had "recklessly skirt[ed] the edges of
misrepresentation" and created "a likelihood of consumer confusion over plaintiff's endorsement or
involvement." Allen, 610 F. Supp. at 628-30. Allen thus also demonstrates the potential harm to society,
in the form of consumer deception, that can be triggered even by unauthorized appropriations that do
not involve an express false endorsement. In Allen, it was the implication of sponsorship that the court
found especially persuasive. The court observed that "even if the public does not believe that plaintiff
actually appeared in the photograph, it may be led to believe by the intentional reference to plaintiff that
he is somehow involved in or approves of their product." Id. at 628-29.
135. 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981).
136. Id. at 1348. See also infra notes 257-61 and accompanying text.
137. Russen, 513 F. Supp. at 1366. The court concluded that "the ordinary purchaser generally
familiar with plaintiff's marks is likely to believe that defendant's show is somehow related to,
associated with, or sponsored by the same people or entity that provides the actual Elvis. Presley
entertainment services identified by its own marks." Id. at 1371. The court also noted that it is not
necessary that the "public be led to believe that defendant's show is composed of actual Elvis Presley
performances or is produced by the plaintiff." Id.
In Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989), the Second Circuit evaluated the potential for
consumer deception in artistic works. Rogers involved the use of the film title Ginger and Fred in a
movie by Fellini about two fictional Italian performers who imitated the well-known American dancers
Fred Astaire and Ginger Rogers and became known in Italy as "Ginger and Fred." Id. at 996-97. The
defendants described their film "as the bittersweet story of these two fictional dancers and as a satire
of contemporary television variety shows." Id. at 997. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's
grant of summary judgment to the defendants on both the plaintiffs' Lanham Act and state law right-of-
publicity claims. Id. at 1001-02.
The Rogers court recognized that both titles, as well as "the artistic works they identify, are of a
hybrid nature, combining artistic expression and commercial promotion." Id. at 998. The court
articulated a standard governing these types of cases which requires that the Lanham Act should "apply
to artistic works only where the public interest in avoiding consumer confusion outweighs the public
interest in free expression." Id. at 999. The court opined that when an allegedly misleading title uses
a celebrity's name, the Lanham Act typically will not apply unless the title is not artistically relevant
to the underlying work, or, if it is so relevant, the title is explicitly misleading as to the work's source
or content. Id. Applying this standard, the court held that "the interests in artistic expression" preclude
application of the Lanham Act with respect to Rogers' claim that the title of the defendants' film implies
an endorsement or involvement by the plaintiff, and misleads people into believing that the film is about
her and Astaire. Id. at 1001. Still, the decision does not eliminate completely the possibility that
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Another case involving an entertainment use with the potential for consumer
deception is Marcinkus v. NAL Publishing Inc., where the defendants
published and distributed a work of fiction that used the plaintiff's name to
provide "a sense of historical accuracy."'139 The plaintiff was an archbishop
in the Roman Catholic Church who had been accused by authorities in Milan
of contributing to the 1982 collapse of Banco Ambrosiano 40 According to
the facts of the case, the theme of the fictional work in question revolved
around a plan hatched by three Vatican officials, including the plaintiff, to
assassinate Yuri Andropov, the former Soviet Premier, to prevent attempted
assassinations of the Pope. 4' The plaintiff's character is especially promi-
nent since it is his character who initially came up with the plan. In a
prefatory note, the publisher clarified that the book is fiction and that any
resemblance of the characters contained in it to actual persons is "entirely
coincidental."' 42 Even more specifically, the preface states: "Some real
people such as ... Paul Marcinkus ... appear as characters in the book to
give a sense of historical accuracy. However, their actions and motivations are
entirely fictitious and should not be considered real or factual."'43 In
addition to the content of the book, the plaintiff objected to the use of his
name in newspaper advertisements for the book and in the book's dust
jacket.'44
The plaintiff sought injunctive and other relief under the New York privacy
statute. 4 The court's disposition is revealing. Initially, the court refused to
dismiss the plaintiffs complaint for two reasons. First, it did not think that
as a matter of law, readers of the book would necessarily think the book was
complete fiction and that there was "no connection between the Archbishop
in the book and plaintiff."' 146 In support of this view, the court pointed to
the inside flap of the cover which stated that the book is "set on the cutting
edge between documented fact and masterfully crafted fiction."' 147 Second,
the court sustained the complaint because the defendants used the plaintiff's
consumer deception can arise even with respect to unauthorized appropriations in an entertainment
context.
138. 522 N.Y.S.2d 1009 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987).
139. Id. at 1009.
140. Id. at 1009-10.
141. Id. at 1010.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. According to the court, "both an advertisement in the New York Times and the inside dust
jacket contain, in prominent places, the following language: 'Archbishop Paul Marcinkus leaned forward,
lowered his voice, and said... [.].' Id.
145. N.Y. Civ. RiGHTS LAW §§ 50-51. The defendants argued that their use of the plaintiff's name
is not a use for advertising or trade within the meaning of the statute, and that resorting to the statute
to enjoin a "clearly labeled work of fiction . . . would have a devastating effect on the publishing
world." Marcinkus, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 1010. Further, the defendants argued that even if the state privacy
statute did apply, its activities should be exempt under the First Amendment since "the novel
disseminates information and fosters public discussion about Vatican activities." Id.; see infra note 235
(discussing newsworthy exemption under New York law).
146. Marcinkus, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 1013.
147. Id.
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name on the inside flap of the cover and in other advertising for the book.' 48
Thus, the court's concern with the misrepresentation potential in this case is
readily apparent.149 Nevertheless, the court still declined to issue a prelimi-
nary injunction to recall all copies of the novel, in part because it obviously
was disturbed by the First Amendment implications of so doing.
50
b. Potential for Decreased Incentives
Allowing the unauthorized use of an individual's persona can also harm
society by diminishing the incentives for creation. This discussion entails two
separate inquiries. First, is there a risk that right-of-publicity plaintiffs will
be less inclined to maximize their creative potential for the betterment of
society if they know that unauthorized uses of their personas will be tolerated
under either a liability rule or a "no protection" approach? Second, to what
extent will society experience decreased incentives stemming from users under
a liability approach? This second inquiry considers both the potential for harm
to prospective users as well as the potential negative impact on society as a
whole if users decide not to pay and to refrain from any utilization or
creation.
The Supreme Court has explicitly endorsed the right of publicity as an
"economic incentive" for individuals to invest whatever time is necessary to
produce performances with public appeal.' Still, it is very difficult to
evaluate the potential for diminished incentives stemming from the reduced
desire of right-of-publicity plaintiffs to maximize their creative potential as
a result of widespread tolerance of unauthorized appropriations. For some
celebrities, the psychological and financial rewards of stardom undoubtedly
would compensate for the ability of others to freely appropriate their personas.
For other celebrities, however, the potential for widespread unauthorized
appropriation may be sufficient to dissuade them from pursuing a career in the
limelight. Recall, for example, singer Tom Waits' firm policy against
appearing in commercials.'52 Perhaps the more committed a particular
148. Id. In so holding, the court observed:
Here, however, it cannot be said as a matter of law that the use of plaintiff's name in the
book, on the cover and in the advertising does not violate the statute and therefore does not
state a cause of action. Even if the underlying use was found not to violate the statute, the
placing of plaintiff's name in a prominent place and the quoting of statements from the book
uttered by the character with plaintiff's name and office raises the question as to whether or
not defendants commercially appropriated his name. This is especially so in the print
advertising where it cannot be immediately discerned that the quotation was not actually uttered
by the plaintiff.
Id. at 1014.
149. Cf Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426, 433 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (in an action by the
heirs and assignees of Agatha Christie to enjoin movie producers and a publisher from distributing a
movie and a book fictionalizing an incident in Christie's life, the court emphasized that it was obvious
to the public that the events depicted in the novel and movie were fictitious). See infra notes 166-69,
276-79, and accompanying text for a discussion of this case.
150. Marcinkus, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 1014-15. See infra notes 282-84 and accompanying text.
151. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977).
152. See supra text accompanying notes 114-17.
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celebrity is to a certain moral philosophy, the more likely that individual
would be to refrain from maximizing creativity and striving for stardom if
unauthorized appropriations were routinely allowed.
A discussion of diminished incentives must also consider the potential for
diminished incentives on the part of the user. As a society, we clearly benefit
from the creation process of those who use others' personas just as much as
we do from the creation process of those whose rights are appropriated. One
argument advanced in this Article is that in certain situations, users should
have the right to appropriate another's persona, but only if they pay for this
right. Although a discussion of how this determination should be made is
considered more fully in Part II.C, at this point it is worth exploring whether
a liability rule approach can negatively impact upon users' interests to the
point where society as a whole will be adversely affected.
Although it can be argued that this inquiry regarding diminished incentives,
like the one involving publicity plaintiffs, must of necessity be extremely ad
hoc and dependent upon the whims of a particular user, a few general
observations can still be made. Whether a particular user will want to utilize
a publicity plaintiffs persona for a price is not dependent upon the nature of
the product or creation that is involved, but rather upon whether the end
product for which the persona is used is likely to reap an economic benefit for
the user that will exceed the cost of using the persona. Creators of works that
are likely to result in an economic benefit which can be used to offset any
mandatory payments are probably more likely to engage in the utilization or
creation process upon payment of a fee to the plaintiff rather than forego the
opportunity to create.'53 This is likely to be especially true where the
economic benefit of the work will be derived, in whole or in large part, from
the persona of the publicity plaintiff. Where such is the case, the potential for
unjust enrichment also is extremely high. Assuming this is how creators of
economically profitable works will operate, at least two conclusions can be
drawn. First, society is unlikely to suffer significantly from diminished
incentives on the part of users of potentially profitable creations even if these
users are forced to pay for a desired use. Second, it may be appropriate for
the law to recognize this assumption regarding users' behavior in fashioning
the appropriate relief in such situations.
54
In contrast, where the benefits of use are internalized, a creator is more
likely to be creating for the sheer pleasure that the creation process offers,
without immediate or primary concern for monetary compensation. One such
example is a painter who paints for pure enjoyment, without any expectation
of profit. Although a few such creators may be likely to create even if forced
to pay for certain uses of a plaintiffs persona, most others arguably will not
be able to afford this luxury, absent the potential for a commercial benefit
from their works that will offset the required payment. In these situations,
153. Cf. Gordon, supra note 57, at 1575 (suggesting that a liability rule approach will be viable only
with respect to commercial users who can obtain a monetary benefit from their use).
154. See also infra text accompanying note 271.
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then, there is much more of a risk of diminished incentives, with concomitant
negative consequences for society. Again, in fashioning relief, courts should
consider that as a society we should especially encourage artistic expression
that is not economically motivated.
The most difficult situations to resolve, however, occur when a user creates
for both pleasure and profit, but the profit potential is uncertain, or perhaps
secondary to the creation process itself. The determination as to whether a
particular user in this situation would prefer to pay and to preserve the
creation option, or to simply abandon his efforts, is speculative. Thus,
evaluating the harm to society as a result of these diminished incentives is
also difficult. This speculation further complicates the selection of an
appropriate remedy. Still, explicitly recognizing this as a gray area in the
societal harms calculus can at least help clarify the issues and focus the
analysis.
3. Harms to Relatives and Assignees of Deceased Individuals
Preventing the unauthorized appropriation of an individual's persona also
safeguards the interests of relatives and assignees of deceased individuals.'
55
The right of publicity's development as an offshoot of the right of privacy'56
initially clouded the judiciary's determinations with respect to whether the
right of publicity should be descendible. Given the personal nature of the right
of privacy, many courts have held that a decedent's relatives could not
recover for invasion of their privacy rights resulting from the defendant's
appropriation of the decedent's persona, unless the defendant simultaneously
invaded the relative's own privacy.157 In contrast, other courts have allowed
recovery by the relatives of a decedent in invasion-of-privacy actions where
the defendant appropriated the decedent's persona for commercial pur-
poses. 158 Nevertheless, in theory, right-of-publicity actions by relatives of a
decedent should not suffer from this confusion because the right of publicity,
unlike the right of privacy, is capable of being assigned or licensed during the
persona's lifetime and made the subject of an express or implied contract.'59
155. For a brief discussion of the interests of assignees of living personas, see supra text
accompanying note 123.
156. See Kwall, supra note 32, at 192.
157. Id. at 208-09 (discussing invasion-of-privacy suits brought by relatives of the deceased).
158. See Bazemore v. Savannah Hospital, 155 S.E. 194, 196 (Ga. 1930) (noting that the suit was
based on injury to surviving relatives and not on injury to the decedent). According to Loft v. Fuller,
"The rationale behind... [such] decisions is that the relatives of the deceased have their own privacy
interest in protecting their rights in the character and memory of the deceased as well as the right to
recover for their own humiliation and wounded feelings caused bythe publication." 408 So. 2d 619, 624
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981). Further, some states have enacted statutes which allow relief to the personal
representatives and relatives of a decedent whose name or likeness is appropriated for commercial
purposes. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
159. See Kwall, supra note 32, at 210. "In fact, the act of assigning or licensing one's publicity
rights is the embodiment of the important distinction between the personal right of privacy and the
severable right of publicity." Id. The right of publicity's characterization as a property right that is
capable of assignment or licensing facilitates the argument that recovery for publicity violations by the
relatives and assignees of the deceased should include compensation for emotional harms triggered by
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Many jurisdictions now recognize a descendible right of publicity. 60 One
case which explicitly held that the right of publicity is descendible and
enforceable by the celebrity's estate and those holding licenses from the estate
is State ex rel. Elvis Presley International Memorial Foundation v.
Crowell.'6' In Crowell, the court articulated several justifications for a
descendible right of publicity. Specifically, the court observed that recog-
nizing a descendible right of publicity (1) promotes an individual's right of
testamentary distribution, (2) prevents unjust enrichment, (3) promotes a
celebrity's expectation that she is creating something of value to pass on to
her heirs and assigns after her death, (4) promotes the expectations of any
licensees with whom the celebrity might have contracted, and (5) furthers the
public interest in truthful representations regarding sponsorship of goods.1
62
The justifications for a descendible right of publicity recognized in Crowell
underscore the relevant harms to relatives and assignees of an individual when
unauthorized appropriations are countenanced. The financial interest of a
decedent's relatives in her publicity rights "deserves no less recognition and
protection" than their financial interest in the decedent's "other tangible
assets." 6 3 To the extent an individual's persona possesses commercial value,
that individual's heirs and legatees are entitled to benefit economically from
any commercial use, given their personal relationship to the decedent."c The
court in Crowell also explicitly recognized the interest of assignees who have
contracted with a celebrity to use that individual's persona.
65
In addition to the potential economic harm that relatives of a decedent can
suffer by virtue of unauthorized appropriations of the decedent's persona,
there is also the potential for emotional damage resulting from a use which
the defendant's unauthorized appropriation. Although allowing compensation for emotional harms
suffered by relatives is contrary to the practice of limiting claims to the life of the victim in privacy law,
this limitation need not constrain recoveries for violations of the property-based right of publicity.
160. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
161. 733 S.W.2d 89 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987). In Crowell, the plaintiff not-for-profit corporation filed
an unfair competition action to dissolve another not-for-profit corporation and to prevent it from using
Elvis Presley's name. Id. at 91. Presley's estate intervened on behalf of the defendant corporation,
asserting that it had given the defendant corporation permission to use Presley's name. Id. The
defendants moved for summary judgment and counterclaimed for statutory and common law violations
of Presley's right of publicity.
The trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, ruling
that the right of publicity is descendible and that Presley's estate has the right to control the commercial
exploitation of Presley's name and likeness. Id. The appellate court agreed that the right of publicity is
descendible under Tennessee law, but vacated the summary judgment and remanded the case because
of genuine issues of material fact regarding the merits of plaintiff's laches defense to defendant's
counterclaim. Id. at 101-02.
162. Id. at 97-99.
163. Id. at 98.
164. See Kwall, supra note 32, at 213. "In essence, this rationale for a descendible right of publicity
is an extension of the unjust enrichment rationale justifying the existence of the right of publicity. Both
of these rationales are predicated on the theory that if someone appropriates something of value, she
must pay the rightful owner the value of that which is appropriated." Id. (footnote omitted).
165. Crowell, 733 S.W.2d at 98. Of course, these assignees can be adversely affected by
unauthorized appropriations regardless of whether the celebrity in question is dead or alive, because such
uses always weaken the value of prior legitimate endorsements. See supra note 122 and accompanying
text.
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the relatives find objectionable, or which they believe the decedent would
have found unacceptable. One case which presents this situation is Hicks v.
Casablanca Records,'66 in which the heirs and assignees of Agatha Christie
sought to enjoin movie producers and a publisher from distributing a movie
and book fictionalizing an actual eleven-day disappearance in the mystery
writer's life. The works in question portrayed Christie "as an emotionally
unstable woman, who, during her eleven-day disappearance, engages in a
sinister plot to murder her husband's mistress, in an attempt to regain the
alienated affections of her husband."' 167 Although the court in Hicks refused
to enjoin the defendants' works on First Amendment grounds, 68 the facts
of the case clearly illustrate that relatives of a decedent can be harmed in non-
economic ways by unauthorized uses of a decedent's persona .
Moreover, sometimes the relatives of a decedent will want to protect the
reputational interests of the persona. The assignees of a decedent may also
have an interest in protecting the decedent's reputation since such damage
might negatively impact upon the value of their assignment. After the death
of Leonard Bernstein, his children began to license an array of merchandise
such as coffee mugs, umbrellas, stationery, address books, T-shirts, and other
items. 70 In addition to generating money for one of Bernstein's pet projects,
the merchandising efforts were intended to protect the dommercial use of his
persona and to provide a "preemptive strike" against competing items that
would cheapen his image.17' The need to protect such interests on the part
of Bernstein's relatives is especially compelling since now is the time when
the historical value of Bernstein's musical contribution will be determined. If
his persona is allowed to be cheapened and overexposed, it may be many
generations before his work will be reexamined within the classical tradition.
In the context of evaluating the harms to relatives and assignees of a
decedent, some consideration also must be given to the appropriate duration
of a descendible right of publicity. In some states where the right of publicity
is descendible, its duration is statutorily specified. 72 Nevertheless, even in
these instances, it is relevant to ask whether, in a conflict between the First
Amendment and the right of publicity, the interests of more distant relatives
should be considered on a different par from the interests of the individual
whose publicity rights have been appropriated as well as the interests of closer
relatives. Although an individual's children, grandchildren, and even great-
grandchildren arguably have a right to benefit financially from her efforts and
possessions, this right is less compelling when it is asserted by more remote
.166. 464 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
167. Id. at 429.
168. See infra notes 276-79 and accompanying text.
169. These nonmonetizable harms also can be more objectionable to the relatives of a decedent than
economic harms. See supra part II.B.l.
170. Phoebe Hoban, The Bernstein Bonanza, NEW YORK MAG., Aug. 30, 1993, at 126, 129-30.
171. One of Bemstein's children explains that soon after Bernstein died, "there was an ad in the back
of a magazine for a bust of Leonard Bernstein you could send away for. It was made of some awful
cheap, shiny ceramic stuff, and it made him look like Mickey Mouse." Id. at 130.
172. See supra note 33.
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descendants. The Leonard Bernstein situation discussed above amply
illustrates that the relatives and assignees of a decedent should be entitled to
some space after that person's death to establish the worth of her contribution,
free from insensitive exploitation. Still, after society has had enough
opportunities to view the persona on display in what the relatives and
assignees consider to be the most appropriate setting, the guardians of the
persona should be required to relinquish their claim and allow people to make
whatever they wish of the icon.
Thus, after a certain point, the descendants of the person originally
protected should have no greater claim to the publicity rights of the principal
than should a totally unrelated party.17 3 This Author believes that the longer
the period of time the principal has been dead, the less likely the right of
publicity should prevail over the First Amendment, even if the right of
publicity is still otherwise protected by statute in a particular jurisdiction. In
other words, because the First Amendment's interest in free speech remains
constant, a presumption in favor of the First Amendment should arise after a
certain point in time and should prevail over the rationales justifying a
descendible right of publicity once they are sufficiently diminished. 74 Until
such time as this presumption arises, however, in a conflict between the right
of publicity and First Amendment, the interests of the relatives and assignees
of a deceased persona should be evaluated in much the same way as the
interests of the persona while alive.
The question remains, of course, as to when this presumption favoring the
First Amendment should arise. This Author believes that this determination
should be a matter for judicial discretion, but would adopt a caveat that for
a minimum fixed period of time following an individual's death, an indivi-
dual's descendible right of publicity should be protected from unauthorized
exploitation in the same way as if the subject were still alive. This Article
suggests a minimum period of twenty years following the persona's death as
a reasonable amount of time for affording the relatives and assignees of a
decedent an exclusive period of protection, given that the value of an
individual's publicity rights will typically decline with the number of years
following the individual's death. 75 This period would also allow the value
of the individual's societal contribution to be established free from exploit-
ative treatments. After the expiration of twenty years, courts should have the
173. See Kwall, supra note 32, at 251. In discussing the interests at stake with respect to imitative
stage performances where the subject of the performance is deceased, Professor McCarthy suggests
balancing
(1) the estate's economic interest in the exclusive right to stage imitative performances; (2) the
unauthorized imitator's right to pursue a livelihood; [and] (3) the public's right to enjoy
imitative performances.... [I] would view the estate's economic interest as of less weight than
the other two factors simply because even unauthorized imitations will inspire greater public
interest in seeing or hearing recordings of the deceased's original performances and in buying
celebrity memorabilia.
MCCARTHY, supra note 71, §8.16[B][6], at 8-110.
174. See Kwall, supra note 32, at 251.
175. See id. at 252-53.
[Vol. 70:47
RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
discretion to tilt the scales in favor of the First Amendment, even if the right
of publicity is still otherwise protected by statute or common law.
4. Unjust Enrichment
The Supreme Court has recognized the prevention of unjust enrichment as
"'[t]he rationale for [protecting the right of publicity].'1 1 6 The relevance
of unjust enrichment deriving from a user's unauthorized appropriation of an
individual's persona has been noted in the foregoing discussion of harms, but
because its relevance is so pervasive to this analysis, a separate capsulization
of this concept is warranted.
It is perhaps easiest to see the harm that the presence of unjust enrichment
engenders for the publicity plaintiff, and her relatives and assignees, since
they are being denied the value of the defendant's gain by virtue of the
unauthorized appropriation. Somewhat less obvious is the harm suffered by
society, and even the user, in situations with a high potential for unjust
enrichment. As a society, we value and respect individual property rights. As
discussed earlier, when unauthorized, uncompensated uses are sanctioned,
there is a risk that publicity plaintiffs will refrain from engaging in creative
endeavors. Although this inquiry is admittedly speculative, its relevance
cannot be ignored.' Moreover, society may suffer the potential for dimin-
ished creativity on the part of users if the legal system sanctions resort to the
unauthorized appropriation of desired commodities in lieu of reliance on
original creativity.' If we further assume that users benefit psychologically
and financially from the creation of their best possible work product, it is
arguable that the users themselves are being disserved by a system that fails
to promote the achievement of the highest possible level of creativity.
The fact that our legal system does respect property rights is the predicate
for our abhorrence of unjust enrichment. Still, some would argue that it is
imprudent to classify the potential for unjust enrichment as a harm. This view
recognizes that the constriction of private property rights can benefit society
by stimulating creativity among users in ways that otherwise would not be
possible absent liberal use privileges. Under this view, users are disserved by
a system which is hostile to use privileges because they are prevented from
drawing on elements necessary to realize their creative potential." 9 Thus,
situations can and do exist in which the rights of property owners must be
considered secondary to a greater societal good. For these reasons, the impact
of all of the harms discussed in Part II.B of this Article must be evaluated in
176. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977) (second alteration in
original) (quoting Harry Kalven Jr., Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 326, 331 (1966)).
177. See supra notes 151-52 and accompanying text.
178. See Kalven, supra note 176, at 331 ("No social purpose is served by having the defendant get
for free some aspect of the plaintiff that would have market value and for which he would normally
pay.").
179. See Gordon, On Owning Information, supra note 11, for a detailed exploration of these themes.
1994]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
conjunction with an examination of the benefits that society receives in
different contexts from allowing unauthorized appropriations of an indivi-
dual's persona. This theme will be explored in Part II.C, which develops a
framework in which such determinations can be made with respect to the
right-of-publicity and First Amendment conflict.
C. Measuring the Benefits Against the Harms
in Search of a Remedy
The preceding discussion of harms suggests several important points that are
relevant at the outset to this discussion of remedies. First, the nature of the
harm asserted by the plaintiff can animate the choice of a remedial approach.
When a plaintiff's objection to the defendant's use is economic in nature and
the defendant's use is purely commercial, a property rule approach will be the
most appropriate resolution. In contrast, economic objections to uses of a less
pure commercial nature are subject to the balancing analysis developed herein
and can result in property rule, liability rule, or "no protection" resolutions.
These points will be developed more fully below. Moreover, since it is more
problematic under the First Amendment to enjoin uses that are not purely
commercial, the existence of a moral objection to the defendant's use is a
critical factor in determining the propriety of injunctive relief under a
property rule approach.' In assessing a morally based harm, the nature of
the plaintiff's moral objection should be carefully considered. It should be
emphasized, however, that although plaintiffs with morally based objections
are especially interested in injunctive relief, sometimes the award of
injunctive relief is not a viable option. For example, Tom Waits did not seek
injunctive relief since the commercial had already run and Frito-Lay stopped
airing it at about the time the complaint was filed.'' Waits did, however,
receive a hefty damage award even though the theory of his case was not
based on economic deprivation but rather on the defendants' use of his
persona in a manner that Waits found distasteful. Nevertheless, a reading of
the opinion strongly suggests that Waits would have preferred no use of his
180. An economic argument with normative implications has been advanced that the award of an
injunction under a property rule approach must consider the "wealth" effects in instances where an
owner refuses to consent to a use on the ground that such use will damage her reputation. These
"wealth" effects represent "the impact on one's.., change brought about by being given, or being
denied, an entitlement" Wendy J. Gordon, Toward a Jurisprudence ofBenefits: The Norms ofCopyright
and the Problem of Private Censorship, 57 U. Ci. L. REV. 1009, 1043 n.124 (1990). Specifically, if
the plaintiff has the legal entitlement, she will not sell the right to use her persona in a damaging way
at any price. On the other hand, if the plaintiff has no legal entitlement to prevent the use at issue, her
ability to do so is limited by her financial resources which may be insufficient to allow her to purchase
the right to prevent the use. Under these circumstances, the outcome of a transaction between the buyer
and seller does not necessarily reflect any "independent information about 'value' for purposes of
determining whether an injunction will maximize the economic value of the property. Id at 1042-43.
Thus, a court faced with this situation cannot rely on economics as the basis for its remedial choice, but
must instead invoke other norms in determining the appropriate outcome. The proposal put forth in this
Article facilitates such an analysis.
181. Telephone Interview with Tom Waits' legal counsel (Aug. 11, 1993); see supra notes 114-17
and accompanying text.
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persona by the defendants as opposed to receiving a profit from the defen-
dants' use.
Second, the potential for consumer deception is clearly a factor which a
court must consider in fashioning an appropriate remedy. A general argument
can be made that the greater the potential for consumer deception attributable
to a defendant's unauthorized use, the stronger the case for a property rule
approach. The likelihood of consumer deception increases in those instances
where a plaintiff would not have endorsed a particular product, or approved
of any connection with a particular product, for any price. As discussed
earlier, even less traditionally commercial uses can present the potential for
consumer deception."
Where a plaintiff makes a very strong showing with respect to both the
moral objection and the potential for consumer deception, a court should have
the discretion to consider awarding injunctive relief, notwithstanding the First
Amendment interests on the other side. The case for injunctive relief in such
instances is further strengthened if a strong risk exists that a failure to enjoin
the defendant's use will deter the plaintiff from continued creation, if the
persona is still alive or has been dead for less than twenty years, and if the
case involves a high potential for unjust enrichment. Admittedly, this
argument is raised somewhat tentatively, especially regarding cases lacking
a pure commercial use, since the constitutional command should override all
but the most unusual showings in these situations.'83 Still, the door should
be left open to the possibility that a court should retain the discretion to
award injunctive relief in exceptional situations, rather than being constricted
by the notion that such a remedy is automatically forbidden.
Even if a court decides not to award a plaintiff injunctive relief, the
magnitude of harms as defined by all of the above factors should be
considered in connection with whether mandatory damages should be awarded
under a liability rule approach. In addition, the propriety of mandatory
damages should be evaluated in terms of the potential for decreased incentives
on the part of the user. In this respect, it has been argued that creators of
works with a high potential for profit are more likely to continue the
utilization or creation process upon payment of a fee to the plaintiff rather
than forgo the opportunity to create. This is especially true where the profit
will be derived, in whole or in large part, from the individual whose persona
is being appropriated.
182. See supra notes 135-50 and accompanying text.
183. Such unusual showings apparently were not met in the Marcinkus, Presley, and Rogers cases
discussed previously in part lI.B. For example, in Marcinkus, the plaintiff archbishop had a strong moral
objection to being implicated in an assassination conspiracy, yet the court refused to grant injunctive
-relief. Marcinkus, 522 N.Y.S.2d 1009, 1010 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987). In Presley, the court specifically
noted the potential for consumer deception concerning sponsorship of goods and services but did not
grant the plaintiff a preliminary injunction. Presley, 733 S.W.2d 89, 99 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987). Finally,
the court in Rogers also discussed the potential consumer deception caused by the film title but still
granted the defendant summary judgment. Rogers, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989). For a more
complete discussion of Rogers, see supra note 137.
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In contrast, the First Amendment is likely to trump completely a plaintiffs
right-of-publicity claim in certain situations. Some of the factors relevant to
this determination have already been discussed. The prior discussion of harms
suggests that the "no protection" approach may be appropriate in situations
with little or no risk of consumer deception, a low potential for unjust
enrichment, and where the plaintiff has been dead for more than twenty years.
The following discussion will highlight additional factors that are applicable
to the "no protection" approach. These include the lack of a true property
interest on the plaintiff's part that is implicated by the defendant's use, and
situations where the defendant's expressive needs or creative contributions are
especially strong.
The framework that this Article proposes for resolving conflicts between the
right of publicity and the First Amendment relies on a balancing process
under which the benefits that society receives from allowing the use of
unauthorized appropriations in particular contexts are measured against the
harms discussed in the foregoing parts of this Article. Although, as stated
earlier, this proposal does not endorse a pure categorization approach to
resolving right-of-publicity and First Amendment conflicts, the following
discussion will be more focused if it is organized according to particular types
of uses. Therefore, this analysis separately explores informational, entertain-
ment, and commercial uses. This discussion will show that informational uses
typically fall into the "no protection" category given the lack of a true
property interest on the plaintiff's part with respect to the information used.
This holds true even if the information is used in a commercial commodity.
If, however, the defendant attempts to convey information through a visual
depiction of the plaintiff, the plaintiff has a stronger property right which
requires an application of the balancing analysis developed herein. The
outcome of such an analysis can result in the application of a "no protection"
or liability rule approach, or possibly in a property rule approach in
exceptional situations.
Entertainment uses are also subject to the balancing analysis and can result
in "no protection" or liability rule protection. In exceptional circumstances,
property rule protection is also possible. Uses of a commercial nature that
contain informational and entertainment elements, or that involve expressive
needs or substantial creativity on the part of the user, can fall into any of the
three categories, depending on the outcome of the proposed balancing
analysis. In contrast, primarily commercial uses are readily subject to a
property rule approach without violating First Amendment principles.
1. Informational Uses
Many uses of a primarily informational nature will involve the appropriation
of information or statistics about a publicity plaintiff, often in uses that are
afforded First Amendment protection. In these instances, the protected nature
of the defendant's work is typically the main focus. Of course, the analysis
is problem-free when the informational use at issue results in a work in which
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the product is the information itself. When the information at issue is being
used in a work that is clearly protected by the First Amendment, such as a
book or article, the analysis is simple-the First Amendment must prevail
over the right of publicity. This principle was explicitly recognized in
Rosemont Enterprises v. Random House, Inc.,"8 4 where the court stated that
the right of publicity "can have no application to the publication of factual
material which is constitutionally protected."'8 5
What should happen, however, when informational uses are put into a
separate commercial product that lacks the traditional First Amendment
protection of literary uses? In Uhlaender v. Henricksen,'8 6 the court held
that a baseball table game manufacturer violated baseball players' rights of
publicity by the unauthorized appropriation of their names and playing
statistics for use in a board game. 87 The court stated that the players'
identities, as "embodied" in their names and statistics, are "the fruit[s] of
[their] labors and [are] a type of property."' 8 8 Conspicuously absent from
the court's opinion, however, is any consideration for the First Amendment
implications of classifying statistical information as property. Moreover, the
court failed to appreciate the apparent inconsistency created by its holding.
Specifically, if these same statistics had been used in a book about baseball
rather than in a board game, it is quite possible that this court would have
reached the opposite conclusion.8 9 The difficulty of the Uhlaender court's
position is apparent. Who is to say that a game does not disseminate
information? Furthermore, are not books, magazines, and even newspapers
commercial to a considerable degree?' Although board games may not
184. 294 N.Y.S.2d 122 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968) (holding that a corporation formed to prevent the
publication of certain biographical material about Howard Hughes could not maintain an action against
the publisher and author of a biography about Hughes), affd, 301 N.Y.S.2d 948 (N.Y. App. Div. 1969).
185. Id. at 129.
186. 316 F. Supp. 1277 (D. Minn. 1970).
187. Id. at 1283.
188. Id. at 1282. Further, in response to the defendant's argument that it should be able to use the
data on the players because such data has already appeared in newspapers and magazine articles, the
court observed that prior disclosure is irrelevant in a publicity action because such disclosure is precisely
what makes the appropriated information valuable. Id. at 1282-83.
189. The court relied on language from a prior decision, stating that "although the publication of
biographical data of a well-known figure does not per se constitute an invasion of privacy, the use of
that same data for the purpose of capitalizing upon the name by using it in connection with a
commercial project other than the dissemination of news or articles or biographies does." Id. at 1282
(quoting Palmer v. Schonhom Enterprises, 232 A.2d 458, 462 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1967)). Palmer
was an action by professional golfers against the manufacturer of a game incorporating golfers'
professional profiles.
190. As one court perceptively noted:
Our system relies for freedom of information, ideas, and entertainment, high or low, primarily
on privately owned media of communication, operating at private cost and seeking private
profit. Books, newspapers, films, and broadcasts are produced and distributed at private cost
and for private profit, that is to say, "commercially," and the use of materials from the lives
of living persons in such publications can enrich authors, photographers, and publishers just
as their use in advertisements ....
Anderson v. Fisher Broadcasting Cos., 712 P.2d 803, 812 (Or. 1986) (holding that "[p]ublication of an
accident victim's photograph is not appropriation for commercial use simply because the medium itself
is operated for profit").
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manifest the same authorial presence as fine literature, society as a whole is
likely to enjoy and be enriched by both types of works. 9'
The problem here is typified in Nature's Way Products, Inc. v. Nature-
Pharma, Inc.,192 where both the plaintiff and the defendant sold herbal
formulas developed by a renowned author on herbal medicines. The author
had originally sold his retail herb store to the defendant, and subsequently
formed a new corporation. 93 The plaintiff claimed that it had purchased
from the author the exclusive rights to use his endorsement and name in
connection with selling its herbal products.' 94 In the defendant's advertising,
the defendant stated that the author was a founder of its business and that its
products were based on formulas that he developed. The defendant argued that
this advertising did not violate the author's right of publicity that had been
assigned to the plaintiff because "the right of publicity does not protect
dissemination of historical information." 95 The court, however, disagreed
with the defendant's argument that the historical exception should apply to the
facts of the case because the defendant was using historical information to
market a product completely different from the historical information
itself.'96 In this respect, therefore, the court viewed this case as distinguish-
able from those in which the defendants used historical information in books,
articles, and other works entitled to First Amendment protection.
The analysis in Nature's Way is unsound. The use of the information which
was at issue in that case should not give rise to liability for violating the right
of publicity. To the extent the plaintiff was objecting that the defendant had
advertised that the author was a founder of its business and that its products
were based on formulas that he developed, no liability is warranted. This is
simply factual information about the product and its history which the
defendant is entitled to use in a truthful manner. The court's emphasis on the
separate commercial nature of the defendant's product is erroneous. Indeed,
what if the work in which the information was used were a calendar or some
other commodity through which information can be conveyed, although not
in as traditional a format as a book or article? The real problem with the
court's analysis is that it stems from a desire to categorize the type of use and
191. Cf. Ginsburg, supra note 57, at 1924-36 (discussing, in a pre-Feist article, high authorship and
low authorship copyrightable works and calling for copyright protection of both, with low authorship
works such as maps, directories, computer databases, and other informational compilations being subject
to protection by compulsory licensing). But see Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The
Metamorphoses of "Authorship ", 1991 DUKE L.J. 455, 462 (1991) (In explicating the hierarchy implicit
in the Romantic "authorship" construct, the author notes that "art contains greater value if it results from
true imagination rather than mere application, particularly if its creator draws inspiration directly from
nature.).
192. 736 F. Supp. 245 (D. Utah 1990).
193. Id. at 247. The author placed all of his trademarks, formulas, and trade names in this new
company, which appeared as one of the plaintiffs in the case.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 253.
196. Id.
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to make a determination of liability follow immediately from this categoriza-
tion.
9 7
Right-of-publicity plaintiffs do not have a property interest in information
about themselves. The appropriation by a defendant of playing statistics and
other facts in the public domain is very different from the appropriation of an
individual's name, likeness, or other attributes protected by the right of
publicity.'98 Balanced against a publicity plaintiff's virtually nonexistent
property interest in such information is society's substantial interest in public
dissemination of information. This societal interest is equally compelling
regardless of the particular vehicle in which the information is disseminated.
Moreover, these situations lack the element of unjust enrichment because the
users are not appropriating something to which they have no right. 9 9 In
light of these considerations, right-of-publicity plaintiffs should not be able
to obtain injunctive relief under a property rule approach against defendants
using information about the plaintiffs. Nor should they be able to compel
users to pay for the ability to use this information under a liability rule
approach. If a user chooses not to pay and to forgo the opportunity to create,
the cost to society in these circumstances would be far too high.
What outcome is appropriate when informational uses involve a moral
objection? In general, informational uses are not likely to result in morally
based objections, although in certain situations they can. Suppose a celebrity
objects to the publication of an unauthorized biography which depicts her in
an unflattering light?200 A useful example is furnished by Loft v. Fuller,2 °'
in which the wife and son of a pilot killed in a well-publicized plane crash
brought an action based on a work of nonfiction that referred to the decedent
197. The case of Sinkler v. Goldsmith also involved an informational use of an individual's persona.
623 F. Supp. 727 (D. Ariz. 1985). In Sinkler, the widow of a spiritual leader sued one of her husband's
former students and collaborators for using the name and "preeminence of her husband" in the
defendant's classes and lectures about the spiritual movement. Id. at 733. The court concluded that the
plaintiff should lose on this count of her complaint because the leader's right of publicity was not
descendible since he failed to exploit it during his lifetime. Id. at 733-34. Although the court reached
the correct result with respect to whether the defendant should be able to use the deceased leader's name
and preeminence, its reliance on the descendibility issue was both erroneous and unnecessary. See
Kwall, supra note 32, at 217-26 (advocating a freely descendible right of publicity without an
application of the commercial exploitation standard). Under the analysis proposed herein, the defendant
would have a right to any truthful information about the deceased spiritual leader in conducting her
classes based on his spiritual movement.
198. Cf. Vinci v. American Can Co., 591 N.E.2d 793, 794 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990) (holding that the
use of athletes' names and accomplishments on a series of promotional disposable drinking cups did not
invade the athletes' privacy by appropriating their names and likenesses, given that the "[r]eference to
the athletes' names, likenesses, and identities was merely incidental, historical information").
199. See, e.g., New Kids on the Block v. News America Publishing, Inc., 745 F. Supp. 1540, 1546
(C.D. Cal. 1990) (validating defendant magazines' use of a 900 number service in their publications to
conduct a poll pertaining to the plaintiffs, a popular music group, because the defendants' use of the
plaintiffs' name "was descriptive and related to the constitutionally protected activity of news gathering
and dissemination and not merely commercial exploitation"), aff'd, 971 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1992).
200. Cf New Era Publications International, ApS v. Carol Publishing Group, 904 F.2d 152 (2d Cir.
1990) (concluding that an unauthorized biographer's use of quotations from copyrighted works by L.
Ron Hubbard, the founder of the Church of Scientology, was fair use).
201. 408 So. 2d 619 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
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as a "reappearing ghost."2 2 The court denied their cause of action under the
relevant state statute prohibiting the unauthorized publication of someone's
name or likeness for commercial or advertising purposes2"3 because the
language of the statute specifically provides that it "does not apply in the case
of any book which is published as part of a bona fide news report or
presentation having a current and legitimate public interest."2  As Loft
demonstrates, the analysis regarding the appropriate result in situations
involving morally based objections would not differ from those situations
involving only economically based objections. Society's interest in the
dissemination of information should outweigh the plaintiff's interest in these
circumstances. Of course, this analysis assumes that the defendant is not
knowingly fictionalizing the information about the plaintiff and representing
this information as truthful.20 5
2. Visual Depictions Conveying Information
Sometimes, information is conveyed through visual depictions of the
publicity plaintiff. One's face and body represent the embodiment of an
individual's presentation of herself to the world and thus these cases can be
said to involve the quintessential property right.20 6 In Edison v. Edison
Polyform Mfg. Co.,2 7 the court observed: "[I]t is difficult to understand why
the peculiar cast of one's features is not also one's property, and why its
pecuniary value, if it has one, does not belong to its owner, rather than to the
202. Id. at 620. The plaintiffs' objection to the depiction of their husband and father in this fashion
qualifies in the morally based category, since referring to him as a "reappearing ghost" could be
interpreted as casting an aspersion on his good name.
203. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 540.08.
204. Loft, 408 So. 2d at 621. Interestingly, the court also denied the plaintiffs' action based on
common law invasion of privacy, since relatives of a decedent cannot maintain this type of action. Id.
at 621. See supra notes 157-58 and accompanying text.
205. See Eastwood v. Superior Ct., 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 352 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that the
"news" exemption to the California right-of-publicity statute does not exempt from liability knowing
or reckless falsehoods). For firther amplification of Eastwood, see the discussion infra at note 234. But
cf MCCARTHY, supra note 71, § 8.10, at 8-74.1 (criticizing the line of cases treating falsity as a
sufficient rebuttal to a First Amendment defense against a right-of-publicity claim, and observing that
"[flalsity should be relevant only to claims of defamation, false light invasion of privacy, or false
advertising").
206. The assertion that one's appearance is the quintessential property right can, of course, be
debated. Cf Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990) (rejecting the argument
of an ownership interest in extracorporeal body parts), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1388 (1991). Although
a detailed analysis of the body-parts debate is beyond the scope of this Article, it is worth noting that
the property right in one's visage arguably is even greater than that in excised human tissue since the
latter may have a value which stems solely from the fact that it is extracorporeal. In contrast, the value
of an individual's visage is derived from its attachment to the persona involved and embodies an
individual's self-presentation. The same cannot be said of any other bodily organ. Many commentators
have argued in favor of recognizing a property interest in extracorporeal body parts. See generally
Sharon N. Perley, Note, From Control Over One's Body To Control Over One's Body Parts: Extending
the Doctrine of Informed Consent, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 335, 337 n.13 (1992) (citing the scholarly
commentary on both sides of the body-parts debate).
207. 67 A. 392 (N.J. Ch. 1907).
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person seeking to make an unauthorized use of it. '20  Thus, in these
situations the plaintiff's property right is stronger than it is where information
alone is being appropriated, and consequently, there is more of an opportunity
for unjust enrichment. Balanced against this stronger property right, however,
is society's compelling interest in the dissemination of information. Moreover,
as the following discussion will show, society's interest in using photographs
for informational purposes may vary, depending on the relative fame of the
photograph at issue." 9
One can consider the problem of visual depictions in connection with right-
of-publicity claims where the complaint is primarily economic in nature. In
Stephano v. News Group Publications, Inc.,2'0 a professional model brought
an action against the publishers of a magazine for using a picture of him
modeling a jacket in a weekly column containing information about new local
products and services. 2 ' The column offered information about the jacket
and stated where it could be purchased.2 2 In grappling with the question of
whether the defendant's use of the plaintiff's picture was one for trade or
advertising purposes,213 the court emphasized the newsworthiness of the
jacket's availability and focused on the context of the article rather than on
whether the defendant had the commercial motivation of increasing its
magazine's circulation.2 4 Thus, a picture illustrating a public interest article
will not violate the statute unless it does not have a true relationship to the
article or the article "is an advertisement in disguise."215
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.2 16 also involved a visual
depiction in a constitutionally protected medium. In that case, the Supreme
Court explicitly considered the interplay between the right of publicity and the
First Amendment. Zacchini involved a television station's broadcast of the
plaintiff's entire human cannonball act, without consent, on its nighttime
208. Id. at 394. In Edison, the court enjoined the defendant from using Thomas A. Edison's name
and picture in connection with the manufacture and sale of a medicinal preparation. See also Munden
v. Haris, 134 S.W. 1076, 1078 (Mo. App. 1911) (establishing a person's property right in his picture).
209. See infra text following note 230.
210. 474 N.E.2d 580 (N.Y. 1984).
211. Id. at 581-82.
212. Id. at 582. The plaintiff had taken part in a photographic session and apparently had agreed that
the defendant could use the photographs taken during the session to illustrate a particular article
published in a different edition of New York Magazine. Id.
213. The case was brought under New York's privacy statute. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51.
214. Stephano, 474 N.E.2d at 585. Professor McCarthy questioned the reasoning in Stephano on the
ground that the identity of the person wearing the clothes cannot be considered newsworthy, and
therefore constitutionally protected, even though the clothes themselves can be regarded as of interest
to the public, MCCARTHY, supra note 71, § 8.12[B], at 8-90.1.
215. Stephano, 474 N.E.2d at 585. The court rejected the plaintiffs argument that the article was "an
advertisement in disguise." Id. at 586. The Stephano court also noted that a result contrary to the one
it had reached "would unreasonably and unrealistically limit the [newsworthiness] exception [to the state
privacy statute] to nonprofit or purely altruistic organizations which are not the only, or even the
primary, source of information concerning newsworthy events and matters of public interest." Id. at 585.
See also Anderson v. Strong Memorial Hosp., 531 N.Y.S.2d 735 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988) (holding that the
use of an HIV patient's silhouette picture in a newspaper article about a hospital's AIDS research did
not constitute an advertisement in disguise), aff'd in part, 542 N.Y.S.2d 96 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989).
216. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
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newscast. The Court in Zacchini observed that had the television station
"merely reported that petitioner was performing at the fair and described or
commented on his act, with or without showing his picture on television, we
would have a very different case."217 But the defendant's filming and
display of the plaintiff's circus act went well beyond the reporting of a
newsworthy event. As such, the defendant's use was not in keeping with a
purely informational purpose, and this situation resulted in a great degree of
unjust enrichment. Of course, the challenge remains of determining where "the
line in particular situations is to be drawn between media reports that are
protected and those that are not. 218
Other courts adjudicating right-of-publicity actions based on visual
depictions have had difficulty determining the extent to which the problematic
use is informational. For example, in Mendonsa v. Time Inc.,2"9 the defen-
dant publisher published and publicly distributed a picture of a sailor kissing
a nurse on V-J Day. The photograph was published initially by the defendant
in 1945, and had since been republished both by the defendant and other
publications.22 In 1987, the defendant offered for sale copies of the
photograph for $1600.22' The sailor depicted in the photograph then brought
an action against the publisher for "misappropriation of likeness. 222 Clearly,
the offer for sale was a commercial use, and the court therefore denied the
defendant's motion to dismiss. Interestingly, however, the court also
concluded that it could not determine whether all other publications of the
photograph that occurred subsequent to the original publication were
commercial in nature.223
Although Mendonsa is an easy case because the patently commercial use
can easily be severed from any other uses that may be constitutionally
protected,24 one can think of much harder cases in this category. For
example, in Beverley v. Choices Women's Medical Center Inc.,225 the court
held actionable the inclusion of a photograph of a doctor taken at a conference
in a calendar advertising the medical services of the defendant medical center.
The calendar depicted people and events the defendant considered important
217. Id. at 569.
218. Id. at 574-75. See MCCARTHY, supra note 71, § 8.4[B][3], at 8-24 to 8-25 (observing that most
authorities have found Zacchini unsatisfying due to its narrow scope and observing that the decision has
nothing to do with the typical right-of-publicity decision in which a plaintiff's identity, rather than
performance, has been appropriated).
219. 678 F. Supp. 967 (D.R.I. 1988).
220. Id. at 968.
221. Id.
222. Id. The action was brought under the Rhode Island statute prohibiting the use of an individual's
likeness for "purposes of trade." R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-28.
223. The court stated that whether these subsequent uses "served some other protected public interest
is a matter that will have to be decided after a full development of the facts." Mendonsa, 678 F. Supp.
at 972.
224. Cf Marcinkus v. NAL Publishing Inc., 522 N.Y.S.2d 1009 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (sustaining
the plaintiffs complaint because the defendant had used the plaintiffs name on the inside flap cover
of a book of fiction and in other advertisements for the book). See supra notes 138-50 and
accompanying text.
225. 587 N.E.2d 275 (N.Y. 1991).
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in the women's movement. In addition, an explanatory caption appeared under
the plaintiffs photograph.2 2 6 The court held that the defendant's use of the
plaintiff s photograph was for advertising purposes within the meaning of the
227state statute, ' notwithstanding the public interest message of the calendar,
and noted that the defendant is not a "media enterprise. '228 In essence, the
court concluded that the commercial nature of the defendant's use clearly
outweighed whatever informational overtones the calendar possessed.
Courts should not decide these types of cases based on the medium in which
the defendant's use appears. Such an analysis would lead to the incongruous
result of approving the drawing of a ballplayer in a book about baseball, but
prohibiting the use of that same drawing in a calendar. 2 9 Instead, courts
should craft a remedy by balancing society's high degree of entitlement in the
area of informational uses against the type of harm being suffered by the
plaintiff, the potential for consumer deception resulting from the defendant's
unauthorized use, the profit potential of the defendant, whether the subject of
the photograph is deceased, and if so, for how long, and the potential for
unjust enrichment.
This analysis suggests that where the plaintiffs picture is being used in an
informational setting, and the use is in keeping with its informational purpose
and is not in any way false or deceptive, society's entitlement generally
should preclude injunctive relief. As discussed earlier, however, this Article
would like to allow theoretically for the possibility of applying a property rule
approach in these situations if exceptional circumstances are present.230
Additionally, the above factors are relevant with respect to whether mandatory
damages should be granted under a liability rule approach. In evaluating
society's interests, the nature of the photograph itself should be considered.
What if the defendant in Mendonsa were using the photograph in a way that
lacked a strong commercial component and contained more political or
entertainment overtones? Could not an argument be made that a famous
photograph such as the one at issue in Mendonsa has taken on a life of its
own and thus has become one of the cultural icons society needs to use? If
so, it may well be appropriate to weigh society's interests in a free use much
more heavily under these circumstances. Under the analysis proposed herein,
this result is even more compelling if the subject of the photograph has been
dead for over twenty years.
On the other hand, in some informational settings the inclusion of a
plaintiff's likeness may significantly enhance the defendant's profit potential.
Where such is the case, the potential for unjust enrichment is heightened. In
226. Id. at 277.
227. The action was brought under New York's privacy statute. N.Y. CIv. RiGHTs LAW § 51.
228. Beverley, 587 N.E.2d at 279. The court stated that the defendant "may not unilaterally neutralize
or override the long-standing and significant statutory privacy protection by wrapping its advertising
message in the cloak of public interest, however commendable the educational and informational value."
Id.
229. E.g., Pirone v. MacMillan, Inc., 894 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1990); see infra notes 313-20 and
accompanying text; cf. supra notes 186-91 and accompanying text.
230. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
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these instances, a court should consider awarding the plaintiff damages in an
amount equal to that which she would have charged for the use of her
likeness, plus a measure of the defendant's profits to which the plaintiff is
entitled.23" ' Of course, the inclusion of likenesses that are de minimis or
merely incidental would not merit an award of damages.232 Thus, even when
a defendant's overall creation is likely to yield a profit potential that may
enable him to pay for the use of the plaintiffs likeness, and where the
defendant may very well choose to pay this amount rather than forgo the
option to create, such payment still should not be required if the defendant's
use of the plaintiffs likeness is de minimis as opposed to a contributing
factor in the defendant's profit potential.233 Many fact-specific issues would
need to be considered by a court in determining whether a particular use is de
minimis.
Application of the foregoing analysis to the cases discussed in this section
suggests that Zacchini would be decided the same way because the defendant
exceeded the scope of informational purposes, The same is true with respect
to Mendonsa because the use with which the court was concerned was not
informational but rather strictly commercial. In Beverley, this analysis would
place more emphasis upon the informational value of the calendar than did the
court. Additionally, it would focus on whether the defendant's use of the
plaintiffs picture was de minimis, or whether its inclusion significantly
contributed to the defendant's profit potential. If the use was not de minimis,
the case would present a higher potential for unjust enrichment. One way in
which a court might make this determination is to consider how many other
photographs of comparable physicians or prominent women were included in
the defendant's calendar. This same analysis could be invoked in Stephano.
Specifically, the court could have considered whether the article in question
was one of many in the magazine that would be of interest to the general
readership, and whether the model's stature was such that people could be
expected to buy the magazine just to see his picture.
A greater dilemma is presented by cases involving visual depictions where
the plaintiffs objection is primarily moral or contextual. The easier cases in
this category involve a false or misleading use, which clearly militates in
231. Of course, the relative fame of an individual can affect the amount of damages awarded in such
instances.
In the case of a celebrity, fame, skill, and prior marketability must be taken into account in
establishing the fair market value of the plaintiff's name or likeness. In contrast, one measure
of the fair market value of a private citizen's name and likeness is the amount which a
professional would charge to pose for a picture possessing equal audience appeal.
Kwall, supra note 32, at 204.
232. See supra note 198.
233. Cf Brown v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 799 F. Supp. 166, 172 (D.D.C. 1992) (holding
that a 27-second clip of a 1965 television performance by James Brown was lawfully used in the movie
The Commitments, because the clip had been lawfully acquired and the mere use of the name "James
Brown" in the movie did not "constitute the type of wholesale appropriation" necessary to prove a right-
of-publicity claim), aFt'd, 15 F.3d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
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favor of the plaintiff.234 Absent the element of falsification, however, the
public's entitlement frequently prevails, even where the plaintiffs are raising
morally based objections.235
234. In Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342 (Cal. CL App. 1983), the court held that the
National Enquirer's use of actor Clint Eastwood's name and photograph in connection with the
publication of a nondefamatory article, which was false but presented as true, constituted actionable
infringement of Eastwood's right of publicity under the California common law and the relevant state
statute. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a).
Eastwood alleged that the Enquirer used his name and photograph on the cover of the publication
containing an article about a love-triangle between Eastwood and two female celebrities and also
sponsored a telecast advertisement featuring Eastwood's name and photograph in connection with the
article. These uses, according to Eastwood, were intended to promote the sales of the publication.
Eastwood, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 344-45. Eastwood had alleged that the news account in question was false
and a subterfuge for the commercial exploitation of his name and likeness, and thus the court felt
obligated to entertain a discussion of the constitutional issue of publisher fault which typically is at issue
in defamation and privacy actions. The court determined that the Enquirer's conduct constituted
commercial exploitation and was not privileged by constitutional considerations or as a news account
under the terms of the California statute. See CAL CIV. CODE § 3344(d). In light of the morally based
objection by Eastwood and the high potential for consumer deception, the result in Eastwood clearly
is justified.
235. In Baugh v. C.B.S., Inc., 828 F. Supp. 745 (W.D. Cal. 1993), a mother and daughter brought
an action under the California right-of-publicity statute against CBS arising out of the following
circumstances. An episode of the CBS program "Street Stories" featured a film of the Mobile Crisis
Intervention Team attempting to provide assistance to the plaintiffs, who were victims of domestic
violence. The broadcast presented a version of the facts in which the team was providing support and
encouragement to the plaintiffs. Id. at 750. According to the mother, she was never told that the film
that was being made of them would be used on a CBS program or for any other commercial purpose.
The plaintiff also alleged that she had agreed to the filming as long as she was not going to appear on
television, and that she was told the film was for the district attorney's office. Id. at 751. The plaintiff
made it very clear in advance of the program's broadcast that she vehemently objected to the airing of
her personal story on television. Id. at 752.
Initially, the court noted that the California statute safeguards against appropriation in two
circumstances: those involving "commercially exploitable opportunities" and those involving
appropriations which injure the feelings of the plaintiff. Id. at 753. Noting that this case involved the
second category, which essentially involves a morally based objection on the part of the plaintiff, the
court concluded that because the broadcast was not false (unlike Eastwood), the "news" or "public
interest" nature of the defendant's activity rendered it protected. The court observed that the California
statute's news and public affairs exemption, CAL. Civ. CODE § 3344(d), clarifies "that when news or
public affairs publications are involved, the balance must be drawn strongly in favor of dissemination."
Id. at 754. The court thus dismissed the plaintiffs' claim for commercial appropriation under the
California statute. In contrast, the court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' privacy
complaint for disclosure of private facts since it was not "convinced that Plaintiffs' [sic] personal
involvement in an incident of domestic violence is newsworthy as a matter of law." Id. at 755.
In a similar case, Dora v. Frontline Video, Inc., the court considered a documentary about legendary
surfers in the early days of Malibu which included footage of the plaintiff surfer while he was surfing
at that beach, as well as an audio interview and photographs. 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 790 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
The plaintiff maintained that he was never interviewed or photographed by the defendant and that he
never consented to the use of his name, photograph, likeness, or voice in the documentary. Id. at 791.
Again, the court classified the plaintiff's common law complaint as one involving injury to feelings
since the plaintiff had declared: "I just wish to be left alone." Id. at 792. The plaintiff had apparently
devoted much energy to avoiding the limelight and had been out of the country for twenty years.
Nevertheless, in light of the public interest nature of the documentary, the court held that under the
common law, the defendant was not required to obtain the plaintiff's consent for the use of his attributes
appearing in the film. Id. at 793-94. In addition, the court concluded that the public affairs exemption
contained in the California statute also exempted the defendant from liability. Id at 795.
New York courts have interpreted the "public interest/newsworthy" exemption to liability under N.Y.
CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51, in a similarly expansive manner. See, eg., Ann-Margret v. High Society
Magazine, Inc., 498 F. Supp. 401, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (denying the plaintiff relief in an action under
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Notwithstanding the public's entitlement, the remedial dilemma in cases
involving a moral objection to a visual depiction is suggested by the facts in
Tellado v. Time-Life Books, Inc.236 That case involved the unauthorized use
of a photograph taken of the plaintiff while he was serving in Vietnam. The
defendant used this photograph of the plaintiff in various promotional
materials for its series of books about the Vietnam War."' The plaintiff
discovered one of the defendant's brochures while he was emptying a trash
can in his capacity as a company janitor.23 Seeing the photograph triggered
all of the horrid memories that he had been attempting to suppress for almost
twenty years and caused the plaintiff great emotional trauma.2"9 It was
undisputed that the photograph was not used in any of the actual books in the
defendant's series. The court denied the defendant's motion for summary
judgment, holding that the defendant's use of the photograph was commercial
and not "privileged as a matter of law. 240 Moreover, the court rejected the
defendant's contention "that its use of the photograph is privileged under the
First Amendment ... because the photograph was taken in a public place
during a war and, although it was not used in the book, it could have been so
used.124' The court discussed the Supreme Court precedents establishing that
reasonable regulations of commercial speech are acceptable, and observed that
it is reasonable to require the defendant to compensate the plaintiff for the use
of his likeness. In the court's view, this requirement would curtail the
defendant's freedom of speech "only insofar as it is required to share some
of its profits with the individual whose likeness is helping to stimulate those
profits. 242 Significantly, the court observed that had the defendant simply
used the plaintiff's picture in a book to depict the history of the Vietnam War,
the use would have been privileged by the First Amendment, regardless of the
profit motive underlying the book.243
Tellado is an especially difficult case because the photograph itself arguably
involved a newsworthy event, even though it was not used in a medium that
the state privacy statute based on the magazine's publication of photographs taken from a movie in
which the plaintiff had appeared partially nude because her partially nude performance was "of great
interest to many people" and thus "constitutes a newsworthy event"); Creel v. Crown Publishers, Inc.,
496 N.Y.S.2d 219 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985) (holding that the inclusion of a nude photograph of non-
celebrity plaintiffs in a guide book to nude beaches is not actionable under the state privacy statute). See
generally Mendonsa v. Time Inc., 678 F. Supp. 967, 971 (D.R.I. 1988) ("The scope of the subject matter
which may be considered of 'public interest' or 'newsworthy' has been defined in most liberal and far-
reaching terms.").
236. 643 F. Supp. 904 (D.N.J. 1986).
237. Id. at 905-06.
238. Id. at 906.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 911.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 913.
243. Id. at 914. Cf Berkos v. National Broadcasting Co., 515 N.E.2d 668, 679-80 (Ill. App. Ct.
1987) (holding that the defendant broadcasting station was not liable for unauthorized commercial
appropriation based on its use of a photograph and references in a news report on a federal criminal
investigation which the plaintiff felt to be libelous, and that the network's use of "teasers" to increase
viewer share was also protected since they pertained to the news reports).
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is typically afforded the highest degree of First Amendment protection. The
plaintiff in Tellado probably would have been equally traumatized regardless
of whether the defendant had used the photograph in promotional literature or
in the actual books. Both types of unauthorized uses would have triggered the
memories he had tried so hard to suppress. Nevertheless, the court took the
position that although he would be unable to prevent the use of his photo-
graph in the actual books, he could recover for a similar use in advertising
literature. This analysis simply misses the mark because granting the plaintiff
damages for the defendant's unauthorized appropriation is, theoretically, not
what the plaintiff wanted, although after publication of the brochure it may
have been the only available alternative. Given the deep moral objection to
the defendant's use, the court should have stressed the availability of
injunctive relief with respect to future advertisements, with damages being
awarded concomitantly. Such an approach would also provide future
deterrence in similar situations.
The more difficult issue, however, is whether a plaintiff such as Tellado
should be able to obtain any sort of relief if the photograph in question had
appeared in one of the books in the defendant's series, rather than in just the
promotional materials. Application of the analysis suggested herein would
begin by noting that society has a very high degree of entitlement with respect
to books in general, and especially regarding books about such an important
phase in our history. Still, it is necessary to factor into the analysis the
considerations that emerged from the earlier discussion of the relevant harms
in determining whether injunctive relief is appropriate. The plaintiff's
objection was clearly morally based and the defendant's use caused the
plaintiff a severe degree of emotional trauma. Nevertheless, the nature of the
harm to the plaintiff was not reputational in nature and the case, as altered in
the hypothetical, presents no potential for consumer deception. These factors,
when considered in conjunction with the constitutional command underlying
the First Amendment, compel the conclusion that injunctive relief should not
be granted in this situation. This Author would so conclude, despite the fact
that the plaintiff in Tellado was alive, even if not well.
A court grappling with such a case must also consider the propriety of
mandatory damages, even if it declines to award the plaintiff injunctive relief.
First, based on the facts recounted by the actual opinion in Tellado, 44 it
would not seem as though the photograph could be considered a cultural icon
whose use must be preserved at all costs. Second, as pointed out above, the
plaintiff in Tellado was alive, and this factor favors the plaintiff. Third, the
profit potential of the defendant's use could weigh in the plaintiff's favor
given that book sales can generate significant income. In this regard, however,
it is necessary to consider whether the use of the plaintiff's photograph was
de minimis, or a factor contributing to the defendant's profit potential. Of
course, the degree of unjust enrichment present in this case also relates to this
inquiry. In making this determination, a court could consider whether the
244. Tellado, 643 F. Supp. 904.
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photograph essentially captured the mood of the era the book was trying to
depict. In addition, a court could consider whether this particular defendant,
or a similarly situated defendant, would simply refrain from creating if it were
forced to compensate the plaintiff for the market value of the photograph as
well as for a share of its profits. Although predicting how any particular
defendant would react in these circumstances is a bit speculative, it is
plausible to argue that a defendant such as the one in Tellado would either
pay the plaintiff or find another picture with similar, if not identical, appeal,
rather than forgo the entire project. After all, use of Tellado's photograph by
the defendant was not essential to the completion of its project. 245
If a court, based on the foregoing considerations, were persuaded that the
plaintiffs interests deserved vindication, it should consider awarding the
plaintiff damages. Of course, an award of damages absent injunctive relief
would not really give the plaintiff the type of relief he is seeking, given that
the plaintiff's objection is primarily morally, rather than economically, based.
Still, this remedy could provide a particular plaintiff with some measure of
compensation while simultaneously sending out a message to other potential
users that, in certain instances, mandatory damages may be appropriate. In
addition, the imposition of mandatory damages could make the defendant stop
and think about the harms its use has caused the plaintiff, and thus send a
message to other potential users that these harms should be considered in the
future. Moreover, the imposition of mandatory damages could force potential
users to employ the persona's visual depiction only to the extent necessary to
make their artistic point.
3. Entertainment Uses
An endless number of uses can be grouped into the entertainment category.
As the following discussion demonstrates, however, uses that furnish
entertainment can frequently be informative and/or can contain commercial
elements. Regardless of the components of a particular entertainment use, as
a society we place a high premium upon entertainment and these uses are
considered especially beneficial.246 Thus, entertainment uses involve a high
degree of societal entitlement.
As with all of the uses discussed previously, a right-of-publicity plaintiff
can raise an objection that is either primarily economic or moral to a
particular use of her persona in an entertainment medium. This discussion will
begin with those entertainment uses in which the plaintiff's primary objection
is economic. One important group of such cases involves stage shows
consisting of the impersonation of a famous performer or group of performers.
In Apple Corps Ltd. v. Leber,247 the court was required to determine whether
245. But see Baugh v. C.B.S., Inc., 828 F. Supp. 745, 754 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (rejecting the plaintiffs'
argument that the public interest defense is not applicable when there is no need to use the plaintiffs'
likenesses).
246. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
247. 229 U.S.P.Q. 1015 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1986).
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the stage show "Beatlemania" violated that group's publicity rights.2 4' The
court described the show as "consist[ing] of Beatles look-alike, sound-alike,
imitators performing live on stage twenty-nine of the more popular Lennon-
McCartney songs, to a mixed media background and foreground of slides and
movies which depicted a whole variety of subjects, many of which related to
events occurring during the 1960'S.' '249 The court, by its own admission,
was "faced with the dilemma and conflict posed by the interaction of the First
Amendment and plaintiffs' publicity rights."25 Noting the lack of clarity
surrounding this area,25' the court recommended a balancing analysis in the
form of copyright law's fair use doctrine to treat "this new and gradually
evolving area of law. '2 2 Applying this test, the court found in favor of the
plaintiffs based on the defendants' "massive appropriation of the Beatles
personna [sic]. '253 What seemed to be the most important factor in the
court's determination was the extent to which the show had been performed
nationally, resulting in the defendants' accumulation of forty-five million
dollars.254 The court granted both injunctive relief against further perfor-
mances of the show255 and damages based on the fair market value of the
defendants' use.256
A different decision respecting the appropriate remedy was reached in
Estate of Presley v. Russen,257 where the court was faced with a motion for
a preliminary injunction with respect to the defendant's production of a show
in which a performer impersonated the late Elvis Presley.258 The court
concluded that although the show both informed and entertained, it "serve[d]
primarily to commercially exploit the likeness of Elvis Presley without
contributing anything of substantial value to society.1259 Nevertheless, the
248. See also Brockum Co. v. Blaylock, 729 F. Supp. 438, 446 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (stating.that "[a]
musical group, as well as an individual performer, has a protectable right of publicity").
249. Leber, 229 U.S.P.Q. at 1016.
250. Id.
251. The case was brought under the New York privacy statute. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51.
252. Leber, 229 U.S.P.Q. at 1017.
253. Id.
254. Id. In noting the number of people who saw the show and the amount of money the defendants
received, the court recognized the defendants' actions as a "massive appropriation" stating "this case
was not just one photograph among many in a newspaper or magazine." Id.
255. Id. at 1016.
256. Id. at 1018. In assessing damages, the court made the following findings:
Based upon the uncontradicted evidence in the record, the public demand for and popularity
of the Beatles was so great during the mid-70's that plaintiff could have named its own price
for the exercise of the right to license a production such as Beatlemania. Consequently the
Court accepts the figure of a royalty rate of 12 2% of gross as the fair market value of the right
taken by the stage performance, and $2,000,000 for the right taken by the movie.
Id.
257. 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981).
258. See supra notes 135-37 and accompanying text.
259. Russen, 513 F. Supp. at 1359. Russen distinguished the defendant's use from a pure commercial
use of Presley's picture to advertise a product in that the defendant's use constituted a form of
entertainment and provided information by illustrating the performance of a legendary star. Id. at 1359-
60. Nevertheless, in the court's view, the entertainment lacked its own creative component and the
information which the performance provided about Presley was of limited value as compared with a
biographical film or play about Preslev. Id.
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court observed that "the close relationship... between the right of publicity
and the societal considerations of free expression" required the plaintiff to
demonstrate "an identifiable economic harm."260 Ultimately, the court
refused to issue a preliminary injunction against the show because the plaintiff
failed to demonstrate adequately a connection between the defendant's activity
and the plaintiff's diminished ability to profit from the use of Elvis Presley's
name or likeness.26 Of course, the possibility of damages was not discussed
in Russen since the court's only concern there was the propriety of a
preliminary injunction.
In Groucho Marx Productions, Inc. v. Day and Night Co.,262 the district
court relied on the Russen decision in concluding that the defendant's
production of a play featuring performers simulating the Marx Brothers'
unique style, appearance, and mannerisms was not protected expression.263
Although the Second Circuit Court of Appeals subsequently reversed on the
choice of law issue, the appellate court suggested that it might otherwise have
been inclined to reverse the district court's First Amendment ruling.264 Thus,
Groucho Marx and Russen indicate that there is some room for disagreement
260. Id. at 1378-79.
261. Id. at 1379. The court continued:
[Tlhere is insufficient evidence that plaintiff's (or its licensees') ability to enter into agreements
licensing the use of Presley's name or likeness in connection with consumer products is
seriously jeopardized by defendant's activity. As a matter of fact, it is even possible that
defendant's production has stimulated the public's interest in buying Elvis Presley merchandise
or in seeing films or hearing records embodying actual Elvis Presley performances.
Id. (footnote omitted). The court went on to note "that the plaintiff has not claimed that defendant's
production is so false or of such a poor quality that the reputation, and the resulting commercial
viability, and marketability, associated with the name and likeness of Elvis Presley has been or will be
adversely affected." Id. at 1379 rL49. This statement underscores the economically based objection on
the part of the plaintiff in that case.
In contrast, the court granted a preliminary injunction with respect to the defendant's sale of Elvis
Presley pendants and records, in light of the plaintiff's ongoing sale of these items. Id at 1382-83. The
court also preliminarily enjoined the defendant from using certain marks and logos that were associated
with Presley during his lifetime, and from advertising the show in such a way that was likely to confuse
the public into believing that the defendant's show was in any way connected with Presley's estate. Id.
Recently, another stage show impersonation of the Beatles was litigated, this time under the
Tennessee right-of-publicity statute. See Tennessee Personal Rights Protection Act, TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 47-25-1105(a). In Apple Corps Ltd. v. A.D.P.R., Inc., 843 F. Supp. 342 (M.D. Tenn. 1993), the
plaintiff alleged that the defendants' use of the name "The Beatles" and the combination of the
individual names of the famous foursome in both their performances and the publicity materials for their
performances violated the state statute. Id. at 345. Relying on Russen, the court rejected the defendants'
argument that they were entitled to First Amendment protection for their use of the Beatles' names and
likenesses. Id. at 347. The court held, however, that although the state statute does not prohibit the use
of such names in a performance, the statute allows liability for the defendants' use of the names in their
advertising and promotional materials. Id. Accordingly, the defendants were permanently enjoined from
such conduct. In addition, the court enjoined the defendants from using look-alikes of the Beatles in
advertising and promotional materials. Id at 349-50.
262. 523 F. Supp. 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982).
263. Id. at 494. The court did not believe the play qualified as a parody because it simply duplicated
the original, rather than building upon it by adding its own creative elements. Id. at 493.
264. The court indicated in a footnote that if it had to rule on the soundness of the district court's
interpretation of the federal constitutional law, it "would have to examine closely defendants' substantial
argument that their play is protected expression as a literary work, especially in light ofthe broad scope
permitted parody in First Amendment law." Id. at 319 n.2.
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on the constitutional issue involved in these cases. The Leber opinion
recognized the need to devise an analytical method for treating these types of
cases, although the court there did a superficial balancing analysis that merely
focused on the amount of money the defendants made from the show.
Under the analysis proposed herein, several factors are relevant. First, these
cases involve a high societal entitlement. Society cannot be deprived of
viewing impersonations of legendary figures such as the Beatles and Elvis
Presley who had a major impact on our culture. Eliminating the ability of
individuals to establish the current meanings of these cultural icons in our
society would, in essence, cause a grievous harm to society. 265 This analysis
suggests that Leber reached the wrong result by ordering injunctive relief.266
Of course, this conclusion assumes that the defendant's project does not
involve any false sense of sponsorship or other type of consumer decep-
tion.267
Regarding the propriety of mandatory damages, the situation in Leber is
somewhat complicated by the fact that one of the Beatles was dead at the time
of the lawsuit. Still, John Lennon had not been dead for more than twenty
years and the other Beatles were very much alive. 68 Clearly, this factor
favored the plaintiffs.269 Moreover, Leber involved a high profit potential,
and the plaintiff's primary grievance was economic. 2 0 Additionally, much
of the defendant's profit was directly attributable to the appeal of the Beatles'
persona, and thus the use cannot be considered de minimis. Thus, this case
involved an enormous degree of unjust enrichment.
The argument for mandatory damages is drastically diminished, however,
where a comedian impersonates a celebrity during the course of his mono-
logue, since in most instances, the comedian's act is not relying upon the
appeal of the celebrity to a great extent. An intermediate situation is a show
in which the plaintiff is one individual among several who are being
impersonated. Although hard-and-fast rules cannot be fashioned to cover all
potential situations, the extent to which the defendant's profit is directly
attributable to the appeal of the publicity plaintiff should be considered by the
court. In this regard, a court adjudicating this type of action should question
whether the defendants, if forced to pay for the fair market value of the
265. See Gordon, supra note 57, at 1568-69; see also supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text.
266. See supra text accompanying note 255.
267. See Russen, 513 F. Supp. at 1370-71 (noting use of certain marks may confuse consumer as to
sponsorship of show).
268. John Lennon died in 1980 at the age of 40. THE CONCISE COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA 73 (2d
ed. 1989).
269. This case suggests the possibility that my presumption favoring the First Amendment when the
decedent has been dead for over 20 years may become somewhat complicated when the persona is that
of a group composed of various individuals. In this Author's view, this presumption should not be
invoked at all unless all of the members of the group are dead. When such is the case, however, a court
ought to have some leeway to invoke this presumption even if all of the members of the group have not
been dead for at least 20 years. The constitutional command of the First Amendment supports greater
flexibility in this situation, since otherwise society may have to wait an inordinately long time to
reestablish the meaning of cultural icons.
270. This was also the situation in Russen. See discussion supra note 261.
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plaintiffs persona, would rather pay or forgo the creation option. Undoubt-
edly, the defendant in Leber would choose to pay as attested by the fact that
even after the court's imposition of damages, the defendant still retained a
handsome profit.21 ' These factors suggest the propriety of a mandatory
damage award in a case such as Leber.
How should the analysis in this area proceed when the plaintiff is raising
a morally based objection to the use of her persona in an entertainment
medium? The validity of the plaintiff's moral objection may be more likely
to be an issue with respect to entertainment, as opposed to informational, uses
since creators in the entertainment area generally can invoke a plaintiffs
persona in a greater variety of ways than is the case with informationally
oriented works. For example, in Valentine v. C.B.S., Inc.,2  the plaintiff
sued the writers and distributors of a popular song about a murder trial in
which the plaintiff was a witness." 3 The plaintiff claimed that the song
defamed her because it implied that she participated in the conspiracy of a
crime and that the defendants failed to check the veracity of the lyrics. 4
The court held, however, that the plaintiffs interpretation of the song was
unreasonable. 5
Invalid moral objections aside, this Author believes that where it is obvious
that the defendant's work is fiction, the First Amendment argument should
generally outweigh whatever contextual or moral objections a plaintiff may
raise. With respect to pure fictionalizations clearly marketed as such, there is
virtually no chance of public deception. Thus, the basis for the plaintiff's
moral objection is diminished. These factors strongly militate against the
award of injunctive relief. In addition, the other factors of the analysis also
militate against awarding mandatory damages. With respect to fictionalized
works, an argument can be made that they generally do not derive their appeal
from the persona of the publicity plaintiff so much as from the independent
contribution of the work's creator. This consideration also suggests a reduced
potential for unjust enrichment. Moreover, there would be a tremendous
chilling of incentives if writers were forced to compensate someone every
time they created a character who resembled or was derived from a real
individual. These points are illustrated in Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 6
in which the heirs and assignees of Agatha Christie sought to enjoin movie
producers and a publisher from distributing a movie and book fictionalizing
an incident in Christie's life in a manner that was extremely unflattering to
the deceased. The court clearly recognized that it was faced with a "novel and
271. See supra note 256 and accompanying text.
272. 698 F.2d 430 (11 th Cir. 1983).
273. Id. at 431.
274. Id. The plaintiff's action was based on defamation, invasion of privacy, and unauthorized
publication of her name.
275. Id. at 432. Moreover, in specifically discussing the plaintiff's complaint for unauthorized use
of her name in violation of the state statute, the court resorted to the typical analysis that no commercial
exploitation occurred because the defendants did not use the plaintiff's name "to directly promote a
product or service." Id. at 433.
276. 464 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). See supra text accompanying notes 166-69.
[Vol. 70:47
RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
rather complex question" since "books and movies are vehicles through which
ideas and opinions are disseminated and, as such, have enjoyed certain
constitutional protections, not generally accorded 'merchandise."' 277 The
court also emphasized the lack of other cases presenting this constitutional
question in the context of the right of publicity.78 Finally, the court found
that the book in question was fiction and held that free speech interests must
prevail over those of the right of publicity.279
The situation is far more complicated, however, when the defendant's use
is a combination of fiction and fact. According to literary critic Michiko
Kakutani, we are being besieged with "books, movies and television
docudramas that hopscotch back and forth between the realms of history and
fiction, reality and virtual reality, with impunity."28 Kakutani is especially
critical of such works because "they do not even announce themselves as
works of fiction, but instead masquerade as the truth," and "unabashedly play
both to people's hunger for information and relevance, and to their appetite
for entertainment."28  Recall Marcinkus v. NAL Publishing Inc. 282 which
involved the archbishop who sued the defendants for publishing and
distributing a work of fiction that used his name, in an unflattering manner,
to provide a sense of history. In that case, the court refused to enjoin the
book's publication and emphasized that "whatever [the] literary merit or
ultimate social value" of the book, it "is entitled to at least some degree of
first amendment protection."283 From a remedial standpoint, however,
Marcinkus presents a relatively easy case because, although the book itself
could not be enjoined, the court could have enjoined the objectionable
advertisements and awarded damages to the plaintiff in connection with just
277. Hicks, 464 F. Supp. at 430.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 433. In so holding, the court also emphasized that this case did not involve any "delibera.te
falsifications or an attempt by a defendant to present the disputed events as true." Id See also Matthews
v. Wozencrafl, 15 F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that state law protection against misappropriation
of one's name and likeness does not extend to use of facts from an individual's life in a work of
fiction).
280. Michiko Kakutani, Is it Fiction? Is it Nonfiction? And Why Doesn't Anybody Care?, N.Y.
TIMEs, July 27, 1993, at C13.
281. Id. Although no right-of-publicity case involving docudramas has ever gone to trial, Elizabeth
Taylor once brought a misappropriation and common law right-of-publicity action against ABC for
developing a biographical docudrama of Taylor's life. Taylor v. American Broadcasting Co., No. 82 Civ.
6977 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). The initiation of the lawsuit killed the project and the suit was ultimately
dropped. See Jacqui Gold Grunfeld, Docudramas: The LegalityofProducing Fact-BasedDramas-What
Every Producer's Attorney Should Know, 14 HASTINoS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 483, 509-11 (1992). Most
authorities have concluded that docudramas are a privileged First Amendment use. Id. at 511; see also
MCCARTHY, supra note 71, § 8.9[F], at 8-70.
282. 522 N.Y.S.2d 1009 (N.Y. Sup. CL 1987). See supra notes 138-50 and accompanying text.
283. Id. at 1014-15. In balancing the equities, the court also noted that the book contained an express
disclaimer and that the defendants contended that they would suffer much financial loss if forced to
recall. Id. at 1015.
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that use.284 Thus, the commercial elements of that case were readily
separable from the non-commercial elements. 8 5
In situations involving uses that may not be subject to such an easy
resolution, the analysis herein can prove fruitful. As Marcinkus recognized,
society has a high entitlement to works such as semi-fictional books, movies,
and television programs. These are legitimate vehicles of free expression and
deserve constitutional protection. Moreover, an argument can be made that as
a society, we must have the ability not only to write about, but also to
interpret, the thought-processes of individuals who are the subjects of these
entertainment works.
28 6
Despite society's high entitlement in this area, there are important harms to
consider when allowing the unauthorized appropriation of an individual's
persona in these media. In the first place, when an individual's persona is
used without permission in a semi-factual, semi-fictional medium, there is a
high potential for meritorious moral objections to the content or context of the
use. In fact, societal sanctioning of this type of use could cause some
individuals to refrain from pursuing a career in the limelight. Second, these
types of works present a high potential for consumer deception to the extent
they masquerade as completely factual accounts. 287 A particularly strong
showing on both of these factors might persuade a court to grant injunctive
relief in certain instances, particularly where the potential for. consumer
deception is overpowering. Although such a result would be extremely rare
in light of the substantial First Amendment interests at stake, current courts
284. Marcinkus was decided in the context of a preliminary injunction and thus the issue of damages
was not discussed. Toward the end of the opinion, the court added that it was denying the plaintiff's
request for an injunction with respect to the dust cover and the use of the plaintiff's name in print
advertising. The court stated that "the dust jacket labels the book a novel, and is attached to the book
and the disclaimer contained therein, and thus it should follow the denial of injunctive relief for the
book." With respect to the print advertising, the defendants apparently had no intention of continuing
its use. Marcinkus, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 1015; see also supra notes 145-50 and accompanying text..
285. Cf MCCARTHY, supra note 71, § 8-11 [C], at 8-83 (advocating an analysis focusing on the
"primary purpose" of the usage to determine its "primary impact"). ..
286. This emphasis on interpretation of the subject at the expense of the in' ividuality of the subject
has a parallel among radical deconstructionists in literary circles whose theory "reduces the creative
individual of romantic theory into little more than a factory worker assembling images, words, and ideas
that are the common property of the culture and embedded in the language." ALVIN B. KERNAN, THE
DEATH OF LITERATuRP 113 (1990). According to the critic David Lehman, acceptance of this view of
writing necessitates the elimination of plagiarism since de-emphasizing the author's role means that "the
text enters the academic equivalent of the public domain." DAVID LEHMAN, SIGNS OF THE TIMES 59
(1991). See also Litman, supra note 90, at 1011 (observing that "authorship is the product of astigmatic
repackaging of others' expression" and that the "legal concept of originality" cannot be taken seriously
because it would be difficult to determine what aspects of an author's work were actually original).
According to David Lehman, "[flor the hard-line deconstructionists, not only is literature self-referential;
its meanings are undecidable, as 'indeterminate' as the velocity and location of a moving electron."
LEHMAN, supra, at 57. Not surprisingly, this post-modernist phenomenon also has resulted in the
prevalent practice of quoting earlier works of art in subsequent art forms in both high and popular
culture. See Kakutani, supra note 280, at C16.
287. See supra notes 280-81 and accompanying text
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seem to assume automatically that injunctive relief is never warranted, even
when a plaintiff makes these showings.288
Even if a court adjudicating -such a use is not inclined to grant injunctive
relief, a consideration of the plaintiffs moral objection and the potential for
consumer deception should weigh heavily in its decision regarding an award
of mandatory damages. In addition, courts should consider that these types of
uses typically involve a high profit potential that is directly attributable, in
large part, to the appeal of the persona whose publicity rights have been
appropriated. Where this is the case, a great potential for unjust enrichment
exists as a result of the defendant's unauthorized use. Moreover, given this
high profit potential, if the creators of these entertainment media were given
the option of paying for the use of the plaintiffs persona or forgoing the
ability to create the work, many undoubtedly would choose to pay. Therefore,
mandating compensation to the subjects of these works probably would not
chill the user's incentives to create in a majority of instances.
4. Primarily Commercial Uses
The final category of uses this Article considers are those that are primarily
commercial in nature. As mentioned earlier, it is often difficult to make a
determination as to whether a particular use is primarily commercial. For
example, suppose an artist paints a picture of supermodel Cindy Crawford
without her permission. In light of our desire to encourage artistic expression
divorced from commercial ventures, this type of situation should not give rise
to either injunctive relief or damages." 9 Now suppose, however, the same
artist subsequently sells the painting for a handsome profit. Should the
subsequent sale convert this previously sanctioned use into a primarily
commercial use? What if the artist had intended to sell the finished product
the entire time he had been painting?
As the foregoing example illustrates, the definition of a primarily commer-
cial use can be problematic. As previously discussed, many types of
informational and entertainment uses can have strong commercial over-
tones.29 0 Moreover, it is not possible to invoke a definition of commercial
use that depends upon the primary motive of the creator, because such a
definition will be subject to manipulation by the interested parties. Notwith-
standing these difficulties, the categorization of a particular use as primarily
commercial is critical because primarily commercial uses trigger a different
analytical methodology from the other types of uses which have been
288. See Marcintus, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 1014 (in refusing injunctive relief where plaintiff showed both
moral harm and potential consumer confusion, the court noted that the plaintiff's privacy right must be
balanced against the First Amendment freedoms, and since there was not a clear right to injunctive relief
based on the "moving papers," the court refused to grant injunctive relief); see also supra notes 138-50
and accompanying text.
289. See supra text following note 154; notes 186-96 and accompanying text; text following note
245.
290. See supra notes 186-205, 247-85 and accompanying text.
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explored. Rather than offer a hard-and-fast definition for primarily commercial
uses, this Author would prefer to see courts exercise a degree of discretion in
making these determinations. In many cases, primarily commercial uses will
involve the sale of merchandise that is severable from the objectionable right-
of-publicity use. Moreover, media such as the painting of Cindy Crawford
which are typically afforded a substantial degree of First Amendment
protection will usually not be categorized as primarily commercial in nature.
Still, it is impossible to conceive of a set of rules that will cover all potential
uses, and therefore, courts need to be flexible in this area.
At least one commentator has argued that from an economic standpoint, the
unrestricted use of publicity rights in a commercial context may result in
greater efficiency. This argument analogizes celebrity personas to what the
economists term "public goods" in the following ways. First, "[ojnce a
celebrity has developed or acquired a commercially valuable identity, others
can use or appropriate it at a cost that is close to zero."29' Second, the use
of a celebrity's persona is "nonrivalrous" in that the use of a celebrity's name
or face on merchandise does not prevent the celebrity or anyone else from
doing the same.292 Third, a celebrity's persona is "nonexhaustible" in that
it can be used repeatedly without becoming "used up."293 The argument
continues that, to the extent the commercial use of a celebrity's persona
shares these features of "public goods," there will of necessity be some social
loss by virtue of forcing compensation for its use.2 94
This argument, however, fails on several fronts. Initially, even the
commentator who advances it "freely concede[s]" its "speculative charac-
ter., 295 Secondly, the public goods character of celebrity personas is highly
questionable, particularly with respect to the questions of whether the use of
such personas can legitimately be viewed as "nonrivalrous" and "nonexhaus-
tible." On the contrary, it is equally if not more plausible to assume that the
more a particular celebrity's persona is used on various forms of merchandise,
the less value that persona will have?.96 Moreover, there is also the need to
291. See Madow, supra note 38, at 222 n.445.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Professor Madow provides the following example to illustrate his point:
[S]uppose a T-shirt can be manufactured for $5.00, and that Madonna's name can be
emblazoned on it for an additional fifty cents. The T-shirt must sell for $5.50 or more. If,
however, Madonna insists on a payment of $2.00 per T-shirt, it must sell for at least $7.50.
People who value the T-shirt at more than $5.50 but less than $7.50 will not purchase the T-
shirt. This is inefficient, inasmuch as the value they place on the shirt exceeds its cost of
production .... [S]ociety would be better off" if the T-shirt sold for $5.50. Any price higher
than that "creates the same sort of allocative efficiency loss as monopoly." In short, the right
of publicity, by enabling a celebrity to exact a fee for use of her name or face on merchandise,
may result in underproduction and overpricing.
Id. at 222-23 n.445 (citations omitted) (quoting Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983
Term-Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L REV. 4, 21 (1984)).
295. Id. at 222 1h.445.
296. See Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432, 438 (5th Cir. 1994) (noting that if a well-known
public figure's picture could be used freely to endorse commercial products, the value of his likeness
would disappear).
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consider the importance of insuring exclusivity in the publicity context
because if the individual whose publicity rights are being appropriated cannot
"reap a profit from that product, then there is nothing upon which to base a
source of pecuniary return."'297 As Professor Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss has
noted, "[e]xclusivity is therefore necessary to assure the creator freedom from
those who did not make the creative effort and thus would undercut the price
at which the creator could profitably sell the work. '29 8 Although it could be
argued that a celebrity who continues to pursue her career would always be
able to reap a return from her major avenue of success even if unauthorized
commercial endorsements of her persona were allowed, it is equally possible
that the unfettered use of a celebrity's persona in a merchandising context will
adversely affect the marketability of the celebrity in her main area of
expertise. This adverse impact can arise if the celebrity is so overused that
she no longer is viewed by the public as embodying the essence of a unique
spirit that once made her successful, or if the celebrity's persona is used in
conjunction with unpopular, undesirable, or dangerous products. In addition,
there is the high potential for consumer deception stemming from the
unregulated commercial use of an individual's persona. 299 For these reasons,
damages with concomitant injunctive relief is the appropriate remedial choice
for the majority of primarily commercial uses.
In most instances, awarding injunctive relief will not be problematic from
a First Amendment standpoint when the defendant is using the plaintiff's
persona in a primarily commercial context. People should not be forced to
serve as marketing tools against their will.3°0 Still, in situations with a less
commercially obvious element, or in situations in which a mixture of
commercial and political, entertainment, or informational elements exists,
301
awarding injunctive relief may be problematic under the First Amendment. In
addition, a property rule approach may be problematic for commercial uses
which implicate expressive needs of the appropriator or involve significant
297. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language In the Pepsi
Generation, 65 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 397, 408 (1990).
298. Id. Professor Dreyfuss sees the right of publicity and other types of intellectual property such
as patents, copyrights, and misappropriation as different from trademark rights because the law in these
other areas protects "the one and only product that the creator has for sale." Id. The situation is different
with respect to the owner of a trademark:
[T]he owner of a trademark is really in the business of selling a different product .... The
profit and the incentive to enhance quality comes from the marketing success of this other
product, not the trademark. Exclusivity in the trademark is only needed to point consumers in
the right direction, and that function is preserved by protecting the mark's signaling fiinction.
Id. (emphasis in original). Professor Dreyfiuss constructs a theory of expressive genericity under which
courts faced with cases involving trademark uses that contain both expressive and signaling functions
could prohibit trademark owners from suppressing the use by others of a trademark in a context in
which the mark is "rhetorically unique." Id. at 418.
299. See supra part II.B.2.a.
300. But see infra notes 303-06 and accompanying text.
301. One commentator has distinguished those uses of an individual's name or likeness in an
advertisement in which the plaintiff is actually advertised as part of the product being sold from those
uses in which the plaintiff is "part of the rhetorical matter." See Theodore F. Haas, Storehouse of
Starlight: The First Amendment Privilege to Use Names and Likenesses in Commercial Advertising, 19
U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 539, 542 (1986).
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creative effort put forth by the unauthorized user. The use of celebrity
photographs on T-shirts with creative or double entendre slogans typify the
conflict between the celebrity's interest and that of the users in this con-
text.3 °2 Such examples also raise the argument that as a society, we must
have the ability to interpret and reestablish the meaning of cultural icons.
One rather interesting illustration of this argument is the adoption in the
1950's by the urban gay community of Judy Garland's image as a powerful
means of self-expression.0 3 In 1982, a gay greeting card company issued
a card which featured Garland as Dorothy in The Wizard of Oz in a gay bar,
with the inside message, "Toto, I don't think we're in Kansas anymore. ' '311
Should Garland's estate or her assignees have a right to object to such a
merchandising effort?305
302. Professor Madow offers many such examples, including the sale of a T-shirt featuring a
photograph of Leona Helmsley with the caption "Off With Her Head." See Madow, supra note 38, at
204-05. In the summer of 1994, T-shirts bearing pictures of Nicole and O.J. Simpson with various
captions cropped up everywhere.
An interesting recent case illustrates the problem presented by these types of commercial uses. In
Cardtoons v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 838 F. Supp. 1501 (N.D. Oki. 1993), the court was
confronted with the question of whether unlicensed trading cards containing parodies of active major
league baseball players violated the players' right of publicity. The plaintiff in the case, the trading card
company, was seeking a declaratory judgment that its actions were not violative of the players' right
of publicity. The defendant, the Major League Baseball Players Association, was the assignee of the
players' individual publicity rights. The issue presented was whether the plaintiff's parody trading cards
were protected by the First Amendment. The case was litigated under the Oklahoma right-of-publicity
statute. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1449(A).
According to the facts, the cards featured "caricatures of the players' faces and humorous commentary
about their careers." Id. at 1507. Although their names were changed, a person reasonably familiar with
baseball would be able to identify the players parodied on the cards.
The district court adopted the rather academic opinion of the U.S. magistrate. This opinion groped
for a framework in which the issue could be resolved and looked to the parody defense in both
trademark and copyright cases. Ultimately, the court found that the card company's profit motive was
decisive. Interestingly, however, the opinion refused to grant the Association's request for a preliminary
injunction because it failed to show that irreparable harm would occur if one did not issue. The opinion
stated that the state statute's provision for damages was adequate to redress any harm to the Association.
Thus, the case was set for trial, but as of this writing, no further action has been taken.
The analysis developed in this Article would have been of considerable assistance to the court in
grappling with the First Amendment. Clearly this is a case involving a commercial use containing
substantial creative contributions by the user. Rather than relying on trademark and copyright analogies,
and focusing exclusively on the card company's commercial motive, the court should have evaluated
the potential for decreased incentives, consumer deception, and unjust enrichment presented by the card
company's use. In considering the decreased incentives inquiry, the court also should have evaluated
whether the card company's use of any one player was de minimis. Moreover, the court's analysis
should have emphasized that the Association was objecting to a harm of a primarily economic nature,
and explicitly acknowledged the living status of all of the players depicted.
303. This phenomenon is discussed in Madow, supra note 38, at 194-95.
304. Id. at 195.
305. President and Mrs. Clinton now face a similar dilemma, as they have become the stars of a new
line of political greeting cards by Recycled Paper Greetings that make fun of various aspects of the
President's personality and past. The most popular card features a cartoon of the First Couple with the
following inside inscription: "See-there are scarier things than growing older. Happy Birthday." When
asked what the President thinks of this new venture, a White House spokesperson supposedly replied:
"He would ask only one question: Does this profit-making enterprise balance its disservice to the
community with community service somehow, somewhere, and summer jobs for youth?" As of the time
this reply was issued, the President reportedly had not seen the new line of greeting cards. Candace
Bushnell, People Are Talking About: Birthday Bill, VOGUE, Sept. 1994, at 167, 178.
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This example is difficult because it juxtaposes a traditionally commercial
use with a strong freedom of expression element It also involves a potentially
morally based objection by the interested parties. The approach suggested in
this Article calls for a balancing of the societal benefits against the potential
harms in fashioning a resolution. On the benefits side is a strong societal
entitlement to the use of Garland's persona. On the harms side is the morally
based objection to Garland's association with the gay movement, the
diminished marketing value of Garland's image, and the potential for unjust
enrichment on the part of the greeting card company. Nevertheless, if this
Author were deciding the case, the scales would be tipped in favor of the
greeting card company with respect to both injunctive relief and damages. On
the issue of injunctive relief, Garland's moral objection is especially
compelling because it is of the reputational variety. Still, the case presents a
fairly low capacity for consumer deception. Moreover, Garland has been dead
for more than twenty-five years, 0 6 and therefore society's interest in being
able to reestablish the meaning of her persona must be accorded special
importance. As a society, we must be able to redefine the meaning of cultural
icons, even if such articulations are likely to offend the sensibilities of those
who currently are seeking to preserve the images of these icons.
With respect to an award of mandatory damages, the plaintiff's case is
strengthened by the fact that this case contains elements of unjust enrichment
and presents at least a fair probability that the defendant would pay to
continue its use. However, the timing of Garland's death also furnishes a
particularly strong reason for refusing to mandate compensation to Garland's
estate since presumably her relatives and assignees have already had a
substantial opportunity to capitalize on her publicity rights. In addition, it is
unlikely that consumers will believe that Garland's estate authorized, or was
in any way involved with, the marketing of the greeting cards.
The Judy Garland hypothetical can be compared with White v. Samsung
Electronics America, Inc.,"°7 which also raised the conflict between the First
Amendment and the right of publicity in a commercial setting. According to
the majority panel opinion, the plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact regarding
whether the defendant's use, in an advertisement, of a robot suggestive of
White violated the plaintiff's right of publicity.305 The dissent lamented the
majority's holding, and was clearly uncomfortable with the potential reach of
the opinion: "The majority's position seems to allow any famous person or
entity to bring suit based on any commercial advertisement that depicts a
character or role performed by the plaintiff.""°9 This concern was shared by
the dissent in the denial of the petition for a rehearing, who observed that the
306. Judy Garland died in 1969 at the age of 47. THE CONCISE COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra
note 268, at 308.
307. 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992), amended, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 19253 (9th Cir. Aug. 19,
1992), reh'g en banc denied, 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2443 (1993). See supra
notes 129-34 and accompanying text for a discussion of this case.
308. White, 971 F.2d at 1399.
309. Id. at 1407 (Alarcon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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majority opinion gives White "an exclusive right not in what she looks like
or who she is, but in what she does for a living.' '310 These concerns raise
the question as to whether the public derives a benefit from allowing White's
persona-at least as it was appropriated in the context of this case-to remain
free for use at the expense of White's publicity rights. Resolving this question
requires a determination of the degree to which society will be enriched by
being exposed to the clever use that Samsung made of White's persona, and
whether this benefit to society outweighs the harms suffered by White and the
public.
Notwithstanding the First Amendment concerns raised by the dissenters,
both in the original White opinion and in the denial of rehearing, the case can
initially be analyzed from the standpoint of whether the defendant did, in fact,
appropriate sufficient attributes of White's persona to merit liability in the
first place. Assuming this question is answered in the affirmative, a court
could still reasonably conclude that society's entitlement to Samsung's use of
White's persona in this context is not as great as was the gay greeting card
company's use in the Judy Garland example. The card company was using
Garland's persona to convey a message about what it means to be gay in our
society. Samsung was using White's persona to sell VCR's. Moreover, in
White, a stronger potential for consumer deception exists since people
reasonably could assume some form of sponsorship on the part of White.3 '
Perhaps another way to approach this distinction is to conclude that the card
company's use is not primarily commercial, notwithstanding the intent to sell
greeting cards. If courts had the discretion to determine what types of uses are
primarily commercial, this approach could be readily invoked.
In most instances involving unauthorized commercial appropriations, the
free speech interests are not nearly as strong as in the Garland example and
society's entitlements are significantly weaker. Moreover, as the foregoing
discussion illustrates, circumscribing the free choice of an individual in
commercial decisions regarding her persona entails a high degree of harm to
publicity plaintiffs, creates a strong potential for consumer confusion, and
results in a large potential for unjust enrichment on the part of the users.
Unauthorized commercial uses of a deceased's persona also create the
potential for significant harm to the deceased's relatives and assignees. These
observations compel the conclusion that forced uses of an individual's persona
typically should not be sanctioned when the use is primarily commercial in
nature. Along with an award of injunctive relief, an award of damages
compensating the plaintiff for the defendant's prior conduct should be
granted.1 2
310. White, 989 F.2d at 1515 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting), denying reh'g en banc to 971 F.2d 1395
(9th Cir. 1992), as amended by 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 19253 (9th Cir. Aug. 19, 1992).
311. See supra notes 129-34 and accompanying text.
312. It is important to add that even in a commercial setting, the nature of the injunctive relief can
be tailored to allow for First Amendment freedoms. In Allen v. National Video, Inc., for example, the
court noted that "the scope of injunctions against misleading commercial speech should be limited to
that necessary to avoid consumer confusion." 610 F. Supp. 612, 630 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). Thus, the court
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CONCLUSION
This Article has developed a framework within which the conflict between
the right of publicity and the First Amendment can be addressed. Although it
is impossible to devise a methodology that will easily resolve this conflict in
all situations, the approach suggested here focuses the inquiry by isolating
both the relevant harms, as well as the societal benefits or entitlements that
exist with respect to a particular use, and by measuring them against each
other. Moreover, the balancing process discussed herein recognizes that the
appropriate remedy in any given situation may vary according to the nature
of the relevant harms and entitlements. Thus, in certain instances, publicity
plaintiffs should be able to prevent any unauthorized use of their personas
under a property rule approach, whereas in other situations, a forced but
compensated use of an individual's persona should be allowed under a
liability rule approach. Occasionally, no protection for the plaintiff is
appropriate and the use should be allowed with no compensation forthcoming.
The balancing analysis developed in this Article suggests that publicity
plaintiffs typically should not be accorded any protection against informa-
tional uses, regardless of the format in which the information is conveyed.
The same result is warranted with respect to entertainment uses which
constitute pure fictionalizations. Regarding other entertainment uses as well
as visual depictions which convey information, the proposed balancing test
can result in no protection or liability rule protection for the publicity
plaintiff. In exceptional situations, property rule protection is also possible.
Primarily commercial uses generally should be enjoined. Publicity plaintiffs
who object to either hybrid commercial uses or commercial uses manifesting
substantial creativity by, or expressive needs of, the user can rdceive no
protection, liability rule protection, or property rule protection, depending on
the outcome of the proposed balancing analysis.
The Introduction mentioned several fact patterns which illustrate the tension
between the right of publicity and the First Amendment. This Article will
conclude by applying the balancing approach developed herein to the two
most recent of these cases. The first, Pirone v. MacMillan, Inc.," 3 involved
the use of three photographs of Babe Ruth in the defendant's Baseball
Engagement Calendar.1 4 The right side of every page in the calendar
consisted of a calendar for a particular week, supplemented by baseball trivia
linked to a particular date. The left side of every page featured a photograph
of a baseball player, ballfield, or other item of interest to baseball fans. Two
of the photographs involving Ruth appeared as photographs accompanying
refused to enjoin Allen's look-alike from ever appearing as a Woody Allen look-alike "since that could
interfere with his ability to make money and express himself in settings where there is no likelihood of
consumer confusion." Id. Instead, the court enjoined the defendant look-alike from appearing in
advertising in which a reasonable person might believe that the defendant was Allen or that Allen had
approved of his appearance. Id.; see also supra note 134.
313. 894 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1990).
314. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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particular weeks, and the third one appeared on the cover of the calendar." 5
The plaintiffs in Pirone were the daughters and licensees of Babe Ruth.
3 1
The Pirone case involved a visual depiction with strong informational
overtones. Ruth's heirs have a greater property interest in his visual depiction
than in statistics about Ruth's'baseball career. On the other hand, the use of
these photographs in a calendar such as the defendant's is informational in
nature. The cover photograph showed Ruth helping a small boy with his grip;
the photograph corresponding to the week of October 31 showed Ruth saluting
General John Pershing; and the photograph illustrating the week of December
5 showed a baseball autographed by Ruth.3 17 Had these photographs been
included in a book about baseball, their use would have been privileged. It is
difficult to articulate a rationale as to why a different result should obtain
with respect to their inclusion in a calendar, which in this case possesses a
strong informational component. 8 Notwithstanding the property interest in
Ruth's likeness, the societal entitlements in this informational setting are
strong.
A consideration of the relevant harms reveals that the plaintiffs in Pirone
did not appear to assert a morally based objection to the inclusion of Ruth's
photographs in the calendar. Instead, their grievance seemed to be based
entirely on economics. Moreover, both the district court and the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the potential for consumer confusion
as to sponsorship of the calendar was nonexistent." 9 The strong societal
entitlement, the lack of a morally based objection, and the lack of possible
consumer confusion compel the conclusion that injunctive relief is inappro-
priate in this case. On the other hand, if given a choice between forgoing the
option of using Ruth's likeness and paying for the use, it is plausible to
assume that the defendant would choose to pay. The inclusion of even three
photographs of Ruth in a calendar containing more than fifty-two pictures
probably should not be considered de minimis, given Ruth's stature and the
inclusion of his photograph on the cover of the calendar. The publication of
a baseball calendar probably would not be regarded as complete without some
pictures of the legendary "Babe." Thus, forcing the defendant to pay most
likely would not reduce the defendant's incentives to create in this particular
315. Pirone, 894 F.2d at 581.
316. The plaintiffs alleged trademark infringement, unfair competition, and violations of both the
common law right of publicity and the New York privacy statute. See NEW YORK Civ. RIGHTS LAW
§§ 50-51. The plaintiffs did not claim any particular ownership interests in the photographs in question.
Pirone, 894 F.2d at 581. The court did not reach the conflict between the right of publicity and the First
Amendment because it held that the plaintiffs were precluded from suing under the state privacy statute,
and that no common law right of publicity exists in New York. Id. at 585; see also supra note 26.
317. Pirone, 894 F.2d at 581.
318. Cf Beverley v. Choices Women's Medical Center, Inc., 587 N.E.2d 275 (N.Y. 1991); see also
supra notes 225-28 and accompanying text. Beverley is similar to Pirone in that both involve calendars
with informational components.
319. Pirone, 894 F.2d at 585. The Second Circuit held that summary judgment for defendant was
proper since the plaintiff had failed to present a material issue of fact on the likelihood-of-consumer-
confusion issue in its federal and common law trademark infringement counts.
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situation. The question then becomes whether, in light of the First Amendment
interests at stake, the defendant nonetheless should be required to pay.
This Article suggests that the fact that Babe Ruth has been dead for more
than forty-five years32 should tip the scales in favor of no mandated
compensation in this particular case. Ruth's family and assignees have already
had ample time to reap benefits from Ruth's publicity rights, and may
continue to do so in those jurisdictions where Ruth's descendible right of
publicity is still protected against commercial exploitation. Nevertheless, in
a conflict between the right of publicity and the First Amendment, the length
of time since Ruth's death should militate against forcing the defendant to pay
for the use of Ruth's likeness under the facts of Pirone.
In another recent case, Hampton v. Guare,32" ' the plaintiff sued the author
and producers of the play Six Degrees of Separation for using incidents from
his life without his permission. He also sued the publishers of the book
version and the company that had purchased the film rights. 322 The plaintiff
did not allege that the character in the play bore his name or even physically
resembled him, but instead focused on the play's use of true facts. The
plaintiff had masqueraded as the son of actor Sidney Poitier and had conned
wealthy Manhattan families into providing him with food, lodging, and
money. He stole property from all of the families with whom he had stayed.
Eventually, he was arrested and pled guilty to attempted burglary in the
second degree.32 3 In his complaint, the plaintiff alleged that he had created a
unique character with unique characteristics that are his "sole and exclusive
natural property. ' 324 The plaintiff also asserted that "since the Play was
mainly based on events of his life," the defendants had commercially
exploited his unique property, thereby violating his exclusive rights.325
Under the balancing analysis set forth in this Article, Hampton becomes a
relatively easy case. The plaintiff was asserting an economic objection to the
defendants' use of truthful information that was in the public domain.326
Notwithstanding the plaintiff's allegations, he was essentially attempting to
assert a property right over information. Balanced against the lack of the
plaintiff's property interest is the strong creative contribution on the part of
the respective defendants. Indeed, the success of the play undoubtedly was
largely attributable to their efforts. Thus, this case does not involve a strong
showing of unjust enrichment. Moreover, no potential for consumer confusion
appears to be present in this case since no mention is made of the defendants'
320. Babe Ruth died in 1948 at the age of 53. TEE CONCISE COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note
268, at 719.
321. 22 U.S.P.Q.2d 1713 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992).
322. Id. at 1714.
323. Id. He received a sentence of between one to four years. Id
324. Id. (quoting 8 of Complaint).
325. Id. As in Pirone, the Hampton court did not reach the First Amendment and right-of-publicity
conflict because it found the defendants' conduct not actionable under New York's privacy statute since
the plaintiffs name, portrait, or picture was not used. Id. at 1715.
326. The plaintiff in Hampton sought recovery of $100,000,000 in compensatory and punitive
damages. Id
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manipulation of the facts to impugn the plaintiff's integrity. Finally, this is a
case involving a strong entitlement on the part of the public with respect to
both the subject matter and the medium in which it was presented. Thus, an
analysis of both the relevant harms and societal benefits strongly favors the
defendants, who should be free to use this material concerning the plaintiff
without providing any compensation.327
If the right of publicity is to accomplish its intended objectives in a
meaningful fashion, it must come to terms with the First Amendment in an
intellectually honest manner that is tailored to accommodate the needs of both
doctrines. This Author's hope is that this proposal for a truce between these
two warring factions is a step toward the implementation of such a frame-
work.
327. From a factual standpoint, Hampton is similar to Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432 (5th Cir.
1994). In Matthews, the court addressed the potential conflict between the First Amendment and an
action for misappropriation of factual information in a fictionalized story. The court refused to hold the
defendant liable for including the plaintiff's life story, absent the use of his real name, in her novel: "As
there is no fear that any valuable information provided by the facts of one's life will be reduced by
repeated use, the law does not forbid the 'appropriation' of this information." Id. at 439. The holding
and rationale of Matthews are consistent with the thesis of this Article.
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APPENDIX A
MATRIX #1: RELATIONSHIP OF RELEVANT
HARMS TO REMEDIAL CHOICE
Type of PROPERTY LIABILITY NO
Harm RULE RULE PROTECTION
PROTECTION PROTECTION
Economic Economic objec- Evaluate Economic objec-
Harms to tions to economic tions to infor-
Plaintiff primarily com- objection with mational uses:
mercial uses: respect to type typically yes.
typically yes. of use.
Economic
Economic objections to
objections to hybrid uses:
hybrid uses: maybe yes.
maybe yes.
Moral Non- Evaluate Moral objections
Harms to informational strength of to informational
Plaintiff uses to which plaintiff's moral uses: typically
plaintiff would objections. yes.
never consent:
suggests yes. Invalid moral
objections:
typically yes.
Consumer Uses to which Evaluate degree Little or no risk:
Deception plaintiff would of consumer suggests yes.
never consent: deception.
suggests yes.
Deceased Strong risk that Evaluate risk Little risk that
Incentives plaintiff will that plaintiff plaintiff will
refrain from will refrain refrain from
creating absent from creating creating absent
injunction: absent protection:
suggests yes. protection. suggests yes.
Evaluate risk De minimis
that defendant uses: typically
will refrain yes.
from creating if
forced to pay.
Harms to Plaintiff alive or Evaluate use Plaintiff dead
Relatives dead for less with respect to for more than 20
than 20 years: lifespan of years: suggests
suggests yes. persona. yes.
Unjust High potential: Evaluate Low potential:
Enrichment suggests yes. potential. suggests yes.
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APPENDIX B
MATRIX #2: RELATIONSHIP OF SOCIETY'S
ENTITLEMENTS TO REMEDIAL CHOICE
Type of Use Property Liability No
Rule Rule Protection
Protection Protection
Informational Unlikely. Visual Depictions conveying Typically.
information: balance will result
in liability rule protection or no
protection; property rule
protection possible in
:exceptional circumstances.
Type of Use Property Liability No
Rule Rule Protection
Protection Protection
Entertainment Yes in Yes Yes Pure fiction-
exceptional depending depending alizations:
circumstances. on balance. on : typically yes.
balance.
Commercial
Property Rule Liability No
Protection Rule Protection
Protection
Primarily Hybrid use; commer- I Primarily
commercial use: I cial use with i commercial
typically yes. expressive needs of/or use: unlikely.
substantial creative
contribution by user:
property rule, liability
i rule, or no protection,
depending on balance.
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